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GREAT EXPECTATIONS: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 
AND THE PROMISE OF TECHNOLOGY BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  
A CASE STUDY 
 
American research universities, especially over the past 30 years, have 
increasingly become involved in technology transfer activities. For public land grant 
institutions, involvement is largely inspired by a desire to maximize revenue 
opportunities and demonstrate economic relevance. This intrinsic case study addresses 
the efforts of a public, land grant and flagship institution, the University of Kentucky, to 
augment its technology transfer activities, with a specific focus on its attempts to spin off 
university technology-based firms. The data were gathered primarily through oral history 
interviews with technology transfer personnel, entrepreneurs, and spinoff personnel. Its 
purpose is to understand better the structure of the university’s technology transfer 
operations, the impact of changes in institutional administration and priorities on these 
efforts, and variables that challenge and accommodate accomplishment of organizational 
goals. The findings of this study indicate that the structure of technology transfer 
operations at the university is complex, and somewhat confounding. Administrative 
changes impact various groups differently than others, and a major challenge to the 
accomplishment of goals is funding. Moreover, distinct but related groups seem to lack 
consistent, overarching goals. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
An Overview of Technology Transfer 
Over the past three decades, much focus has been placed on university technology 
transfer (TT) efforts.  Technology transfer is “university activities that are directly or 
indirectly linked with the private sector, like patenting and licensing, launching and 
nurturing new firms, conducting research for industry, and cultivating academic fields 
that contribute to technological advance” (Geiger & Sá, 2008, p, 1). One significant goal 
of institutional technology transfer operations, particularly among public institutions, is 
technology-based economic development (TBED) (Geiger & Sá, 2008). Overall, 
institutions concentrate on patenting and licensing for revenue generation (Mowery, 
Nelson, R., Nelson, B., & Ziedonis, 2004). Public institutions of higher education, in 
particular, have done so to compensate for a decline in state support, a central source of 
revenue (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Moreover, one rationale for TT from public 
institutions and federal and state policy makers is that early involvement by prestigious 
universities led to the development of technopoles, where university-industry 
collaborations have resulted in local economic development (Woodward, Figueiredo, and 
Guimarães, 2006). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, as part of a broad shift toward stronger 
intellectual property rights, is largely considered an enticement for reluctant institutions 
to enter into the field, as well (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007).  
University newcomers have not generally seen comparable economic development 
outcomes. These newly participating institutions have been associated with a high 
volume of patents with low commercial value (Mowery, et al. 2004). In addition, many 
question the legitimacy of TBED efforts, noting that institutional revenues and economic 
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data are skewed by outliers. The bulk of revenue from patenting and licensing at 
Columbia, Stanford, and the University of California system (all historically dominant 
among commercially active institutions) is derived from a small number of home run 
patents, that have led to uncharacteristically large institutional royalties, as well as local 
development of associated firms (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007, p. 169). Overall, 
measurements of research and development investments of universities indicate that their 
strongest economic contribution remains in the development of human capital (Geiger & 
S a, 2005). 
Research and assessments of university TBED initiatives are often conducted in three 
manners. Outcomes assessments and rankings of university TBED are derived through 
data collected by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM). AUTM 
annually collects data based on fundamental metrics of the number of: invention 
disclosures to the technology transfer office, patents (applied for and granted), licenses 
procured, and revenue (from licensing agreements, investment liquidation, intellectual 
property sales, and legal settlements). AUTM data influence virtually all scholarly 
attempts to evaluate and compare outcomes of technology transfer execution at 
universities [National Research Council (NRC), 2010]. Others, examining the notable 
differences in outcomes between universities (based on AUTM measures), have generally 
sought out variables that could contribute to these differences. Results indicate factors 
such as governance (public or private status), institutional prestige, and presence of 
academic units are often correlated with performance outcomes (Geiger & Sá, 2008; 
Graham & Diamond, 1997; Lowen, 1997; NRC, 2010). A third group of scholars has 
approached research universities, and technology transfer (TT) operations, from the long 
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view. Framing their studies from a historical perspective, these researchers address the 
evolution of institutions’ research enterprises. For example, Graham and Diamond (1997) 
and Geiger (2009), consider university research primarily from a historical perspective, 
studying the relationships between both manifest (conscious changes that, at the time, 
may have been unremarkable) and latent (shifts in structures, economic patterns, or 
culture) events. Their purposes include eliciting objective descriptions, measuring 
change, and analyzing consequences of circumstances (Kyvig & Marty, 2000).  Each 
presents aggregate level themes of institutional research and policymaking over time, 
presenting brief case studies of institutional efforts to serve as examples of themes at a 
particular juncture. While others specifically address TBED at the aggregate level, 
providing brief case studies to demonstrate themes among institutions and policymakers 
(see Bok, 2003; Geiger & Sa, 2008; Mowery et al., 2004; Thorp & Goldstein, 2010; and 
Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007). Lowen, alternatively, presents a detailed account of a single 
institution. Her work addresses Stanford’s research enterprise, comprised of historical 
data from the early twentieth century to the early 1990s, as a close examination of an 
institution’s increased involvement in research initiatives that has grown into one of the 
most successful and highly regarded examples of TBED (1997). 
The literature also examines institutional attempts to replicate previous university 
success. Studies of specific areas and comparative analyses have outlined technopole 
development; combined areas of high-tech industry and business housed in centers 
purposely developed around renowned universities and research institutes, and suggest 
that economic development results are given (Woodward, Figueiredo, and Guimarães). In 
areas without well-established records in science and engineering research, and for 
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universities without medical research centers, economic growth is not a guarantee (2006; 
Geiger & Sá, 2008).  Various empirical methods have been used to measure local 
spillovers (where exploitation of university research leads to local economic benefit), 
distinctive areas, and urban centers [Graham & Diamond, 1997; National Research 
Council (NRC), 2010]. The institutions that derive millions of dollars per year in revenue 
from commercial activities, note that, less operating costs, the revenue amounts to a small 
fraction of their annual research budgets (Mowery, et al 2004; Yusuf & Nabeshima, 
2007). Therefore, the phenomena of economic growth related to technology transfer are 
approached from a number of perspectives.  
Institutional characteristics, such as governance, prestige, and presence of specific 
academic units, are correlated with contemporary outcome variations among diverse 
institutions. Some of the variables found to contribute to performance differences across 
institutions include existence or lack of medical schools/clinical operations, public or 
private standing, and presence or absence of incentive pay for technology transfer 
personnel (NRC). Yet peer comparisons continue to demonstrate extensive variations in 
areas such as revenue, disclosure rates, active licenses, and university spinoff  (USO) 
(new firms launched from institutional technology) activity (2012). Aspirational 
institutions that have enhanced their research programs demonstrate similarities through 
access to resources and targeted administrative direction (Geiger, 2009). These 
characteristics, however, do not appear to produce a consistent formula for TBED.  
Geography, interpreted as “assets and resources already available in a geographic 
area” (Jackson & Audretsch, p. 119), is perhaps the most significant preliminary measure 
of available resources for technology transfer. The location of preeminent research 
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universities is a factor that lends itself to government investment in human capital 
development through technology transfer. Government initiatives include innovative 
funding and ownership opportunities that can promote development of area human 
capital. Two important byproducts of government investments are enhancement of 
institutional recognition by the business community and employment opportunities in the 
area through firm development (2004). In addition, successful TT operations are 
generally housed within top-ranked institutions. Top-ranked universities or clusters 
experience a halo
 
effect, wherein their draw is greater than the quality of research can 
justify (Hedge, 2005, as cited by DeYoung & Baas, 2012).  This can complicate 
examinations of TBED initiatives, because halo effects can be difficult to measure, but a 
significant factor in firm location and development, leading to economic growth.  
Regarding targeted administrative goals, Geiger & Sá note that in a number of cases, 
university presidents or chancellors have significantly contributed to the success of TT at 
their institutions.  Richard Levin effectually integrated Yale’s portfolio with the 
pharmaceutical business in Connecticut. Martin Jischke, at Purdue, asserted the potential 
of his land grant university’s innovations, and Steven Sample of the University of 
Southern California promoted a university-wide charge for innovation. Prior to his 
emphasis on public and economic welfare, Sample advanced undergraduate admissions 
and faculty prominence, i.e., academic quality, which is considered an antecedent of 
successful technology transfer. While several university presidents have embraced similar 
models to promote TBED through innovation, for the vast majority, their share in the 
possibility of new discoveries appears negligible (2008).    
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Technology transfer, moreover, is an enterprise. Geiger contends that the study of 
research institutions encompasses the relationships of contributing entities (2009). 
Studies of research universities fre uently address the  uintessential role of institutions in 
knowledge creation, as part of their complex missions (see Bok, 2003  Geiger, 2009  
Geiger & Sa , 2008; Graham & Diamond, 1997; Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007).  
Researchers, such as Lowen (1997), have provided extensive studies of individual 
institutions’ historical commitments to their research missions, including technology 
transfer. Others have examined, through social narratives, the evolution of American 
research universities over several decades, noting that the period subsequent to World 
War II, primarily due to expanded federal support, suggests the greatest accomplishments 
in knowledge expansion (see Geiger, 2009; Graham & Diamond, 1997). Research 
universities have significantly transformed, in terms of the intellectual and scientific areas 
practiced and taught, and their recognized societal roles during this time (Lowen, 1997). 
As research universities have evolved over the past century, a major aspect of their 
societal roles is now considered technology transfer; and particularly for public 
universities, technology based economic development.  
Yet, the results of these studies do not consistently overarch. Successful TT 
operations are the exception, rather than the rule. Institutions traditionally benchmark 
their progress utilizing quantitative data that accommodate large and long-established 
research institutions. While over the past three decades, newly participating institutions 
have continued to emerge. Case studies can offer historical context to understand 
outcomes as part of a broader, continuous shift in higher education policy.  
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Three points are clear from the contemporary body of research. First, attempts to 
compare institutional outcomes by accepted quantitative standards (i.e., metrics derived 
from AUTM’s principles) provide a snapshot of the results, without regard to other 
qualitative variables, such as historical involvement and unique institutional 
characteristics. Second, institutional characteristics, such as governance, prestige, and 
presence of specific academic units, are correlated with snapshot outcome variations 
among a broad range of institutions. Finally, the experiences of public institutions are 
distinct from those of private institutions, based upon their unique missions and influence 
by public policy.  
The Complexity of Institutional Comparisons 
Researchers have noted a general contrast between the results of technology transfer 
initiatives at publicly and privately funded universities (see Geiger & Sá, 2008; Graham 
& Diamond, 1997; Lowen, 1997; Marginson, 2007; NRC, 2010). The National Research 
Council has recently noted that comparisons of peer institutions continue to yield 
ambiguous results. Grouping institutions by similar characteristics consistently results in 
large variations in: the amount of patenting and licensing, spinoff corporations, and 
revenue. Examinations of structural factors (which are difficult or impossible to change), 
such as governance, prestige, and presence of specific academic units may account for 
differences in output among various institutions, but not between institutions with 
comparable characteristics (NRC, 2010). A university’s potential for intellectual property 
generation is dependent upon the interaction of a few factors, but the size and 
effectiveness of the technology transfer office can have a substantial influence on 
outcomes (Jackson & Audretsch, 2004; Geiger & Sá, 2008).  Along the same lines, the 
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NRC recently argued that it would be valuable to study the degree to which disparate 
results illustrate institutional differences in non-structural factors (which are in some 
ways controllable), hypothesizing that variables such as organizational structure, 
personnel, and funding sources of technology transfer offices may be associated with 
varied outcomes. “[A] more fine grain analysis could be revealing…but this work for the 
most part remains to be done” (2010, p.52). Moreover, because of the economic impact 
from development of regional technology clusters, in areas of the country such as 
California’s Silicon Valley, North Carolina’s Research Triangle, and Massachusetts’ 
Route 128, technology based economic development has become an objective of 
technology transfer for public institutions (Hedge, 2005).  
Issues with Aggregate Measurements 
As the National Research Council suggests, the data concerning technology transfer 
initiatives at universities are complex. The exploitation of university intellectual property 
(IP) through licensing or development of USOs is more fre uently “discussed, measured, 
 uantified, and debated” (p. 17) than any other aspects of TT. While a large amount of 
research has been conducted concerning university patenting and licensing activities, 
there remains limited consistency among the results (2010).  
The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) is a professional 
organization whose mission is to “support and advance academic technology transfer 
globally” (AUTM Board of Directors-Missions and Goals, 2012). Since 1991, AUTM 
has conducted a set of annual surveys to capture data, including, IP disclosed by faculty, 
patents awarded, licensing activity, and number of startups, i.e., USOs (NRC, 2010). 
While patenting and licensing are significant aspects of the technology transfer process, 
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summing the number of IP disclosures, patent applications and awards, and licensing 
agreements is not a robust measurement of the effectiveness of an institution’s 
technology transfer enterprise. While the process of quantification is relatively clear-cut, 
its use as a measurement yields at least three significant issues.  
First, data are voluntarily self-reported by institutions. Participation fluctuates each 
year. It is unclear whether some institutions purposely choose not to respond during 
periods of what could be considered low activity (NRC, 2010).  Second, the volume of 
patents, licenses, and USOs is not necessarily indicative of technology performance. That 
is, the quality of patents (which could eventually be licensed or spun off) differs 
considerably. As Yusuf & Nabeshima contend, some of the motives for patenting and 
licensing activities range from regional/state economic development policy directives to 
retention of faculty who are interested in pursuing patents and licenses for their IP. A 
large number of patents awarded fail to be cited or actively applied as technology.  
Moreover, the value of patent portfolios typically comes from either a single, or a small 
number, of successful technologies (2007). Using technology transfer activities to satisfy 
parties, rather than pursuing strong intellectual property, devalues the portfolio; and 
muddies the waters.  
Finally, interpreting financial returns from licensing activities, as reported to AUTM 
by institutions, can be problematic. Costs associated with areas, such as TT office 
operations and patent prosecution, detract from the bottom line. Concurrently, aggregate 
institutional revenue results are misleading. Higher licensing revenue from a minority of 
institutions inflates the incomes of the sample institutions, relative to research 
expenditures.  Note that the AUTM survey reflects R&D budgets, but not total operating 
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budgets. In fiscal year 2007, the mean institutional licensing revenue, (represented as a 
percentage of research costs from the AUTM Licensing Activity Survey: FY 2007) was 
4.1%, while the median was 0.9% (NRC). Three outlying institutions represented 
licensing income as 65%, 69%, and 266% of research expenditures (2012). Even among 
institutions with historically successful technology transfer operations, licensing revenue 
represents a small amount of capital, compared to total budgets. In 2007, Stanford 
University earned $50 million from 986 licenses (NRC). However, its research 
expenditures were $700 million. Excluding the capital and clinical operations budgets, 
Stanford’s total budget for that year was $3.8 billion  indicating that licensing revenue 
amounted to a recovery of 1.3% of its operating costs. MIT and the University of 
Washington’s licensing income for that period represent similar percentages of total 
budget recovery at 2.8% and 2.3%, respectively (2012). Further confounding analysis, as 
noted above, the bulk of monetary value in a portfolio is generally comprised of a small 
amount of strongly performing patents. Among Columbia University, Stanford 
University, and the University of California System, institutions with traditions of 
successful licensing operations, greater than sixty-five percent of their gross licensing 
revenues were procured from their top five performing patents for fiscal years 2001-2004 
(Mowery et al., 2004; Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007). As such, aggregated technology 
transfer data from the AUTM database of surveys can make interpretation of specific, 
goal-oriented results difficult.  
Characteristics Attributable to Institutional Results 
In an attempt to reconcile the data concerning institutions and technology transfer, 
Turk- Bicakci & Brint considered less successful institutions; noting that efforts to 
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understand growth and performance of top institutional performers in technology transfer 
is the focus of a large number of studies. Such works attempt to establish variables that 
contribute to success in technology transfer involvement. While studies have provided 
some characteristics that yield strong results, little focus has been granted to institutions 
considered mid or low level performers. Subsequently, it is unclear whether the same 
characteristics affect the majority of institutions involved in technology transfer (2005). 
That is, the body of research has largely established variables that may lead to successful 
TT operations, not whether the absence of such variables is strongly correlated with 
lower performance.   
Turk-Bicakci & Brint’s study of mid and low performing institutions, examining 
AUTM data from 1990-2000, uses three measures: industry research and development 
funding, number of licenses, and licensing income. Their findings suggest that factors 
such as prestige, private or public status, and characteristics of technology transfer offices 
affect the revenue earned by low and mid level institutional performers. They note that 
their analysis indicates, while many researchers assume that the same factors contribute 
to licensing volume and revenue, it is not the case. Their measurements suggest that 
emphasis on science and engineering technology transfer and economic strength are 
strongly correlated with corporate funding and licensing volume. However, only industry 
backing is strongly correlated with licensing revenue.  Industry partnerships increase 
based on the presence of a medical school to generate research. Moreover, a large staff in 
technology transfer offices assists with generation of a large number of licenses and 
increased licensing revenues. A significant finding of the study is that, specifically, 
public land grant status is correlated with higher levels of industry R&D funding, but 
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yields no significant influence on licensing counts or income. The authors suggest that 
many land grant institutions may accommodate their historic commitment to conduct 
research for industry more easily than to produce intellectual property for commercial 
purposes. They also contend, based on the unique differences between public and private 
governance, that increased licensing revenue can be greatly attributed to a university’s 
private operating status (2005).  
Aside from Turk-Bicakci & Brint’s findings specific to public land grant universities’ 
(PLGUs) R&D funding, license volume and revenue, their results are comparable to 
others. For example, Woodward, et al. also suggest that well-established records in 
science and engineering research and medical research centers are correlated with 
successful technology transfer operations (2006). Geiger and Sá propose that institutional 
potential for generating IP (and subsequent licenses and revenues), is dependent upon 
four interacting variables:  
1. The volume of research in patent-rich fields (including science and engineering);  
2. The quality of academicians conducting research;  
3. The degree of entrepreneurial encouragement within the faculty culture; and 
4. The size and competence of the technology transfer office (which can serve as an 
independent factor) (2008).  
Slaughter and Leslie have also addressed the governance status of institutions, 
indicating that the funding options of private institutions are not the same as public 
institutions. Therefore, their engagement in technology transfer is not driven by the 
same factors as public universities (1997) and cannot be compared symmetrically. 
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 In terms of faculty entrepreneurism, collaborative efforts are challenged by 
contrasts between academic and corporate cultures. Role misconceptions, project 
timeframes, and research objectives can lead to conflict in sponsored project 
administration (Ford, Shino, Sander, & Harden, 2008). In addition, university and 
corporate missions are not reflective of each other (Martin, Gruetzmacher, Lanham & 
Brady). They embrace different success metrics, as well as values. While corporate 
agendas are quickly refocused, institutions are tethered to traditional commitments 
that are not easily transformed. There are also structural variants, such as staffing and 
organization. The core unit of the decentralized university is the academic 
department, which naturally embodies disciplinary similarities. Their focus, even 
formally organized across disciplines, is distinct from the market driven focus of 
large corporations (2004, Mendoza & Berger, 2005). 
Economic Development Through University Technology Transfer Operations 
Economic development has become a significant aspect of public institutions’ service 
mission at the local and regional level (Geiger & Sá). The indication that local spillovers 
of university research can stimulate economic growth has pushed many public 
universities to encourage spinoff development: homegrown companies whose technology 
is derived from institutional intellectual property. Such endeavors are also increasingly 
promoted by public policymakers (2008; Jackson & Audretsch, 2004; Hedge, 2005; 
Geiger, 2006).  
Research on technology transfer frequently addresses patenting, licensing of patent 
technology, and spinoff development as a continuum. All of these processes comprise the 
technology transfer process. However, a small number of patents are licensed or spun off 
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into new technology businesses (Mowery, et al., 2004; Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007). 
While licensing agreements can bring in some revenue to institutions, university spinoffs 
are likely “the most distinctive net addition to economic activity by universities” (Geiger 
& Sá, p. 133), because successful spinoffs have the potential to create jobs within their 
firms. University spinoffs, though, are also burdened with finding a business need that 
must to be met, limited funding opportunities and lengthy development processes, and 
inventors with high expectations and limited managerial or marketing skills (2008; 
Martin, et al., 2004; NRC, 2010).   
During the NRC’s 2008 consensus study of university IP management, the 
committees involved heard oral presentations from a number of university officials and 
venture capitalists. Some of the investors argued that universities played no valuable part 
in spinoff development, other than providing and licensing any fundamental intellectual 
property. Nonetheless, university officers described a number of profoundly different 
programs to promote spinoffs as successful. A model befitting a technopole, with access 
to large amounts of venture capital, relies merely on networking between faculty 
inventors and early-stage investors. On the opposite end of the spectrum, are a number of 
institutional models that offer a single program or a number of collaborative services. 
Some provide a separate innovation center from the technology transfer office, where 
technology transfer personnel assist with financing IP until it is attractive to investors. 
Others employ graduate business students to develop business plans for faculty or student 
technologies.  Some institutions manage alumni seed capital funds, while an additional 
model provides incubators or research parks where novice spinoffs can share economical 
space and services. Based on its study, the NRC concludes that while some operational 
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characteristics are common, there is little evidence to offer a standard model for 
technology transfer operations to initiate spinoff success. Moreover, 
Authors of literature surveys agree that empirical research has yet to produce 
 consistent findings. DiGreggorio and Shane write: ‘We find no effect of local 
 venture capital activity and only limited support for an effect of the commercial 
 orientation of university research on technology transfer office start up rates…the 
 presence of a university-affiliated incubator and whether or not the university is 
 permitted to actively make venture capital investments in licenses-do not appear 
 to have an impact on start-up  activity.’ (p. 55, 2010) 
 
At the same time, policymakers continue to promote university technology transfer for 
economic development purposes. 
Public Policy and Technology Based Economic Development (TBED) 
 The federal government, as well as many state governments, establishes policies 
to try to encourage healthy economies (Geiger & Sá). Universities do not generally play a 
large role in these types of policies, but do expedite innovation through their research 
activities. Specific policies impacting research institutions are generally technology based 
economic development policies; directed at science or technology innovations. A primary 
difference between federal and state policies is the direction of innovation benefits. 
Whereas federal policies are targeted at collaboration between institutions and large firms 
for national economic growth, state policies address retention of any economic benefits 
through the work of small to mid-level technology businesses (2008).   
In the post-World War II era, federal R&D funding for research universities has 
underscored an American position that the national government should maintain a 
significant commitment to advancement of scientific knowledge for public good (Geiger 
& Sá). For over 50 years, American institutions have conducted approximately half of the 
country’s basic research (2008). Although its true impact on university engagement in 
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technology transfer is debated (see Mowery, et al., 2004), the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 is 
largely cited as a catalyst for the emergence of TT operations among institutions for the 
past 30 years (see Bok, 2003; Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007; Geiger & Sá, 2008; Thorp & 
Goldstein, 2010). Post Bayh-Dole, a number of federal initiatives, including legislation to 
provide funding for SBIR grants in 1982, and later STTR funding (1992), have aided 
universities in the technology transfer process (Geiger & Sá). Although, the grants are 
highly competitive and awards tend to be clustered among a small number of states, 
California and Massachusetts are frequent recipients (2008).  
State policy makers have also increasingly supported technology based economic 
development efforts. Geiger & Sá argue that state policy makers take different 
approaches to TBED based on variables like the local economy, traditional investments 
in research universities, and the local or regional business environment. Part of the initial 
wave of TBED legislation arose from the states’ negotiation of the Master Tobacco 
Settlement Agreement, where high taxes on tobacco products brought states extra 
funding. The strong economy of the late 1990s, coupled with the emergence of the 
biotechnology industry, led policy makers to invest portions of the funds into biotech 
research. The hope was to establish area technology clusters. This was particularly 
important for startup companies and spinoffs, because they were understood as the 
primary instruments for innovation and job growth. The other approach taken by state 
legislators was to exploit existing federal funding opportunities. In 2006, 21 states 
earmarked funds for investment in pre-seed or seed-stage startup companies. Twenty-
seven states allocated funds for venture capital investments (2008).  
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Purpose of the Case Study 
 This is an intrinsic case study for descriptive and exploratory purposes. Its major 
objective is to provide a greater understanding of the factors that influence the spinoff 
aspect of technology based economic development activities at the University of 
Kentucky (UK). The study examines the perspectives of a purposive sample of 
technology transfer personnel, technology investors, and officers with three university-
based technologies, through oral histories of their experiences. The study addresses the 
structure of the technology transfer organization, any influences a recent administrative 
change may have on pursuit of organizational goals, and participants’ impressions of 
variables that challenge or enhance the realization of goals. The findings of this study 
could contribute to future research of TBED operations at public flagship and land grant 
universities. However, this study is interpretivist and inductive. It is not meant to be 
generalizable. Consistent with a qualitative approach (Glesne, 2006); this study is not a 
hypothesis test. The National Research Council’s hypothesis that the existence of non-
structural factors may contribute to varied outcomes, nonetheless, influences this attempt 
at greater understanding of the case site’s attempts at pursuing a technology based 
economic development enterprise.  
Research Questions 
The objective of this study is operationalized by the following research questions: 
1. How can the organizational structure of the TBED enterprise at the University of 
Kentucky be described? 
2. From an organizational perspective, what are the goals of UK’s TBED enterprise, 
as perceived by affiliated professionals? 
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3. What are the challenges to the TBED enterprise’s goals, as perceived by affiliated 
professionals? 
4. What goals have been achieved by the TBED enterprise, as perceived by affiliated 
professionals? 
5. What factors, as perceived by affiliated professionals, have influenced challenges 
and achievements to the TBED enterprises’ goals? 
Definitions and Terminology 
In practice and throughout the research literature, several terms are used 
interchangeably in reference to technology transfer operations. For the purpose of this 
study, the terms indicated throughout will refer to the following: 
1.  Technology transfer (TT) can be understood from two vantage points. First, is its 
literal definition “university activities that are directly or indirectly linked with the 
private sector, like patenting and licensing, launching and nurturing new firms, 
conducting research for industry, and cultivating academic fields that contribute 
to technological advance” (Geiger & Sá, 2008, p, 1). The second perspective is its 
relation to public benefits, wherein “moving advances in knowledge and 
technology into the commercial stream” (NRC, p. 16) allows universities to 
promote the public good. Under this guise, universities are considered 
accountable to the public, based on a sixty-year tradition of large government 
(tax) investitures into university research. That is, public institutions are expected 
to conduct basic and applied research that positively influences the community 
(2010).  
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2. Technology based economic development (TBED) relates to a specific economic 
development goal of technology transfer. Economic development has resulted 
from a number of university TT operations. Studies have correlated the 
development of specific urban, high-tech economies, with the TT efforts of 
renowned universities and research institutes (Woodward, Figueiredo, and 
Guimarães, 2006). Therefore, TBED has evolved into a goal of university 
technology transfer operations, rather than a derivative.  Such a goal is understood 
as resultant of several contingencies: the comparative strength of the United 
States economy relies on innovation; this concept has been integrated into state 
and national public policy; and for universities, especially public land grant 
institutions, their missions have evolved to include demonstration of their 
economic relevance. Thus, institutions have modified their traditional research 
roles to encompass economic development goals (Geiger & Sá, 2008; Yusuf & 
Fink, 2007). For the purpose of this study, TBED will be used to refer exclusively 
to activities related to the university spinoff aspect of technology transfer for 
economic development. 
3. Spinoff generally refers to a circumstance that meets three conditions, 
simultaneously (Pirnay, F., Surlemont, B., & Nlemvo, F.):  
1. It occurs within an existing parent organization. 
2. It involves one or more individuals, regardless of position or capacity 
within the organization. 
3. The individual(s) exit the parent organization to develop a new 
organization (2003). 
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As Pirnay, et al. suggest, the university spinoff (USO), or university startup is unique, 
though, in that it considers “many facets of a complex fuzzy reality” (p. 356). It is a 
specific type of spinoff, generated from the university as its parent organization (2003). 
However, ventures can be considered USOs even when researchers or students have 
spent an indeterminate period between exiting the university and forming the new firm. 
By Roberts, McMullan and Vesper’s (1987, as cited by Pirnay, et al., 2003) logic, the 
idea leading to the new firm is derived from cumulative knowledge amassed while 
connected with the university, regardless of intermediate employment.  In that respect, 
USOs can fall into one of four of the following broad categories based upon the 
“individual(s) status” (irrespective of current employment/enrollment at the university) 
and “nature of knowledge transferred” (Pirnay, et al, p. 361): 
1. Researcher/Codified: a product-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea 
developed by a researcher(s); 
2. Researcher/Tacit: a service-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea 
developed by a researcher(s); 
3. Student/Codified: a product-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea 
developed by a student(s); and 
4. Student/Tacit: a service-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea developed by 
a student(s) (2003). 
 This classification demonstrates the way in which outcomes measurement for 
spinoffs can be difficult. Such broad categorizations can blur the lines between what 
different institutions consider USO activities, particularly, those activities that involve 
students and researchers who have left institutions for lengths of time. There is not a clear 
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cutoff point, with which to determine if a venture is no longer university affiliated. In 
terms of measurement, affiliation is left up to an institution to resolve. This can lead to 
varying institutional interpretations of what does and does not constitute a USO.  
Additional terms utilized throughout the study 
Startup Financing: There are five rounds generally referenced in startup funding 
(Kelly). These include Seed Capital, Angel Investments, Venture Capital (also known as 
Alphabet Rounds), Mezzanine Financing and Bridge Loans, and Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) (2013). The classifications of startup financing referenced in this study include 
seed capital, Angel investments, and Venture Capital. 
1. Seed Capital:  Commonly, seed capital is the initial investment into a product or 
technology. Entrepreneurs often acquire seed capital from personal savings; 
personal credit cards, or approach friends and family for investments. At this 
stage, private individuals either loan the entrepreneur capital or provide financing 
in exchange for common stock in the company. Due to the low likelihood of a 
return, these individuals are collo uially called the “Triple Fs: friends, family, and 
fools” (Interview C, 2012).   
2. Angel Investors: Wealthy individuals outside of friends and family are known as 
Angel investors. Investments from Angels are often loans that are convertible into 
preferred stock.  Preferred stock (also known as preferred shares) differs from 
common stock, in that its owners have a greater claim to assets and earnings. In 
general, the dividend(s) must be paid prior to common stock payouts. Moreover, 
preferred stockholders rarely have voting rights in the company. With preferred 
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stock, there are both fixed dividends (debt) and potential appreciation (equity) 
(Investopedia, 2013).   
 The term Angel is derived from the theatre. Historically, when individuals 
attempted to present a show on stage, it required capital. Because of their ability 
to save a production, individuals or groups who invested in a show were known as 
Angels. The expectation was that a successful production would lead to a return 
on investments. Angel investments, however, did not require a great deal of 
ownership in the production. The term refers to both the ability to save a 
production and the role of Angel as a benefactor for the arts. Although 
contemporary Angel investors are not christened patrons of entrepreneurship, the 
term has carried over in reference to their early stage involvement in startup 
companies (Interview C, 2012).  
Angel investors must be accredited. Essentially, Angels practice “self-
accreditation” (Interview A, 2012). The Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulates Angel investing. In effect, companies seeking Angel funds are not 
required to disclose the same information as they would in later financing rounds. 
However, Angel investors accept this risk through their protected, accredited 
status. In order to obtain accredited status, individual investors must certify that 
they have $1,000,000 in assets, excluding their primary residence. An individual 
must have income exceeding $200,000 for each of the two most recent years. 
Alternatively, an individual and spouse may have joint income of $300,000 for 
those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income during the current 
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year [Interview A, 2012; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2012]. In 
general, Angel investors have high net income worth. 
3. Venture Capital Financing: Venture Capital (VC), also known as Alphabet 
Round financing, is commonly provided to companies that have developed a 
product or service, and are distributing or selling it, but are not yet profitable. 
Venture capital is often used to counterbalance negative cash flow. Venture 
capital financing, like Angel financing, is frequently offered in exchange for 
preferred stock. Because there can be multiple rounds of venture capital 
financing, these rounds are often referred to by letters of the alphabet. Each letter 
indicates a series of VC financing, based on a valuation of the company. That is, 
VC financing generally begins with Series A, followed by Series B (if the 
company is performing well and has been assessed at a higher value than at the 
time of Series A financing), Series C, and so on. Alphabet rounds can also include 
strategic investors who provide value to the company in areas like technology or 
marketing (Kelly, 2012). Individuals or firms that provide venture capital are 
referred to as venture capitalists (VCs).  
Moreover, several of the participants in this study reference federal grants 
known as Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) and Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) grants. These are administered by the Small Business 
Administration of the United States government. The grants are complementary in 
some ways, in that the research topics designated for the grants are offered by 
some overlapping federal agencies.  
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1. STTR Grants: The Small Business Technology Transfer program provides 
opportunities to expand funding in the federal research and development (R&D) 
arena. It provides joint venture opportunities for small businesses and nonprofit 
research institutions [U.S. Small Business Administration (USSBA)]. The STTR 
program requires small businesses to collaborate formally with a research 
institution during Phases I and II of development. The purpose is to link the 
results of innovations in basic science with commercialization. Federal agencies 
with extramural research budgets in excess of $1 million are required to allocate 
annually 0.3% of those budgets for small business awards. The federal agencies 
that currently participate in the STTR program are the: 
a. Department of Defense 
b. Department of Energy 
c. Department of Health and Human Services 
d. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
e. National Science Foundation 
Within its individual program, each agency administers STTR grants based upon 
Congressional guidelines. The grants are highly competitive and awarded after 
proposal evaluation. 
2. SBIR Grants: The Small Business Innovation Research Program encourages 
small, domestic businesses to take part in federal R&D that has 
commercialization potential. Small businesses that earn the awards can 
explore the technological potential of an innovation and pursue its 
profitability, while concurrently addressing designated areas of U.S. R&D 
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needs. The purpose is to support scientific and technological innovation, by 
investing federal research funds into private sector commercialization activity, 
to strengthen the American economy. Federal agencies with extramural R&D 
budgets that exceed $1 million, annually allocate 2.5% of their R&D budgets 
to the program. Current agency participants include the: 
a. Department of Agriculture 
b. Department of Commerce-National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
c. Department of Commerce-National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
d. Department of Defense 
e. Department of Education 
f. Department of Energy 
g. Department of Health and Human Services 
h. Department of Homeland Security 
i. Department of Transportation 
j. Environmental Protection Agency 
k. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Within its individual program, each agency administers SBIR grants based 
upon Congressional guidelines. Like STTR, these grants are highly 
competitive and awarded after proposal evaluation. Each program is 
structured in 3 phases (below). The STTR and SBIR differ in terms of their 
requirements in a few ways. For SBIR, unless the agency has granted a 
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waiver, the principal investigator must be primarily employed by the for-profit 
business [referred to as the Small Business Concern (SBC)].  An STTR grant 
requires the SBC and research institution to establish an IP agreement that 
details: assignments of intellectual property rights, rights to execute follow-on 
research, and rights to exercise development or commercialization. In 
addition, STTR requires the SBC to perform a minimum of 40% of the R&D, 
while the single institutional partner performs at least 30%. Partnership with a 
research institution is required for an STTR grant, but only encouraged for an 
SBIR grant.  (2012).  
The Three Phases of SBIR and STTR awards are as follows: 
 
a) Phase I: Phase I funding is to assist with establishing “the 
technical merit, feasibility, and commercial potential of the 
proposed R&D efforts and to determine the quality of performance 
of the small businesses prior to providing further Federal support 
in Phase II.” 
b) Phase II: “The objective of Phase II is to continue the R/R&D 
efforts initiated in Phase I. Funding is based on the results achieved 
in Phase I and the scientific and technical merit and commercial 
potential of the Phase II project proposed. Only Phase I awardees 
are eligible for a Phase II award.” 
c) Phase III: “The objective of Phase III, where appropriate, is for the 
small business to pursue commercialization objectives resulting 
from the Phase I/II R&D activities. STTR/SBIR does not fund 
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Phase III. In some Federal agencies, Phase III may involve follow-
on non-STTR funded R&D or production contracts for products, 
processes or services intended for use by the U.S. Government” 
(USSBA, 2012).  
Funding levels and award periods for the phases of STTR & SBBR differ. For 
STTR awards, Phase I awards do not normally exceed $100,000 for 1 year. 
Phase II awards generally do not exceed $750,000 for 2 years. Alternatively, 
SBIR awards are normally not in excess of $150,000 for 6 months, and Phase 
II awards normally do not exceed $1 million for 2 years.  
3. Matching Funds: In the Commonwealth of Kentucky, USOs or other startups 
that qualify for federal SBIR awards and STTR awards can augment their 
funding through the Kentucky Small Business Innovation Research and Small 
Business Technology Transfer Matching Funds program. State dollars are 
available to match all or part of the federal awards earned by Kentucky-based 
companies, or companies willing to relocate to Kentucky. The Matching 
Funds program is managed by Kentucky’s Cabinet for Economic 
Development and contractually administered by the Kentucky Science and 
Technology Corporation (KSTC) (Kentucky Cabinet for Economic 
Development, 2012). 
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
The University of Kentucky and TBED 
The University of Kentucky, like many institutions, began its involvement in 
technology transfer later than universities often recognized for their successful 
technology transfer operations. The university constructed its research park, Coldstream, 
in 1992 (Coldstream, 2009). UK opened its Advanced Science and Technology 
Commercialization Center (ASTeCC) in 1994 (ASTeCC, 2012). In 1997, the Kentucky 
state legislature passed the Kentucky Postsecondary Education Improvement Act (also 
known as House Bill 1), realigning postsecondary education in the state to strengthen 
economic conditions for Kentucky’s graduates (DeYoung & Baas). One objective of 
House Bill 1 was to establish the University of Kentucky as a highly ranked research 
university.  This later became known and marketed as The Top-20 Compact (2012).  
Retired University of Kentucky President Lee Todd served as president from 2001-
2011. During his tenure, Dr. Todd initiated a number of efforts to enhance UK’s status as 
a research institution. In 2006, as part of his Top 20 Plan, Todd created UK’s Office for 
Commercialization and Economic Development. The office was overseen by a new Vice 
President for Commercialization and Economic Development, Dr. Leonard ‘Len’ Heller. 
By 2010, Todd announced his retirement from the University of Kentucky and a new 
university president, Dr. Eli Capilouto, was appointed. Capilouto was charged with 
responsibilities that included revising the university’s financial model, enhancing student 
success, and improving campus safety (University of Kentucky, 2012 b). Vice President 
for UKCED, Len Heller, retired in March 2012. There are no plans to hire someone in 
that position (Interview I, 2012).  Instead, UKCED was placed under the direction of 
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UK’s Vice President for Research, Jim Tracy. This has left the future of UKCED 
uncertain. UKCED’s indefinite future is not unusual, as Bok suggests that the presidential 
priorities affect the allocation of resources to specific units and services (2003).  
Public Institutions: Unique Characteristics and Circumstances 
As Geiger indicates, the examination of research institutions is difficult to aggregate; 
noting that it “address[es] a set of institutions whose central members are obvious, but 
whose peripheral members are never entirely clear.” Moreover, “to address them from the 
perspective of their particular role of cultivating, interpreting, and extending knowledge” 
is difficult, because it includes “the interactions of participating and assisting 
institutions”, as well as, “resources to support academic in uiry (2009, p. xix).” Public 
research universities are distinct in respect to more than governance.  
Public institutions, greater in number of faculty and students, are much more complex 
organizations than private institutions. Their public affiliation exposes them to political 
influence and greater social accountability. These obligations have given rise to a 
considerable variety of classes of public research institutions (Graham & Diamond, 
1997). Geiger utilizes case studies of both public and private research institutions to 
illustrate the diversity of their research enterprises (2009). Graham and Diamond, 
alternatively, separate the two. Moreover, they argue that the utility of the traditional 
Carnegie classifications by research levels is inappropriate. A three-tiered hierarchy, 
applicable to private research institutions, cannot be used constructively for public 
research universities, which are plentiful and diverse. Further complicating amalgamated 
comparisons, are traditional precedents, where state and local politics have emphasized 
the demarcation of public research universities’ missions. Political auspices have further 
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characterized public research institutions by designations such as flagships, land-grant 
institutions, and regional universities (1997). 
Comparisons of technology transfer operations at public and private universities are 
further complicated by institutional variables, as well as the various stages and resultant 
effects of the technology transfer process. The process, itself, consists of progressive 
stages. Outcomes are correlated with corresponding stages. For example, an intellectual 
property disclosure may or may not lead to a patent. A patent may or may not lead to a 
license. A license could or could not yield a spinoff or significant royalties. Finally, a 
spinoff could exit (either through acquisition or profitability) or fail, and so forth. Further 
complicating outcomes analyses; are the level of commercial research involvement, 
available resources at each stage, and the influence of institutional prestige. Objective 
measures tend to avoid variables of time, and emphasize quantity in relation to quality. 
This method fre uently overlooks the significance of “pound for pound ratios of 
productive achievement” (Graham & Diamond, 1997, p. 3). 
Moreover, research activity, particularly in southern regions of the United States, is 
comparatively weak in relation to leading public institutions. Since the American Civil 
War, several factors have contributed to economic instability in the south. Without a 
strong industrial foundation, southern institutions (including the University of Kentucky) 
have been excluded from the influence of commercial funding which has fostered 
research traditions at leading public institutions (Graham & Diamond). Land grant status, 
itself, has continued to encourage focused objectives related to practitioner, rather than 
basic science programs. That is, the academic missions of PLGUs encourage 
concentration in disciplines such as forestry, nursing, and military science, which are 
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historically weak in research productivity (1997). Although many land grant universities 
must compete for resources from rival flagship campuses, the mid-sized University of 
Kentucky is both land grant and state flagship (University of Kentucky, 2012 b). This 
leads to a further division of roles. State land grant institutions are recognized for their 
skewed emphasis on practitioner programs. Concurrently, flagship and medical status 
enhances the amount of per capita research and development funding, particularly from 
federal programs, but flagship missions also promote programs in the social sciences and 
humanities. Such programs traditionally produce less sponsored research (Graham & 
Diamond). Overall, undersized institutions have historically been impeded in their efforts 
to compete with mature research universities with specialized research institutes, hefty 
endowments, and reputations for strong research capabilities. As Graham and Diamond 
state, “Political and business leaders seeking economic development from their university 
campuses would in all likelihood prefer a Michigan State, winning $850 million a year in 
federal R&D funding” (pgs. 158-159) to an institution with lower total research funding, 
but higher per capita federal funding. In fiscal year 2009-2010, UK was among 
institutions awarded more than $40 million dollars for federal research, at roughly $145 
million. Its national rank among institutions earning federal R&D funding was 68. In 
comparison, the top ranked institution in terms of federal R&D funding was Johns 
Hopkins University, with approximately $1.6 billion in funding (The Center for 
Measuring University Performance, 2011). Nevertheless, President Todd made the 
decision to engage the University of Kentucky in efforts for technology based economic 
development. Unless otherwise cited, the following information concerning the 
development of UK’s TBED enterprise is derived from DeYoung and Baas’s 2012 work, 
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Making the Case for a Strong Research University: The University of Kentucky Top-20 
Business Plan, in Stanley, Bienkowsky, and Brada ‘s edited volume: The University in 
the Age of Globalization: Rankings, Resources, and Reforms.  
In June 1997, the Kentucky State Legislature passed House Bill I, also referred to as 
The Kentucky Postsecondary Education Improvement Act. The bill set several goals for 
higher education in the state, including a mandate for the University of Kentucky to attain 
Top 20 status, among national research institutions. The University of Kentucky was 
established in 1865 under the Morrill Act of 1863 with the use of federal land grants. As 
the dedicated state land-grant institution, UK has traditionally offered programs in 
agriculture and the mechanical arts, engineering and mining, in addition to a more 
general liberal arts education. UK is also the state’s designated flagship institution. 
According to Berdhal, public land grant institutions form the nuclei of the public 
education systems in their states and have a history of leadership, research, and graduate 
education (1998, as cited by DeYoung and Baas, 2012). 
Because of its dual land grant and flagship status, the welfare of the university and the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky has been historically interconnected. The legislature’s 
charge stems from the institution’s land-grant designation, as well as an understanding of 
reciprocity between the university and the people of Kentucky. To demonstrate the 
connection between UK’s traditional mission and state welfare, DeYoung and Baas cite a 
1917 report to UK’s Board of Trustees. The following excerpt summarizes the 
relationship, noting, “The possibilities and responsibilities of a state university are largely 
conditioned by the population, resources, industries, and public school system of the state 
which it serves.” The report advised early 20th-century trustees as to Kentucky’s 
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population, income levels, literacy rates and educational attainment, in addition to the 
potential for industrial development within six state regions. The report provided 
intervention plans, by college and department, for each region, indicating, “State 
University’s particular function… [is] to serve widely and powerfully those practical 
needs of the state…for the investigation of problems bearing upon development of the 
State itself and upon the welfare of its citizens (University of Kentucky, 1917, as cited by 
DeYoung and Baas, 2012).” This part of the university’s mission is widely understood by 
its administration and the people of Kentucky.  Moreover, Kentucky has a large rural 
population in addition to its metropolitan areas. As such, university administrators are 
acutely aware of their role in assisting state development.  
The Kentucky Demographic 
Concerning educational attainment and income levels, Kentucky is below average 
among the 50 United States. The state ranks 46th in associate degrees, 47th in bachelor’s 
degrees, and 37th in graduate or professional for population over 25 years of age, for 
highest level of educational attainment. Sixteen per cent of Kentucky’s population falls at 
or below the poverty line. Median annual household incomes of $36,786, are 
approximately $10,000 below those of states with highly ranked universities. Kentucky 
residents are two percentage points above the national average for its population on 
Medicaid. Comparatively, the fifteen states with top-ranked institutions have populations 
that are slightly more than two percentage points below the national average for 
subsidized healthcare. Lung cancer mortality rates in the commonwealth, attributed to the 
27% of Kentuckians reported as smokers, are also well above the national average. The 
amount of overweight or obese residents contributes to Kentucky’s characterization as a 
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state with one of the highest rates of diabetes per capita (Kentucky State Data Center, 
2000; Kentucky State Data Center and the Office of Workforce Research and Analysis; 
University of Kentucky, 2005, as cited by DeYoung and Baas, 2012). 
President Lee T. Todd and TBED 
As part of an effort to address the population’s problematic characteristics, as well as 
the university’s recent mandate to reach advanced status among its peers, the University 
of Kentucky’s Board of Trustees launched a presidential search in 1999. The university’s 
existing president, Dr. Charles T. Wethington, had announced his retirement, effective in 
June 2001 University of Kentucky Libraries, 2007, as cited by DeYoung & Baas, 2012). 
Dr. Lee T. Todd, a former UK faculty member, serving as senior vice president of an 
IBM subsidiary, was chosen out of three finalists for the position. Todd had successfully 
founded two technology companies based upon his faculty research in the UK in the 
College of Engineering. On July 1, 2001, Lee Todd became the 11th president of the 
University of Kentucky (Axelrod, 2001, as cited by DeYoung & Baas, 2012).   
Todd earned his Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering from UK in 
1968. He returned to Lexington in 1974, after completing his Ph.D. and a postdoctoral 
fellowship at MIT, to pursue a faculty career. Todd served as a faculty member at UK 
until 1983, when he founded two technology companies, Projectron, Inc. and DataBeam 
Corporation. Hughes Aircraft acquired Projectron in 1990, while IBM/Lotus purchased 
Databeam in 1998. Todd was also active in science and mathematics reform activities in 
Kentucky, as well as in economic development initiatives (University of Kentucky Office 
of the President, 2009, 2010, as cited by DeYoung and Baas, 2012). Todd was considered 
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by many to be a different breed of president, one with both academic and entrepreneurial 
experience. 
After his presidential inauguration, Todd undertook an extensive marketing and 
public relations campaign to advance his plan for the university to obtain Top 20 status. 
President Todd met with the state’s governor and over 100 state legislators to discuss 
ways that the university could work with communities to address what Todd coined the 
Kentucky Uglies: high statewide rates of diabetes, lung cancer, illiteracy and poverty 
(Todd, 2005, as cited by DeYoung & Baas). With advice from several appointed task 
forces, Todd initiated a strategic plan, and follow up business plan, to advance the 
university’s prestige.  The strategic plan revised the university’s vision, mission and 
value statements, and argued for its critical role in the welfare of Kentucky’s population. 
A key component of the plan was to “elevate the quality of life for all Kentuckians” by 
facilitating economic development (University of Kentucky, 2006, as cited by Baas & 
DeYoung, 2012). Some of the research goals established to accomplish the plan included 
increased federal research expenditures, construction of additional research facilities, and 
an increase in doctoral program enrollment. To enhance the lives of Kentuckians, a plan 
Todd implemented a plan to integrate service into the curriculum and recognize faculty 
service. Yet, in terms of economic growth, the most significant changes made concerned 
the university’s technology transfer operations. 
To establish growth in the local economy, Todd pushed research commercialization 
efforts. In fact, the number of patent applications increased by 10%, and the number of 
university-initiated start-up companies increased to two per year. Todd had some 
difficulty meeting his objective concerning industry-funded research expenditures. 
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Industry-funded research dropped during 2004 and 2005 and then returned to a baseline 
of $13.2 million in 2006 (University of Kentucky, 2006, as cited by DeYoung and Baas, 
2012). Although state funding for university operations initially increased, Todd faced 
decreased state appropriations for the latter part of the 2000s. He continued his efforts, 
establishing a new strategic plan for the years 2006-2009. The plan accommodated the 
expansion of research and clinical operations, as well as the expansion of the faculty and 
student body, to account for a correlation between institutional rank and size. Narratives 
contained in Todd’s business and strategic plans asserted that, in order to answer 
Kentucky’s social, economic, and health issues, the size of the university and its 
operations must increase. 
According to Todd, an increase in size and reach of university efforts would result 
from an increase in the number of Kentuckians with bachelor’s degrees, leading to higher 
median household incomes. Expansion of faculty would also increase intellectual capital 
in the state. The 19% of the population with bachelor’s degrees in 2005 was too much for 
Kentucky’s unstable job market to employ. Todd argued that by engaging a creative class 
of faculty and entrepreneurs the university would collect talented people to create 
businesses and jobs, improve products and services, and battle diseases. These growth 
imperatives were articulated as investments in people. The proclamations conveyed UK 
as an engine for state economic development. Todd referred to growth as a moral 
imperative, based upon the university’s land grant and flagship status (Todd, 2005, as 
cited by DeYoung & Baas, 2012). 
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Establishing UKCED 
Key strategies of the Top 20 business and strategic plans included, increasing 
extramural research funding, enhancing the intellectual property development and 
technology transfer procedures, and increasing the number of start-up companies, 
royalty-bearing licenses, and patent licensing income. The implication was that 
investments in the university’s intellectual property would create a knowledge spillover, 
specifically in terms of university spinoff companies. Todd claimed that USOs and state-
based incentives would lead to more Kentucky-based businesses, jobs, and the 
development of a knowledge-based economy in the state.  
In 2006, Todd created the university’s Office for Commercialization and Economic 
Development. Dr. Leonard Heller was recruited as the Vice President of 
Commercialization and Economic Development. According to Heller, “Dr. Todd was 
very passionate about commercialization and economic development and I told him, ‘I’ll 
do this, as long as you are president’ (L. Heller, personal communication, February 28, 
2012).” Heller earned an Ed.D. in Organizational Development. He had been a faculty 
member at the University of Illinois, University of Michigan, Baylor College of 
Medicine, and the University of Kentucky College of Medicine. He worked as the CEO 
of WTT, Inc., which was one of the university’s first spinoffs. WTT created 
thoroughbred drug screens for the horse racing industry. Neogen Corporation, an 
international animal and food safety corporation, acquired WTT in 1991. UK earned 
roughly $2 million in royalties from the technology (UKCED, 2012 d).  
The number of technology transfer personnel increased under UKCED, but the 
reporting structure was streamlined and Heller reported directly to Todd, providing a 
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direct line from the Office for Commercialization and Economic Development to the 
president.  The office was responsible for intellectual property development, 
commercialization and licensing of university-based intellectual properties and 
technologies, development of the UK Coldstream Research Campus, and business 
development for new and existing technology-based companies and small businesses at 
UK. The office’s original slogan was Research Means Business (Highlights of Todd, 
2010a; University of Kentucky, 2010d, as cited by DeYoung & Baas, 2012). 
The economic development strategy was marketed as crucial to improving the quality 
of life in Kentucky. It would not only benefit the economy, but also offer targeted 
research and assistance to tackle some of Kentucky’s leading healthcare problems: 
diabetes and lung cancer. The research initiative was modeled after those in areas with 
high-technology clusters, such as the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina, Route 
128 in Massachusetts, and Silicon Valley in California. Universities in these areas are 
recognized for conveying knowledge to local industries, operating in-house business 
incubators, and operating scientific research parks in their areas. Some firms establish 
themselves near prominent universities to accommodate interaction between their 
research and development (R&D) teams and distinguished scientists (Hedge, 2005). 
 Based on case studies of successful ventures, a widely assumed notion among 
public university administrators is that university R&D leads to economic development. 
Results indicating a direct link between flagship university R&D and new state 
businesses and industries, however, are weak. Other considerations include markets, 
environmental factors, access to qualified labor, and presence of existing high-technology 
clusters. Concerning patent citations and their impact on local economies, private 
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universities outperform publics in local research spillover. The influence of high-tech 
clusters and private universities brings to light a disadvantage of modeling; that is, 
metropolitan prestige and geographic location often plays a substantial role in where high 
technology and knowledge-based businesses choose to locate and form partnerships with 
nearby universities. Central Kentucky, plagued with many of the ‘Kentucky Uglies’, is at 
a disadvantage in such considerations (Hedge, 2005; Woodward et al., 2006, as cited by 
DeYoung & Baas, 2012). 
Private research universities dominate the U.S. News and World Report’s “Best 
Colleges and Universities Top 25”. Triangle Park, Route 128 and Silicon Valley are 
heralded as university-industry collaboration success stories. Top-ranked universities or 
clusters experience a “halo” (p. 383) effect, wherein their draw is greater than the quality 
of research can justify (Hedge, 2005). There are over 1,000 centers similar to UK’s 
Office of Economic Development in the country. Although these centers contend that 
they are innovative, in fact, they are replications of previously successful ventures. The 
relatively small number of institutions with successful programs has collaborated with 
industry since the early 20th century. The evidence suggests that the research expansion 
strategy for Kentucky was an effort to create an image of prominence for future 
possibilities rather than a strategy that would have any immediate impact (Mowery et al., 
2004; Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2007, as cited by DeYoung & Baas, 2012). 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
The research presented here is a qualitative, single, intrinsic case study of the 
University of Kentucky’s technology transfer enterprise, formally known as the 
University of Kentucky Office for Commercialization and Economic Development 
(UKCED). The approach is also referred to as a Constructivist perspective. Utilizing a 
purposive sample, its design is intended to serve as what Stake has termed an intrinsic 
case study.  
An Interpretivist Ontology 
The qualitative approach to this study stems from an interpretivist paradigm. Yates 
argues that qualitative methodologists stress the significance of context in appreciating 
different interpretations and that the data are comprised of entities found in the 
environment that hold meaning for individuals and groups. As such, qualitative study 
often ventures to carry out one or more of the following: 
 Achieve an in-depth understanding and detailed description of a particular aspect 
 of an individual, a case history or a group’s experience(s); explore how 
 individuals or group members give meaning to and express their understanding of 
 themselves, their experiences, and/or their worlds; find out and describe in detail 
 social events and explore why they are happening, rather than how often; (and) 
 explore the complexity, ambiguity and specific detailed processes taking place in 
 a social context (2004). 
 
Rather than control, qualitative researchers seek greater understanding (Hesse-Biber & 
Leavy, 2006). 
Denzin and Lincoln, moreover, argue that “all research is interpretive” (p. 31), in that 
any attempts to answer research  uestions are essentially framed by the researcher’s 
belief system. Many premises are assumed and undisclosed; even the questions posed by 
the researcher are subject to the interpretations s/he implicitly draws upon while 
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constructing the study (2008). Interpretivist assumptions consider how participants in a 
social setting conceive their situations. These socially constructed realities are numerous, 
complex and cannot be separated into “discrete variables” (Glesne, p. 5). The researcher 
serves as the primary research instrument by observing, interacting with, and 
interviewing participants. The role of subjectivity in the research process supplants 
concerns over objectivity. Findings are communicated through descriptive narratives, 
with limited use of quantitative data. Moreover, the approach is inductive and searches 
for patterns within the results, rather than attempting to reduce findings to numerical 
indices or seek norms (1999). This particular qualitative work utilizes an intrinsic case 
study method to address its research questions. 
Intrinsic Case Study 
Intrinsic case studies, as opposed to instrumental or collective case studies, are 
undertaken in consideration of not only what they do represent, but also what they do not. 
Intrinsic case studies are conducted “because, first and last, one wants better 
understanding of this particular case” (p. 121). Intrinsic studies of cases are not 
undertaken because they illustrate specific traits or issues, but because their 
characteristics and, even commonness, are of interest. Although there are some 
similarities in terms of examination it is unlike instrumental case studies, in that the case 
is not secondary to the issue it addresses. It is further separated from collective case 
studies, which like instrumental case studies, are used to draw generalizations, examine 
populations, or general phenomena. Intrinsic case studies are not meant to build upon 
theories. When a researcher commits too strongly to generalization or theory 
construction, s/he runs the risk of pulling attention away from the qualities that are 
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critical to understanding the case. Generalizations, however, are not avoided. They are 
still made concerning the case, itself, and at future points in time, and drawn upon in 
other contexts. The primary purpose of intrinsic case study is to provide readers with 
interpretations, but also allow them the freedom to draw their own conclusions (2008).  
Purposive Sampling & Sampling Frame 
The sampling technique for this study was purposive (also referred to as judgmental), 
in that it is based on knowledge of the population that is meaningful for its purpose 
(Babbie): UK’s Office of Commercialization and Economic Development and other 
entities comprising UK’s TBED enterprise (2008). When generalizability is a 
fundamental goal, random sampling is more appropriate. In this case, random sampling 
was inadequate, due to the case study’s focus. In small cases, purposeful selection is 
favorable, in order to establish specific comparisons. Purposive sampling allows the 
research to highlight rationales or variables that contribute to differences between 
individuals and environments (Maxwell). A small, purposive sample yields greater 
confidence that data and results sufficiently provide a balanced representation of the 
target population, than a similar sample utilizing random variation (1996). 
The approach to sampling was purposive, in that individuals were sought out who 
were either UKCED personnel, members of the Bluegrass Angels (a venture club 
established by UKCED to finance promising technology for commercialization), or UK 
spinoff personnel.  The expectation of this type of sample was that information from TT 
personnel and investors would provide a historical background for UK’s 
commercialization efforts, as well as contemporary issues, from an organizational 
perspective. Moreover, USO personnel’s experiences could presumably connect 
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organizational goals to outcomes and provide further insight into the nature of university 
spinoff development at UK. Finally, sampling three related but disparate groups provides 
crystallization and credibility for interpretation.  
 Gatekeepers and establishment of rapport. 
The sample was based upon my previous knowledge of UKCED’s organization, as 
well as information from a gatekeeper and an intermediary. The intermediary, “whom the 
gatekeepers or potential participants know and respect” (Glesne, 2006, p. 45), is a 
member of my advisory committee, Joseph L. Fink, III. Professor Fink previously served 
as the Vice President for Research and Economic Development and Vice President for 
Corporate Relations and Economic Outreach, as well as Executive Director of UK 
Coldstream Research Campus from 2002 to 2004 (Pharmacy Faculty-Joseph Fink - 
B.S.Pharm., J.D., F.A.Ph.A., 2012 c). Over the course of approximately two years, 
Professor Fink contacted a number of individuals on my behalf. Professor Fink and I met 
with UK’s (now retired) Vice President of Commercialization and Economic 
Development to discuss my emerging research interests. Moreover, Professor Fink 
introduced several personnel from UKCED to my research interests and requested that, as 
a member of my advisory committee, they assist me as I further developed my 
dissertation study. This gave me the opportunity to meet with some staff members prior 
to beginning this study. As Glesne suggests, a certain rapport is imperative in qualitative 
research to reduce distance, calm the anxiety of the participants, and build trust, so that 
insiders have confidence in the researcher and his/her work (2006).  These early 
interactions established the rapport necessary to utilize a gatekeeper to pursue the sample. 
The gatekeeper, a technology transfer officer with UKCED, provided the necessary 
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consent to enter the research setting and offered referrals and contact information in order 
to develop the sampling frame (for additional information on the role of gatekeepers, see 
Glesne, 2006, pp. 44-45).  
 The sample/participants. 
My gatekeeper provided a preliminary list of technology transfer personnel, 
investors/entrepreneurs, and USO personnel, which included e-mail addresses and phone 
numbers. The individuals within the sampling frame were sent introductory e-mails with 
invitations to participate (See Appendices B-D). Introductory e-mails contained general 
information. Once prospective participants responded, correspondence commenced. 
Individuals were given the opportunity to ask questions, provided with more detail about 
the study, including information concerning Institutional Review Board (IRB) exemption 
(see Appendix E) for the study, and asked for permission to record the interviews. Those 
in the sampling frame who agreed to participate were given additional details concerning 
the study’s objectives, the opportunity to review the exemption certification from the 
IRB, and asked to provide Informed Consent prior to their interviews (See Appendix F). 
As I met with participants, as part of the interview scripts (see Appendices G-I), I asked if 
they could think of any additional professionals I should speak with or documents I could 
access, executing a snowball techni ue. Snowball sampling is warranted when “members 
of a special population are difficult to locate” (Babbie, p. 205), so the researcher collects 
data on members of the targeted population and asks them for additional information, to 
locate other members of the population that they know. Accumulating participants using 
the snowball technique can occasionally result in questionable representativeness, which 
is why it is predominantly used for exploratory purposes, such as this study (2008).  The 
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majority of referrals were interviewed, although some fell outside the scope of this study, 
while others either did not respond to multiple requests or declined to participate. 
All of the technology transfer personnel, except for one, participated. The TT 
representative  who declined initially agreed to participate, but soon changed positions 
within the university and indicated that the new position required a great deal of time and 
attention, and could no longer afford to participate. Three out of six USO officers 
participated in the interviews. Two USO officers (one a representative of UK’s medical 
technology incubator and spinoffs, and the other, affiliated with a spinoff of a biomedical 
parent company that was recruited to relocate to Lexington, KY) did not respond to 
repeated requests for interviews. The third USO officer, currently located in California, 
indicated that there was not time in her schedule to participate-particularly given the 
difference in time zones. Alternatively, I contacted an officer of that USO who works 
locally who agreed to participate. I also contacted Lee Todd, UK’s retired president who 
championed technology transfer for economic development purposes and established 
UK’s Office for Economic Development in 2006 (DeYoung & Baas, 2012). Like the two 
USO officers, he did not respond to me. Finally, after alleviating some initial concerns 
over proprietary information from investors, all three agreed to participate. The total 
number of oral history interviews conducted for this study came to ten (see Appendix A-
Legend for Oral History Interviews). This is consistent with Glesne’s contention that data 
collection often concludes under less than perfect conditions, due to limited time or 
resources (1999).   
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 Data collection. 
The data collection process consisted primarily of oral history interviews concerning 
affiliated professionals’ experiences and impressions/interpretations. In general, 
interviews lasted between an hour and ninety minutes. The briefest interview was 
approximately fifty-five minutes, with the longest lasting over two hours. The group of 
interviewees consisted of officers within UKCED, with distinct roles and responsibilities, 
members of the group of investors/entrepreneurs that often provides start-up financing for 
UK associated technology, and entrepreneurs/officers of three of the university spinoffs 
that are currently active. A limited amount of documentation was used in an attempt to 
triangulate data derived from interviews. Thus, the majority of the analysis presented is 
based on data gathered through personal communications. The interviews were 
transcribed and examined, using an open coding technique, wherein codes (or themes) 
were generated by inspection of the transcripts (Babbie, 2008). Per the IRB exemption 
certification for the study, digital recordings and transcripts will be kept for 6 years after 
completion of the work on a password-protected computer and then erased/destroyed.  
Credibility through Crystallization 
A foundation of case study is “description of persons, places, and events” (Janesick, 
p. 69). “The trinity of validity, reliability, and generalizability” (pp. 68-69) is not always 
applicable to qualitative questions. Discussions of qualitative methods and design have 
periodically taken place to address the suitability of these terms outside of psychometric 
study. While the term validity, explicitly defined, is a cornerstone of quantitative 
research, alternate paradigms for descriptive validity and case study deal with 
illumination and interpretation-considerations of the credibility of explanation. Whereas 
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quantitative validity holds a particular set of restricted definitions, qualitative credibility 
acknowledges that there may be multiple legitimate interpretations. The essential 
 uestion for  ualitative case study, is not ‘Are you measuring what you propose to 
measure?’, but “Is the explanation credible? (p. 69)” In terms of a study’s 
appropriateness, Janesick contends that researchers have become preoccupied with 
“methodolatry, a combination of method and idolatry,…[by] defending methods to the 
exclusion of the actual story being told…that often overtakes the discourse in the 
education and human services fields (p. 64).” Because an objective of case study is to 
find “categories and the relationship and patterns between and among categories [leading 
to]… completeness in the narrative” (p. 64), she argues that credibility should replace the 
trinity. As an umbrella term, credibility encompasses strategies such as member-checks, 
journaling, and participant crystallization. These strategies are better suited to qualitative 
study than narrowly defined conceptions of validity, reliability, and generalizability 
borrowed from quantitative methods (2003).  
Moreover, for research in areas like education and human services, the conventional 
consideration of generalizability weakens its purpose (Janesick). Case studies are 
organized to explore unique attributes. Inasmuch, a technical approach to reliability is 
irrelevant because there is no acute need for replication (2003). As previously indicated, 
the purpose of this study is not to provide generalizable findings, but to offer a detailed 
examination of its specific case. Therefore, credibility is approached through 
crystallization. 
Janesick uses the metaphor of the qualitative researcher as choreographer to 
demonstrate this point.  
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 The design of the study begins with some fixed movements: precise interviews 
 are planned, observations are scheduled, documents reviewed and analyzed…At 
 the same time, within the parameters of the interviews, information is disclosed 
 that allows the researcher to improvise, find out more about some critical event or 
 moment in the lives of the participants…Even the act of charting observations and 
 interviews is sometimes improvisational…All choreographers make a statement 
 and begin, explicitly or implicitly, with the  uestion, ‘What do I want to say in 
 this dance?’ In much the same way, the qualitative researcher begins with a 
 similar  uestion: ‘What do I want to know in this study?’ This is a critical 
 beginning point (pp. 50-51). 
 
She argues that questions best suited for qualitative inquiry are generally the questions 
approached by many “educational researchers and theorists, sociologists, 
anthropologists…and historians (p. 51).” Such  uestions concern areas including:  uality 
of innovations or programs, meaning or interpretations of components of subject matter, 
and whole systems at micro and macro levels.  
Janesick cites Richardson’s (1994) discussion of crystallization and contends that it is 
a more appropriate lens with which to view designs and components of qualitative 
research than triangulation. She recommends crystallization as the proper context to 
incorporate the multiple disciplines that influence the character of qualitative study 
design. Richardson’s (1994 p. 522, as cited by Janesick) depiction suggests that the 
crystal: 
 Combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, 
 transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, 
 change, and alter, but are not amorphous…crystallization provides us with a 
 deepened, complex, thoroughly partial, understanding of the topic. (2003) 
 
To provide credibility through crystallization, this study incorporates both internal and  
 
public documents concerning TBED initiatives at the University of Kentucky, as well as  
 
oral histories of active USOs, technology transfer personnel, and Angel investors, in  
 
order to approach the of the organization from multiple perspectives. 
© Tara Kristen Baas, 2013  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE STUDY 
 
 The University of Kentucky and the TBED Enterprise 
“Unless you live it, there aren’t many people that could talk this stuff” (Interview J, 
2012). This statement, from a technology transfer officer at the University of Kentucky, 
provides insight into the complex and interwoven network of relationships that comprise 
the TBED enterprise. Personnel have a mix of educational and professional experiences. 
A broad network of formal and informal partnerships has formed to promote technology 
transfer at the institutional and community levels. Some individuals have seen their 
positions evolve over decades, while others have worked within the general area of 
innovation or small business policy in a variety of positions.  
Several studies have quantitatively addressed some angle of the  uestion, ‘Does the 
structure and organization of TT offices facilitate universities’ contributions to economic 
development effectively?’ An answer that addresses the diverse range of research 
institutions over time has been elusive. What is clear is that the rationale for the TT 
office’s existence generally relates to the public benefit of university discoveries or the 
economic benefit to either the community or institution (Geiger & Sá, 2008). One 
expectation of this study is to investigate the perceptions of TT personnel, in the hope of 
illuminating multiple areas related to their positions. Participants were asked to discuss 
the organizational history and structure of the technology transfer office, their 
backgrounds, the expectations of their positions, what they perceived as major challenges 
and accomplishments of the organization, and any impact administrative changes have 
had on their work.  
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Personnel’s Recollections of Organizational History 
The technology transfer officers who participated in this study have diverse 
backgrounds. Direct experience with UKCED (and its previous interpretations) ranges 
from two years to twenty-eight years. Their formal educations include, law, zoology, and 
statistics. Professionally, their experiences include work in scientific research, 
government, and telecommunications. They relay both common and unique 
understandings of their roles in technology transfer and economic development. 
Ten years ago, when Roger Kemp (pseudonym, Interview I, 2012) joined the 
university, UK had already built the ASTeCC campus incubator facility, as well as 
Coldstream. Kemp knew Lee Todd through his company, Databeam. Kemp was hired 
roughly a year after Todd took office as President of UK. When Kemp began his tenure 
at UK, he had an interest in ideas about a new, technology-driven economy and became 
acquainted with the Dean of the College of Business and Economics. His position was 
housed in the Von Allmen Center for Entrepreneurship in the college. 
Kemp’s contention is that initiating an infrastructure to facilitate commercialization 
consisted primarily of networking. At the time, the state of Kentucky was beginning to 
establish several programs in the area of innovation and commercialization. Kemp notes 
that commercialization was drawing a great deal of attention, largely because Todd “likes 
that kind of stuff.” At the time, there were a small number of local investors.  
 There were investors, there’s always investors, but there were no organized Angel 
 groups…There were groups of 2 or 3 who invested together, another group of 2 or 
 3 here   and in Louisville. There’s money in Kentucky, but there wasn’t any way 
 for entrepreneurs to reach those people. It’s like, ‘who are they?’  Because 
 they’re all private out there and unless you had some personal connection you 
 couldn’t get to them even when you had to. Then some of them, their wealth is 
 built on real estate or fast food, right? So that was scary. [It] is scary to investors, 
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 but when you get an Angel group together, you can work through some of that. So 
 we worked very hard on that and we’ve been very active with that. 
 
Kemp worked with the Dean of the Gatton College of Business and Economics, Dick 
Furst, President Todd, and an investor to organize the Bluegrass Angels in 2004, to assist 
with UK’s commercialization efforts. He argues that the group he helped to establish is 
currently the most active Angel group in the state.  
To promote interest in IP disclosures and spinoff development, Kemp, Todd and Furst 
“put a lot of word out there” to encourage faculty to “do research, start companies, [and] 
create jobs.” At the time, securing space in ASTeCC and starting a company was 
relatively straightforward, but there was “not much of a support structure here” to go 
beyond that point. Part of developing the structure was meeting with faculty to convince 
them that “starting a company…doesn’t have to be scary.” He provided faculty with 
information about SBIR and STTR grants, stating, “Kentucky at that time was not getting 
its fair share of that at all.” The timing was right; however, as Kentucky was developing 
its aggressive matching funds program, which he claims is unique, nationwide.  “That’s 
why I came here. I saw the state was doing some interesting things. Dr. Todd certainly 
lived this kind of stuff and was very supportive of it.”  
In 2000, Kentucky’s General Assembly also enacted the Kentucky Innovation Act 
(Interview C, 2012). The legislation created structures and funding opportunities to 
enhance innovation in the state under the Cabinet for Economic Development (CED). 
The Office of Commercialization and Innovation was created to:  
 Lead the state’s technology-based economic development efforts by developing 
 and implementing a strategy to build and promote technology-driven and 
 research-intensive industries with the goal of creating high-tech job 
 opportunities and developing clusters of innovation throughout the state. [The 
 Office] administers and recommends funding to facilitate recruiting, 
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 creating, and retaining innovation-driven companies and jobs, producing new 
 products and services, and developing new and improved processes (Who  We 
 Are, 2012). 
 
Part of the structural enhancements was the Kentucky Innovation Network, which began 
with six, and currently consists of ten, Kentucky Innovation and Commercialization 
Centers (ICCs) across the Commonwealth. The ICCs are located in areas ranging from 
Louisville, KY, to Ashland, KY. ICCs are designated as part of the Kentucky Innovation 
Network. Each center provides consultation services for areas including business 
development, marketing, and funding sources (About Us, 2012). 
The state’s Office of Commercialization and Innovation funds 50% of the operations 
and salaries of the ICCs, and strategic partners, including the CED and Kentucky 
Technology, Incorporated, (Interview C, 2012), fund the remainder. Some of the ICCs 
are affiliated with local universities, while others like Louisville’s-affiliated with Greater 
Louisville, Incorporated- are affiliated with private entities for funding purposes.  
When the Kentucky Innovation Act was passed, the Von Allmen Center for 
Entrepreneurship was within the organizational hierarchy of the ICCs. Essentially, it was 
the Lexington ICC (Interview I, 2012). It is now part of the University of Kentucky’s 
Office for Commercialization and Economic Development (UKCED), established in 
2006. Currently, the Lexington ICC is located in downtown Lexington in the same 
facility as the Chamber of Commerce (commonly referred to as Commerce Lexington) 
and partially funded by the Von Allmen Center. Because of their close relationship, the 
Von Allmen Center provides initial services to faculty researchers to assist with the IP 
disclosure process through UK’s Intellectual Property Committee. The Lexington ICC 
also becomes involved early in the disclosure process, to assist faculty with state funding 
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opportunities that are available. “One thing that Kentucky does not really lack is the 
number of opportunities that are out there (Interview C, 2012).”  
In conjunction with the establishment of the Bluegrass Angels, Kemp believed he and 
his colleagues were setting the groundwork to effectively venture into commercialization 
of UK intellectual property for economic development. By 2006, the university formally 
established its Office for Commercialization and Economic Development, with Len 
Heller at the helm. Kemp remains unclear as to how the office was funded, “I don’t know 
how all that budget came together – or where it came from.  I just don’t know.” His only 
recollection is that President Todd somehow organized funding. 
The combination of the new Angel group, government incentives, and faculty 
outreach, were considered essential because, “Without that, what you end up with is a 
bunch of faculty-run companies that really don’t create many jobs.” The support structure 
had to be local, considering that venture capital is found at the national level. The 
structure could not be present only at UK, but also in the community (Interview J, 2012).  
Organizational Structure of UKCED 
Under the initial organization, the ICC and Von Allmen Center for Entrepreneurship 
were structured in UK’s Gatton College of Business and Economics. When the Office for 
Commercialization and Economic Development was created, the Von Allmen Center was 
shifted under the Vice President of UKCED, Dr. Len Heller’s charge. When Heller 
retired in 2012, UKCED was placed under the direction of the Vice President for 
Research. That position is currently held by Dr. Jim Tracy. Both Heller (previously) and 
Tracy report directly to the university president. Tracy has several departments and 
offices under his command, whereas Heller was solely responsible for UKCED. UKCED 
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serves as the umbrella organization for the Von Allmen Center, Technology Transfer, the 
Kentucky Small Business Development Center (KSBDC), Coldstream Research Campus 
(which includes ASTeCC), and Kentucky Technology, Incorporated (KTI). The 
University of Kentucky Research Foundation (UKRF) is also affiliated with Technology 
Transfer (Interview B, 2012).  
 The University of Kentucky Research Foundation. 
The University of Kentucky’s Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property 
Development offices are owned by UKRF, which is a non-profit branch of the university. 
All financial resources for research that come to the University are the property of the 
University of Kentucky Research Foundation. However, UKRF does not have a physical 
department with paid employees. Employees can represent UKRF’s interests, but 
representing UK’s Research Foundation means, for example, “I represent UKRF for 
patents. I spend UKRF money (Interview B, 2012).”  The majority of UKRF funds come 
from the university’s share of grant money earned by faculty. In order to facilitate 
revenue generation, Kentucky Technology Inc. (KTI) was established in 1988 as UK’s 
for-profit corporation, owned by the University of Kentucky Research Foundation.  
Kentucky Technology, Incorporated. 
 
KTI is somewhat exclusive from other entities associated with TT at UK, in that it is 
for-profit. KTI’s mission is to earn revenue from licenses, equity investments, and leases 
from the Coldstream Center at the UK research campus, and the ASTeCC campus 
incubator. KTI also invests in university-based technologies and technology-based 
businesses. KTI is also an investor in the Bluegrass Angels’ venture funds (Interview J, 
2012; UKCED, 2012 c). UK’s Administrative Regulations provide KTI with two 
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objectives. KTI’s primary role is to administer a master lease for ASTeCC and 
Coldstream. Business occupants of ASTeCC lease subsidized space. Coldstream space is 
unsubsidized. Rent is paid directly to KTI. Second, it has first rights to commercialize 
university intellectual property. In terms of commercialization, although first rights are 
granted in the university’s regulations, KTI has rarely exercised those rights. The 
rationale for the second objective was to facilitate arm’s length’s transactions from the 
University so that “you could have a company that could own parts of companies that 
they started” (Interview B, 2012).  The one exception that Kemp is aware of is with the 
medical technology company, Therix Medical. He explains it as: 
Now the one I know where they have [exercised first rights] is Therix Medical. It 
is hard. Therix is a private company. KTI was the founder.  KTI did put some 
investment money in it- small amounts. But the primary funding for Therix 
Medical is private. People like the Bluegrass Angels are their investors. So KTI’s 
relationship with Therix is – This is gonna get complicated. KTI’s relationship 
with Therix is they’re a founder and an investor, so they have equity in the 
company. Now – but then Therix still needs  access to intellectual property at UK. 
So there’s two ways they can … when it came time to how  are we going to 
handle Therix – how are we going to  handle the intellectual property – there was 
two ways it could have happened. They could have either got it through KTI, but 
then KTI would have had to exercise its rights with UKRF. Instead – and I don’t 
exactly know why it ended up this way, but instead Therix has a master license 
with UKRF. So, they have access to the intellectual properties through UKRF, not 
through KTI.  So, like any royalties that come out of sales and stuff from Therix, 
the royalties go to UKRF. But if Therix ever sells for a billion dollars, you know – 
then the equity in it would come back to KTI. It’s complicated. It was.  
(Interview J, 2012) 
 
In terms of equity purposes, KTI has executed agreements in the past. Dave 
Richardson (pseudonym, Interview B, 2012) has worked for the various incarnations of 
UKCED for almost three decades and recalls that equity is not exercised as frequently as 
it had been.  
  We have a number of e uity agreements. Now, we haven’t done as much e uity, 
at one point we were doing  uite a bit of e uity startups, but we haven’t been 
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doing it lately. Len [Heller] didn’t really push e uity. I don’t know [why]… most 
of the time you want to take equity and [emphasis added] royalty.  So you want 
some combination of equity and royalty.   
 
Richardson explains that equity investments can be risky. 
Well, the trouble with equity is, if you’re a minority holder of e uity there’s a 
thousand ways for them to screw you.  Right, you don’t control the company.  
Every time they raise money you get diluted, so your share gets smaller and 
smaller. We’ve never been in the position where we would put money into the 
company to keep it. 
 
He continues that generally, the university did not put up any capital for equity. Instead, it 
was part of a licensing deal. In those cases, companies were seeking to pay lower 
royalties, so the trade off for lower payments was equity. 
Unlike e uity agreements, KTI’s leasing function has continued, and will likely 
continue, as long as there are companies leasing space on university properties (Interview 
J, 2012). Coldstream has had a few companies, like Tempur-Pedic Corporation, A&W 
(fast food restaurateurs), and an international law firm choose to locate there over the past 
two years, but is not considered near capacity. ASTeCC, however, has 19 companies 
leasing space and is “almost always full” (Interview I, 2012). KTI’s investment priority, a 
significant goal of President Todd, however, is not currently active.   
During Lee Todd’s tenure, KTI was able to make small investments into the 
Bluegrass Angels’ venture fund, as well as directly into companies. Richardson surmises 
that investor was not a role that the university could play very effectively. Kemp states 
that KTI will abstain from investing, at least for a while, while the new administration 
addresses budgeting issues. He remains unclear as to how KTI carried out that function, 
noting that part of the funds came from rental revenue “and through some other ways”, 
but is unsure, specifically, what those were. Regarding KTI’s dormant status, Richardson 
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indicates, “I don’t know how that [investing] went…I think KTI ran out of money-and I 
was never one of Len’s favorites, so he didn’t talk to me. And that’s just as well.” He 
recalls an exceptional circumstance when KTI may have been used to back patenting 
costs during Heller’s tenure: 
We had a startup and the startup didn’t have [capital for patenting costs]. Usually, 
once we sign a license with the startup, they are responsible for the patent 
expenses. So we had one situation where Len paid patent expenses in return for 
some equity in the company…[that funding] came out of KTI- or out of his 
(Heller’s) budget. 
 
 Kemp suggests that KTI was set up with expectations it has not been able to meet, 
concluding, “It’s never been a moneymaker [and] it’s been around a long time.” There 
appears to be no clear-cut answer as to Kentucky Technology Inc.’s future, other than 
leasing, and none of the technology transfer personnel in this study is completely clear 
about how KTI functioned in the past. What is clear is that what is now the UKCED has 
evolved over the past decade and currently functions as part of a complex and loosely 
affiliated structure of organizations and relationships.  
Affiliated Organizations 
The current network of organizations affiliated with UKCED stems from the work of 
Kemp and others approximately a decade ago. In 2004, the same year the Bluegrass 
Angels was established, the Greater Lexington Chamber of Commerce, Lexington 
United, and the Lexington Partnership for Workforce Development (LPWD) merged to 
create Commerce Lexington, Incorporated (Greater Lexington Chamber of Commerce, 
2012; Interview I, 2012). During that period, the ICC was located in the Von Allmen 
Center within UK’s Gatton College of Business and Economics on campus. As Kemp 
and his colleagues worked to establish the Bluegrass Angels, they found themselves 
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interacting frequently with similar groups working toward economic development at the 
local level. Personnel from a handful of organizations continued to meet regularly on 
common issues, and found that board membership often overlapped. Over time, the 
decision was made to merge the organizations and create the entity commonly referred to 
as CommerceLex.  
Shortly thereafter, Jim Newberry was elected mayor of Lexington. He was a 
Bluegrass Angel, and had a long-term relationship with Dr. Todd. He had also worked as 
the attorney for an officer in a UK spinoff software company that had recently been 
ac uired by a large corporation. Because of Newberry’s support of the university’s 
TBED enterprise, his ties to Todd, and frequent interactions between the Lexington ICC 
and the newly formed CommerceLex, the ICC was relocated from campus to downtown 
Lexington. The Von Allmen Center had earned a grant from the federal government’s 
Economic Development Administration, and the funds were available to move 
downtown. Some office space in the new CommerceLex location had historically been 
rented to a third party business and was being vacated. Although the ICC/Von Allmen 
Center was not formally affiliated with CommerceLex, the space became the new 
location for the ICC/Von Allmen Center for Entrepreneurship. The rationale was to 
create a “tighter partnership” with the economic development staff inside of Commerce 
Lexington (Interview I, 2012). Although it was not legally organized, the association was 
named the Bluegrass Business Development Partnership (BBDP) (Interview C, Interview 
I, 2012). 
The BBDP is a collaboration of the business development specialists from the 
University of Kentucky, Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG), and 
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Commerce Lexington. The BBDP is considered a project of the three organizations. All 
housed in the same building in downtown Lexington, some are employed by the 
university and some work for the other two organizations. The Bluegrass Business 
Development Partnership advertises itself as “a one-stop, super-service provider” 
(Bluegrass Business Development Partnership, 2012). Another justification for the 
location of the ICC and the BBDP was so that representatives could be “the face of UK 
on Main Street” (Interview C, 2012). In addition to its close proximity to campus, the 
location allowed community entrepreneurs to work with the BBDP, and by association, 
UK employees. Under the circumstances, UK employees could assist with multiple types 
of small businesses, not just university technology businesses. The logic was that if 
university employees could facilitate the expansion of community-centered businesses 
like restaurants or bicycle shops, they could help to build wealth in the community and 
possibly gain access to any technologies that local small business owners might be 
developing. In 2006, when President Todd created UK’s Office for Commercialization 
and Economic Development, the ICC remained downtown, but the Von Allmen Center 
for Entrepreneurship was moved under UKCED on campus (Interview C, 2012).  
Today, the ICC remains involved in Von Allmen Center work, however; ICC 
employees travel to campus for budget meetings, or Von Allmen Center representatives 
come downtown to for meetings. The partnership through the BBDP facilitates such 
activities.  
Sometimes it’s a test. ‘Why don’t the next one [meeting] come to my office?’ It’s 
good for faculty to find their way off campus. I kind of wonder if they can even 
do it…if you’re gonna be in business, it doesn’t happen…on campus. It’s gonna 
be out here. (Interview C. 2012)  
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The funding available through the city and state, as part of the partnership, has been a 
“Godsend” (Interview C, 2012) for the university. The structures in place also provide 
significant funding opportunities through the government portion and assistance finding a 
location for a small business in ASTeCC or Coldstream, through UK. However, the 
partnership does have some drawbacks. Entrepreneurs think and act quickly, which is 
antithetical to the bureaucratic cultures of local government and the university. Inventors 
are often unsure if important tasks can be accomplished in a reasonable timeframe. 
Nonetheless, the organizations “do a lot of working together” (Interview C, 2012) and 
believe it is a mutually beneficial relationship. As for the evolutionary nature of 
organizational alliances, Kemp argues that, 
[The missions] are all related. There’s continual change, you know?  I don't know.  
I’ve lived in big organizations, you know. This is my first university job, but you 
live in a big company [the] same stuff happens. Right?  And it changes because of 
financial needs or it changes because of a shift in priorities or a new manager 
comes in with different ideas, and then that happens when you’re a company or at 
a university.  
 
It is all part of working for a large institution. 
Community entrepreneurial organizations. 
 Two additional entrepreneurial assistance organizations are loosely affiliated with 
UKCED and its partners, Awesome, Inc. and Base 163. Awesome, Inc. was founded in 
2009 by a number of University of Kentucky graduates who had started their own small 
businesses. Based on their experiences, the group established a non-profit, community 
incubator for entrepreneurs. One way to think about Awesome’s organization is as 
entrepreneurial “hipsters” (Interview J, 2012). There is no age limit, but the entrepreneurs 
are often younger than typical university faculty and working with mobile applications 
(apps), internet technology, or gaming. In a way, the approach is similar to ASTeCC. At 
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Awesome, inventors “hang out…learn from each other, and work with each other” 
(Interview J, 2012). For a nominal fee, entrepreneurs can rent a desk in the space and 
interact with other inventors. Awesome Inc.’s focus is high tech, creative companies. 
They advertise that:  
By day, Awesome Inc serves as a coworking space for creative and technical 
professionals. We currently have 15 early-stage companies who utilize this shared 
open  collaborative office space. By night, the space is transformed into a dance 
studio, art gallery, event venue, and creative laboratory. (Awesome, Inc., 2012 a) 
 
Awesome, Inc. is linked to UKCED in a couple of ways. The company leases space 
below the ICC, in the Commerce Lexington building and frequently interacts with 
representatives from the ICC and Bluegrass Business Development Partnership. The 
company’s principal is also well connected with the Bluegrass Angels, although 
Awesome, Inc. is focused on “the bottom up instead of the top down (Interview A, 
2012).” Awesome works with individuals seeking seed capital, to try to create their own 
funding network. Although at this stage, the entrepreneurs at Awesome, Inc. need support 
from the Bluegrass Angels, “They aren’t really wild about needing us because we’re a 
bunch of old guys…sitting around making life-changing decisions affecting their 
entrepreneurs (Interview A, 2012).”  Awesome, Inc. generates rental revenues and 
receives funding from wealthy sponsors who support entrepreneurialism. Although they 
collaborate with UKCED, BBDP and CommerceLex, they are not government or 
university-affiliated (Interview J, 2012).  
Base 163 is another entrepreneurial organization in the community with connections 
to UKCED. It is owned by an entrepreneur who is “at least on his third company”, who 
was able to purchase a building in downtown Lexington (Interview J, 2012). 
Entrepreneurs are located on the third floor and the elevators open directly into a large, 
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open space. There is a shared conference room for meetings and individual workspaces, 
but the space, itself, is completely open. In addition to one of the entrepreneur’s 
companies, other inventors lease space. They use it in a similar, shared and collaborative 
manner as the entrepreneurs at Awesome, Inc. The UKCED connection is that two of its 
current spinoffs are located in the building, as opposed to ASTeCC or Coldstream 
Research Campus. One is Therix Medical, the company where KTI serves as founder and 
investor. In laymen’s terms, Therix is the parent company of UKCED’s clinical 
technology spinoffs. The other UK spinoff located in Base 163 is Spinoff Y (featured 
later in this study). Spinoff Y is essentially an online gaming company, in which the 
Bluegrass Angels have made a significant investment (Interview I, 2012).  Like 
Awesome, Inc. Base 163 hosts events like art shows in the evenings, as well as meet ups 
for individuals interested in technology such as mobile applications (Awesome, Inc., 
2012 b). Awesome, Inc. and Base 163 interact with UKCED and its partners and share 
some common goals. UKCED is unique, however, in that it is institutionally affiliated. 
As part of its public, land grant mission, the University of Kentucky is charged with 
serving the public good. UKCED’s role is not strictly to encourage entrepreneurism, but 
to enhance economic development.  
Meeting the Expectations of UKCED 
A significant aspect of President Todd’s Top 20 Plan was marketed as a means to 
enhance the state’s economy (DeYoung & Baas, 2012). The expectation for UKCED was 
that by patenting more university-based technologies, UK would be able to spinoff 
companies and create greater job opportunities. As Kemp indicates, Todd’s Top 20 Plan 
was the impetus for increased focus on technology transfer. The expectation was that 
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increased IP disclosures, coupled with aggressive state programs would lead to a stronger 
economy. “It was all jobs. I mean, it was all jobs. It was taking the good things…at UK in 
terms of teaching and research, but also creating jobs.” 
Challenges to the Mission 
UKCED has not seen a large increase in jobs available in the state, based on its 
efforts. In part, that is because there has not been a detailed effort to track or measure 
workforce changes related to university spinoffs. Additionally, TT personnel cite 
unrealistic expectations, timing, and funding issues. Technology transfer personnel 
indicate that UKCED is not modeled after a specific set of institutions (Interview B, 
Interview C, Interview I; 2012). Instead, the operations and subsequent results are 
considered in relation to the unique resources available.   
Benchmarks 
None of the participants suggested that UKCED attempts to replicate the results of 
other institutions. Instead, they indicated that stakeholders seemed to expect expedited 
economic development similar to that seen in technopoles such as Silicon Valley or 
Route 128. TT personnel were acutely aware of comparisons to technopoles; and clear 
about the length of time and resources necessary to develop a technology cluster. 
Recently, Lexington has been compared to Austin, TX, for its growing community of 
entrepreneurs working with online, big box, and independent game development. The 
gaming community in Lexington is comparatively small, but continuing to grow 
(Interview C, 2012). Although Technology transfer officers look for growth in that area, 
they are in the early stages of developing it. They note that looking to communities, such 
as Austin, is significant in terms of learning best practices, but what works in one area 
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may not be applicable to Lexington or the state of Kentucky (Interview C, Interview I; 
2012). Citing that areas like Silicon Valley have been engaged in TBED for almost a 
century, one individual working with UKCED acknowledges, “I don’t care to be Silicon 
Valley, to be quite honest. There are uniquenesses [sic] about this place that we all love, 
and that’s why we want it [economic development] to happen here. We don’t need to be 
Silicon Valley (Interview C, 2012).”   
Results of economic development are also difficult to measure. Because of cultural 
differences between academic and corporate environments, USOs are often leery of 
disclosing proprietary details. UKCED makes some effort to measure its impacts, but the 
results are not detailed. The results include funding and employment data. Employment 
data are collected through an annual survey. Spinoffs are asked to indicate the number of 
current employees, in addition to new hires. Because the data are self-reported and 
aggregated, analysis is difficult. From 2006-2010, UKCED’s indicates that new hires 
increased spinoff employment by 161% (UKCED internal tracking document). New hires 
from 2010-2011 indicate a 16% increase. The average employee salary for 2011 was 
$65,561.00 annually. Superficially, this seems strong. Yet, these include full and part-
time positions and UKCED does not triangulate the results. The results also include UK 
affiliated companies. Affiliated companies “is not well-defined either” (Interview J, 
2012). That is, an affiliated company is not necessarily a USO. It may be a company, not 
based on a university technology, which has some other connection with UKCED. For 
example, the ICC, in partnership with the BBDP, has a “bigger charge than UK. Their 
charge is to help anyone out there” (Interview B, 2012). However, community companies 
who have worked with the ICC are included among UK affiliated companies.  
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Concerning financial data, projects that are funded from outside UK (for instance, by 
a large pharmaceutical company) for a UK project are included in the results. For 
example, for fiscal year 2011, UKCED and Commerce Lexington distributed a report, 
authored by the Lexington Venture Club that indicates “over $69 million in funding” 
from a variety of aggregated sources for startups. What is unclear is where the funding 
was directed. It may have gone to a large number of affiliated companies, or largely to a 
handful. The term startup can also be misleading. University spinoffs are derived from 
UK research. Startups can include USOs, as well as community companies. The report 
provides the brief descriptions of 79 active startups, including contact information for the 
startups’ principals (Lexington Venture Club, 2012). In a number of cases, however, the 
principal is the only employee (Interview J, 2012).  
Intellectual property transfer processes are separate from economic development, 
however, in that the University of Kentucky utilizes a set of benchmark institutions. UK’s 
technology transfer personnel look to other institutions, largely for process influences, 
but caution against outcome-related comparisons. Using institutions as models is 
dependent on the task. For instance, UK looks to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for templates. Many of the 
agreements in use today were developed years ago by some of technology transfer’s most 
influential institutions. MIT provided the template that UK uses for licensing agreements. 
The NIH has developed some of the Material Transfer Agreement templates that UK 
uses. Overall, MIT and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund (WARF) are considered 
“long time leaders” in the transfer process (Interview B, 2012). Richardson suggests, 
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“Probably for people with no resources, we’ve done better than anyone.”  He contends 
that, 
There are institutions that are not traditionally considered models, but have done 
well because they had resources…The general guideline is that one out of a 
hundred inventions will ever make money. And out of the hundred that makes 
money, only one out of that hundred will make enough to cover patent expenses, 
and then one out of that, will make significant money. So downstream, the 
chances are extremely small. Most university tech transfer offices that make 
money-make money on one big hit and the size of the hit is what determines [the 
return]. But we had some medium, nothing huge, but we have enough to make a 
couple million a year on average over time. 
 
He continues that for many years, the University of Notre Dame had few resources, but 
they have been able to pull ahead of the pack recently. In comparison, however, “The 
ones that have just amazing-like WARF…that was from Vitamin D and Warfarin.” 
Intermittently, institutions, such as Florida State University will “have a hit… [like] 
Taxol.” The chemotherapy drug brought in “$20 million a year…with one person in the 
office.” Yet, when a “hit” results in a single license, increasing the number of personnel 
is risky. Human resources tend to remain constant (Interview B, 2012). Outcome related 
comparisons are less reliable than sharing processes across institutions.   
“We wanna benchmark against those [institutions] that everybody else in the 
university is benchmarking, even though we don’t fit” (Interview B, 2012). Among UK’s 
benchmarks, the university has the least amount of federal funding. Although UK ranks 
low on a number of comparative measures, its technology transfer results places the 
institution “mid pack” (Interview B, 2012).  Technology transfer personnel argue that 
with fewer resources than benchmarks, mid-level performance should be considered 
strong, but there is constant pressure to be in the top. Although UK has a strong faculty, it 
is limited by its size and funding, compared to a benchmark like The Ohio State 
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University, for example. UK’s budget cuts in recent years have led several faculty 
inventors to transfer to other institutions. When one strong faculty inventor leaves, it can 
have a large impact. The recent loss of one pharmacy professor has reduced annual IP 
disclosures by ten. By Dave Richardson’s estimate, approximately 20% of university 
faculty disclose 50% of UK’s intellectual property. Richardson also contends that 
tracking data, such as AUTM measures, does not reveal much about the effectiveness of 
the technology transfer operation, although AUTM data are frequently cited on 
institutional technology transfer websites. 
“I’ve never met anybody that marketed at any university that’s ever done a 
[technology] license based on someone finding it on the internet. It’s [institutional TT 
websites] internal PR. You don’t get licenses from that.” License counts are also not a 
robust indication of effectiveness or possible economic development. Richardson 
suggests than an “infinite number of licenses” could be “worthless.” He notes that some 
institutions have developed reputations for compiling license counts. “Like Utah, they 
have a ton of licenses to look at, but the guy that ran the office was setting up companies 
and licensing to companies that weren’t even real.” Moreover, “We have 47 companies 
this year. How many of these companies have employees? (indicating very few).”  He 
argues that there are several ways to “game this system if that’s what you want to do… 
For a while, we were number one in startups. [It] didn’t mean a whole lot.” 
Public Accountability 
 Unlike public institutions, TT dominant universities, such as Stanford, are not 
held to the same standards for economic development. Their efforts have led to economic 
growth, but “that’s not their emphasis” (Interview B, 2012). The public, however, is 
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aware of the promise of technology clusters and “is not patient about this” (Interview C, 
2012). Institutional research strengths, commercialization models, and job classifications 
can all influence the perception of spinoffs’ economic influence on the community. 
In terms of commercial research disclosures and products, UK’s highly ranked 
College of Pharmacy is likely the strongest contributor (Interview B, Interview E, 
Interview F Interview I; 2012). The pharmaceutical market, however, poses a problem for 
USO development. “It is probably the least sure area” (Interview B, 2012). In order to 
confront the issue, UKCED has devised a licensing and acquisition strategy for 
pharmaceutical technology. While that model is more cost effective, it interferes with the 
economic development objective.  
Several investors from the area earned their wealth in the food, equine, or coal 
industries. There is often a disconnect, in terms of how to develop a drug company, 
because there is not a concentration of pharmaceutical industry veterans in Kentucky. 
Developing a spinoff related to animal drugs, through the College of Agriculture, or even 
pharmaceutical related manufacturing, are often easier to accommodate (Interview B, 
Interview I; 2012). As far as disclosures, UK’s medical school and pharmacy school 
projects occasionally overlap, in that pharmacists can assist with issues of drug delivery.  
The issue of commercializing pharmaceuticals is much more complicated (Interview B, 
2012). 
Pharmaceuticals often demonstrate great potential in animal research that does not 
translate to humans (Interview B, Interview F; 2012). Moreover, pharmaceuticals that test 
well are difficult to launch anywhere in the nation, not strictly Kentucky (Interview I, 
2012). Because of stringent federal guidelines for clinical trials, the investment horizon 
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for pharmaceutical technologies is lengthy and riddled with opportunities for a project to 
“die” (Interview B, Interview E, Interview F; 2012).  Drug development can take 
“probably close to a million dollars, seven-plus years, and you still may not have 
anything at the end…typically there’ s nothing left” (Interview F, 2012). Rather than 
strictly seeking capital locally, pharmaceutical spinoffs can often license their work to a 
subsidiary of a large drug manufacturer. Even that route can lead to termination of 
research and development, though. In the past, UK projects that were going well were 
terminated when the subsidiary or parent company was acquired by or merged with 
another company. When new management comes in, projects are placed under review. 
For a variety of reasons, pharmaceutical manufacturers can choose to terminate a strong 
project. One way that UK has attempted to recover from these losses is to implement 
milestone fees. As a product passes specific milestones in clinical trials, licensees remit 
large fees to the university, to accommodate for the lengthy development phase 
(Interview B, 2012). In addition, the university employs an acquisition model. 
Economic development is less likely to occur with an acquisition model in place, but 
UK has found it difficult to amass the large amounts of money required for multiple 
patents and to finance lengthy development phases that are high risk. While there is no 
average patent cost, the minimum is approximately $10,000 and can range up to $30,000 
per patent. The examiner who prosecutes the patent controls the timeframe and cost. “It’s 
an adversarial process…The examiner is not there to work with you” (Interview B, 
2012).  The appeals process is also lengthy, costly and not a guarantee. The institution 
must pay $5,000 to file a brief. The chances of winning an appeal are about 50%. If that 
occurs, the judgment is based on procedural issues, not the novelty of the invention. 
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Appeals are returned to the initial examiner and “that makes them mad, and so they find 
another citation [to use to reject the patent application]” (Interview B, 2012). Licensing 
technologies is often the “easiest way” (Interview C, 2012) to approach technology 
transfer. Selling a USO to a larger corporation provides an alternative that can recover 
investment costs. It may generate less significant revenue than a homerun technology, but 
it is well understood that large pharmaceutical corporations would not thrive in Kentucky 
(Interview B, 2012).  
Technology transfer officers are highly aware of the economic development 
objectives of their operations. They argue, however, that it is not as simple as conducting 
more research and creating jobs, particularly at a publicly supported institution. 
Well, and there’s this theory of clusters and successes.  Great success-Silicon 
Valley. You can walk out of your door and talk to 20 other people that know what 
you’re doing and have done it before.  San Francisco-the same. Boston-the same. 
There’s just certain areas of the country where you have more expertise. That 
have done it-these clusters, Research Triangle. Unfortunately, we looked at 
Research Triangle and go, ‘Oh, that’s a great model. Let’s do that.’  20 years late 
and a billion [dollars] short. So, you’re always trying to do what everybody else 
tried to do on the cheap. (Interview B, 2012) 
 
An alternative perspective to the economic development objective is that “any time 
you’ve got public dollars going in [to a program], it’s going to impact the 
public…You’ve gotta tell me hopefully people understand how important this 
is(Interview C, 2012).”  Terry Atkinson (pseudonym, Interview C, 2012) argues that most 
people understand that significant job growth in the U.S. is a result of small business 
creation. He argues that it is not something that can happen overnight. It requires building 
and fostering an entrepreneurial community, which requires a public investment. 
Moreover, although technology transfer has not facilitated extensive job growth, it has 
brought about a number of high paying jobs. His contention is that individuals with those 
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positions develop the local economy through the money they spend frequenting local 
establishments-a trickledown effect.  
Dave Richardson remains skeptical. In relation to the impact on the Lexington 
economy, he argues that,  
You’re not really making that big of a ripple [considering the Lexington 
population of approximately] 250,000. It’s kind of like that ‘small business is the 
backbone’ [of the economy], or whatever…You can have a little bit of effect, but 
we haven’t had a Google. We haven’t had something that’s going to build 
hundreds of jobs. Only Republicans will believe that….and unfortunately it takes 
an investment, so you’re only making the rich richer. 
 
Atkinson believes that the Lexington economy can be affected, but the approach must 
be adjusted. Noting that the types of jobs created thus far are “manufacturing, 
distribution, they’re service-related great paying jobs. But they’re not producing the 
product.” He argues that the appropriate method for economic development is to utilize 
institutional intellectual property to create “the next big widget”, develop, and manage it 
locally.  
UKCED’s Accomplishments to Date 
Technology Transfer personnel indicate several challenges to their mission, but also 
cite a number of accomplishments. They include office technology advancements to 
streamline processes, establishment of procedures within the organization, and outreach 
efforts. The challenges of UK’s TBED enterprise are largely related to its economic 
development mission. At this stage in its growth, most of the accomplishments are related 
to establishing a foundation for effective processes and building community support.  
Two major accomplishments were cited in relation to efficiency. First, the technology 
transfer office created a relational database that assigns a case number to every 
intellectual property disclosure. Still early in the process, the office currently has 1,900 
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cases entered. This allows a user to extract all of the traditional paperwork that 
accompanies the patenting process: the application, patentability opinion, prosecution 
history, and licensing information. In a small office, the integration of the database has 
provided more space, although physical files are still kept for a time, and streamlined 
processes. In addition, UK’s TBED enterprise has instituted an Intellectual Property 
Committee (IPC) to facilitate IP disclosures. It is a standing committee consisting of 
diverse faculty with technological expertise. Faculty, staff, or student inventors meet with 
the IPC to discuss their discoveries and the committee determines whether UK has an 
interest in pursuing it (for patenting or copyrighting). If not, the IP is released back to the 
inventor. Disclosures are facilitated through an online submission portal to streamline the 
process (Interview B, 2012).   
UKCED has also made a concerted effort at outreach. The intellectual property 
division currently conducts campus seminars to reach faculty, staff, and funded graduate 
students. Personnel also cite collaboration with partner agencies, the establishment of the 
Bluegrass Angels, and work to recognize and support emerging areas of entrepreneurial 
interest. This includes attendance at conventions for game developers, as well as 
significant investments by the Angels in gaming technology ventures. Finally, they point 
to strengthening community relationships and teams. They agree that it will be a long 
process, but personnel have seen some changes in the Lexington community, in terms of 
embracing entrepreneurialism. Atkinson suggests that some of the change within the 
community results from increased efforts to disseminate progress toward economic 
development as part of a commitment to public accountability (Interview B, Interview C, 
Interview I, Interview J; 2012).  
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The Impact of Administrative Change 
Of the participants in this study, technology transfer personnel were the most 
impacted by administrative changes at UK. They indicate that job duties and processes 
have remained relatively stable, but that the changes have influenced the structure of their 
organization in terms of financing and security, as well as the morale. For the time being, 
technology transfer personnel carry on with their responsibilities in a standard fashion. 
However, the university administration has stated that UKCED will not exist in the same 
format as it did under Len Heller, who retired in 2012. President Capilouto has directed 
some committees to determine the most effective organizational structure for the 
University of Kentucky. The committees are currently examining the best organizational 
fit for the various divisions of UKCED (Interview A, Interview I; 2012).  
Over time, the divisions of UKCED may be shifted into centers, institutes, or 
individual colleges. “Dr. Tracy [UK’s Vice President for Research] has a lot more on his 
plate [than Heller]” (Interview J; 2012). The assumption is that, with so many 
departments, Tracy will remain VP of Research, but the individual pieces of UKCED will 
be spread out and report to a variety of upper of level administrators. Kemp argues that 
the work of UKCED will remain the same. Only the organizational model will change. 
As he notes, the Von Allmen Center was initially housed in the Gatton College. President 
Todd made the decision to create a separate office under a Vice President for 
Commercialization and Economic Development. He suggests it is simply a shift in 
priorities, stating that President Capilouto is “very supportive of this, but it’s not his 
passion. It is different than Dr. Todd’s. Dr. Capilouto’s passion is undergraduate 
education [and] infrastructure”.  Kemp and Richardson agree that job duties evolve over 
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time, but the disclosure, patenting and licensing processes generally remain the same. 
When the Von Allmen Center was located in the College of Business and Economics, 
MBA students assisted with business plans for USOs. Kemp notes that he enjoyed 
working with students and looks forward to the possibility of returning under the Gatton 
College and working with them again. “It can work either way, but it does matter a little 
bit where the university wants to put its priorities.”  
The change has influenced UKCED’s budget and personnel over the past year.  While 
the UKCED employees did not speak to it, one of the Angel investors indicates, “It’s 
been very much downsized here” (Interview A, 2012). Kemp advises that UKCED has 
made some “voluntary budget cuts” in anticipation of organizational change “because 
there’s some uncertainty…but it happens everywhere.” In addition to budget cuts, 
UKCED has also secured grant funding to assist with its operations. UKCED has 
historically utilized grant funding. The two grants are not a new addition to the UKCED 
budget, but do provide some sense of security.  
The Von Allmen Center has secured two grants. One from the state’s Cabinet for 
Economic Development, was initially earned in 2002. Kemp’s salary is paid out of that 
funding. The grant has a matching requirement of one-for-one that comes out of a 
separate piece of the university’s budget. Although the amounts have changed over the 
years, the funding has ranged from $150,000-$175,000, annually, which is matched by 
UK. The current amount is $175,000. The Von Allmen Center has also earned a federal 
grant, in its seventh year, from the Economic Development Administration (EDA) for the 
University Center Program, which provides funding to university innovation centers. 
Each state is awarded one grant and they are generally furnished to public land grant 
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institutions. The EDA grant has traditionally been awarded in 3-year blocks, but funding 
is prorated (ranging from $130,000-$145,000) annually. The EDA grant must also be 
matched by the university. The Von Allmen Center has re-competed for the grant twice; 
and was recently re-approved, now for a five-year block of time. (The EDA grant 
structure has been adjusted). Grant applications require match commitment letters from 
upper level administrators. Previously, Dr. Todd or the Vice President for Budget and 
Planning submitted the letters, because it strengthened the application. However, the last 
match letter was submitted by the Vice President for Research. The applications also 
require letters of support from the community; Commerce Lexington, the Bluegrass 
Angels, and the state government, because the grant is intended to enhance job creation. 
State applications are much easier to submit. “As long as they’re happy with what you’re 
doing, you get it…you don’t really have to apply” (Interview J, 2012).  
Aside from budgetary and reorganizational concerns, TT personnel admit that there is 
currently a difference in their perceptions of administrative priorities. The effect of 
different administrative priorities and organizational changes, however, is not the same 
for each individual. Terry Atkinson agreed to speak to the changes but requested that his 
comments not be recorded.  Roger Kemp addresses the changes pragmatically, citing that 
change is continuous. Dave Richardson seems unconcerned about recent reorganizations. 
“Lee Todd was, at least he said, he was extraordinarily interested in economic 
development. That was his thing.” As for Dr. Capilouto, “I think that he’s a little 
overwhelmed with building dorm rooms and enlarging freshmen classes. I haven’t seen 
that he’s turned his attention to this so far.” Concerning Dr. Heller’s retirement and any 
influence Dr. Tracy’s considerable responsibilities have on UKCED’s direction, 
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Richardson says, “Oh, I think he’s [Heller] an idiot and he had his hands on everything. I 
don’t know if that [Tracy’s responsibilities] affects anything.” Richardson argues that the 
researchers are the most important contributors to technology transfer and upper level 
administrators are secondary. Richardson notes, 
I think if someone in that position could obtain resources, that would’ve been a 
great thing. But it didn’t really happen.  The people that were hired weren’t hired 
to do really tech transfer. They were hired to do publicity…and it was more PR 
for upper people as opposed to the program itself, my people. You know [Dr. 
Todd’s declared passion], just buzz words for investors who knew nothing.  
 
In addition to technology transfer personnel and their operations, the Bluegrass Angels 
play a large role in UK’s TBED enterprise. Angel investors were also asked to reflect 
upon their organization, challenges to and accomplishments toward their goals, and any 
influence administrative changes have had on their organization. See author’s note.1  
The Bluegrass Angels 
As part of Kemp’s initial efforts to enhance technology transfer operations at the 
University of Kentucky, he collaborated with President Lee Todd, former Gatton College 
Dean Dick Furst, and an investor, to establish the Bluegrass Angels, Incorporated (BGA) 
in 2004. Currently, the Angels is a group of approximately 40 accredited investors who 
provide seed capital to university and community entrepreneurs.  
 Angel membership. 
The Angel investors who participated in this study are all heavily involved in the 
organization. They are highly educated and wealthy individuals. Their educational 
backgrounds include electrical and software engineering degrees, two Masters of 
                                                 
1
 References to “venture capital” have been left in parts of this section in order to remain true to the 
original responses. Atkinson (Interview C) provides an explanation. “People will always call everything 
venture capital [but they are] two different kettles of fish.” Angel investments are considered seed capital. 
Seed capital is the round after friends and family. 
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Business Administration, and one ABD (All But Dissertation) towards a Ph.D. in 
Political Science prior to entering the business world. They all attended Ivy League or 
highly ranked public institutions. Two of the Angels have served as President or CEO of 
their companies. The other’s experience is as an entrepreneur with startup companies in 
Atlanta and California, and now oversees his family’s large investment portfolio.  
Kemp refers to the networking process that takes place to build an investor group. 
The Angel investors who participated in this study were either invited by an acquaintance 
or sought out membership in the BGA. None is an original member. For narrative 
purposes, they are referred to by the following pseudonyms: Randall Booker (Interview 
A, 2012), Gary Chiles (Interview E, 2012), and Rob Ellison (Interview F, 2012). For Rob 
Ellison, his interest stemmed from his experience as an entrepreneur, as well as his 
difficulty finding solid investment opportunities on his own.  
It’s [BGA] something I found. My dad and I, we get business plans and people 
coming in to pitch ideas on a fairly regular basis, so we would evaluate 
those…and decided that usually, when somebody’s making an outbound call to 
us, they’ve exhausted the other areas. Because…we don’t have a little sign 
hanging out front saying ‘we invest in young companies’. So typically, by the 
time they were calling us, they’d already kind of gone through their traditional, 
local sources of capital, or whatever, and were unable to get funded.  
 
Ellison opted proactively to join BGA for access to a larger number of presentations, 
before they had been turned down by a number of groups.  
Gary Chiles was invited to join BGA because he is an acquaintance of Randall 
Booker, and saw the opportunity as a way to diversify his interests. The meetings provide 
an opportunity to participate in something he would not normally do. As for Booker, his 
affiliation was “really sort of happenstance.” He ran into Dick Furst (former Dean of the 
Gatton College of Business and Economics) at a meeting. Furst suggested that he meet 
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Roger Kemp. Kemp got Booker involved about six months after establishing the BGA, 
which was then referred to as an entrepreneur’s club, sponsored by Gatton College. He 
recalls it was a small group, “not really much of anybody” and he became involved with 
its advisory board.  
I was looking for something to do.  The whole idea of tech transfer, 
commercialization. Our kids had gone to Stanford. I went to Harvard Business 
School.  I’d seen in Boston and in Silicon Valley, I’d seen how this could work, 
you know… And there was a  meeting at Harvard Business School, where they 
just were trying to link Harvard alumni in the Boston area with the office of Tech 
Transfer at Harvard, and they filled it. They  filled the classroom with 100-and-
something people…and had a bunch of students present. And it was the first time 
that I’d really had a chance … to sort of listen to the students talk, and to realize 
that in many cases, the students of today who were doing this research, are much 
more interested in trying to start a business…[than they] might have been back 
when I was in college.  
  
Booker believes that as the economy has changed, students have become more concerned 
about how they will pay off debt and whether they will be able to find employment. He 
was beginning to feel that there was a considerable amount of interest in technology 
transfer for economic development, and had just completed reading Derek Bok’s, 
Universities in the Marketplace. Booker thought Bok told an interesting story and, 
although he disagreed with some of Bok’s assertions, felt passionate about becoming 
involved in helping early stage companies. Around the same time, Furst was serving as 
an advisor to President Todd, and asked Booker to help establish the BGA’s “two very 
small venture funds to help these companies, one of which is fully vested and the other is 
about two-thirds vested.” 
 Angel Recruitment. 
Angel recruitment is not a formal process. Members frequently bring one or two 
guests who observe the process and determine whether they would like to join. 
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Additional recruitment occurs through networking with friends and colleagues who are 
“sort of like-minded or might be interested” (Interview E, 2012). Some aspects of 
membership are inherently prohibitive. The membership fee is $1,000, which covers the 
cost of beer or wine and appetizers after the meetings (Interview F, 2012). The group’s 
standing meeting time is 4:00 pm and “some professionals that would have the 
wherewithal to do this investing are just unable to come to a meeting that starts at 4:00 in 
the afternoon” (Interview E, 2012). As addressed in the definitions section of the study, 
BGA members must also be accredited investors.  
 Demographics. 
The Angel investor group is generally retired or semi-retired professionals (Interview 
F, 2012).  “The age cohort tends to be a little on the older side, but there’s a smattering of 
younger people as well” (Interview E, 2012).  Recruiting diverse membership can be 
difficult. Booker notes,  
We can’t [recruit] by putting an ad in the paper…we can’t accept a lot of 
people… And I mean in today’s world, unfortunately, you know, with the class 
divisions. I don’t want to make a political statement, but it’s an unfortunate by-
product. A lot of people are kind of– they’re just not really wanting to make a big 
deal of the fact that they’re in that room. I mean they don’t want – they’re not 
interested in a lot of publicity. We’ll talk about the group as a group, but we don’t 
like to talk about the individuals as individuals. I mean that’s – we’re really 
sensitive about that.   
 
He also concedes, 
 We could do better, you know, the Angels. If you look at our membership list, 
it’s primarily a bunch of old white guys, and we don’t have that many younger 
people.  And by younger, I mean like 30s and 40s.  I don’t really mean 20s 
because those – They don’t have any money, but 30s or 40s, you know, people 
that have made some money who are younger. We don’t have a lot of women, a 
lot of people of color.  Of course, the community doesn't have a lot of people with 
color, so I don't feel all that badly about it, but we don’t. And I mean that’s just 
reality. It’s an issue that we have to deal with. 
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 Angel Funds. 
BGA has established two venture funds. The exact amount in the funds is unclear. 
Booker indicates that one is $2 million and the other is $4 million. Atkinson suggests that 
the funds contain $2 million and $3.1 million. Venture Fund I has $2 million. Venture 
Fund II, also known as the sidecar fund, has approximately $4 million. The theory behind 
the sidecar fund is to serve as something like a mutual fund. If an individual investor did 
not have the inclination to vet each opportunity, s/he could invest in the sidecar fund. 
Volunteer fund managers utilize a committee structure for tasks such as review and due 
diligence. Therefore, without making an individual investment, Angels can still invest in 
companies (Interview E, 2012).  
In practice, however, the sidecar fund has been over-utilized. Many of the Angels are 
currently choosing not to make individual investments “and they’re just allowing their 
investment in the [sidecar] fund to be a proxy for investing, themselves” (Interview A, 
2012).  
The Angels are finding that the fund may make an initial investment up to $150,000, 
with the understanding that there will likely be additional funding rounds requiring a 
doubling of the investment. With only $4 million in the sidecar fund, members are not 
willing to invest more than ten percent in one company. That allows approximately ten 
investments per year. What they are learning, “and we’re always learning” (Interview A, 
2012), is that it is less risky to invest lower amounts up front because misreading a 
company’s potential and losing everything is difficult. However, “it’s also very 
demoralizing for companies if they just raise a small amount of money because they have 
to think about three months later, six months later going back” (Interview A). This can be 
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frustrating because no matter how strong an idea is, fundraising takes an exorbitant 
amount of time. Entrepreneurs would prefer to spend that time “developing their idea, 
fixing the technology, finding customers, [and] building revenue” (Interview A, 2012).  
The Angels’ approach to investments. 
 The presentation of an idea or technology plays an important role in the decision 
making process. The Angels see as many as three presentations per month and do not 
meet two months of the year. They may see up to 30 presentations annually. Presenters 
are generally provided 15 minutes to make their pitches. Afterwards, there is a brief 
question and answer section. Angels occasionally interrupt the presentation prior to the 
Q&A to clarify a point or indicate skepticism about the market projections or business 
plan. Entrepreneurs remain at the meeting for the informal wine and cheese session and 
members can mingle with the presenters (Interview A, Interview E, Interview F; 2012).  
The majority of presentations, about 60%, are referrals from UKCED (Interview A, 
2012).  The decision making process is based upon the quality of presentations. Investors 
are interested in more than the technology. They consider how presenters “tell their 
stories”. If the information is not “packaged” properly for the meeting or the valuation is 
too high, the Angels become disinterested (Interview F, 2012).  Fundamental questions 
are, ‘Is a problem being solved and is the solution unique?’, ‘Does the team work 
together well and represent expertise in the field?’, ‘Are they realistic about going to the 
marketplace in a reasonable timeframe?’ (Interview F, 2012). Other times, the presenter 
has a strong idea, but the space is too “crowded” with multiple companies doing similar 
things (Interview E, Interview F; 2012). Moreover, if the Angels have previously 
invested in technologies in that field “that’s putting a lot of eggs in the [for example] 
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medical device basket.”  Even if the idea is novel, if the portfolio already has a number of 
that type of technology, the response is “Thank you very much. And pass” (Interview F, 
2012). 
The Angels also admit that they are not professional venture capitalists. They turn 
down more opportunities than they invest in, but are often being too eager to invest in 
some of the ideas. “We’ve set a limit, you know, my wife, I call her the auditor on this 
thing. She and I went through this and said…we’ve got about as much tied up in this 
activity as we could” (Interview A, 2012).  It is often difficult to reject an investment 
when it seems strong on paper, and particularly early in their membership, the Angels 
contend that they were naïve about the investment horizons (Interview A, Interview E; 
2012). Another variable that can lead to poor investing is the “cheerleader” investor 
(Interview A, 2012). If one member is particularly interested in a technology or has a 
specific expertise, the Angels may bypass some of their processes and agree to invest 
without fully considering the risk (Interview A, Interview E, Interview F; 2012).  
Some of its early missteps have led BGA to reconsider its strategies. The Angels held 
a planning meeting on November 5, 2012, to discuss their ideas. Some of the focus areas 
included the original vision for the group. Some members expressed the need for a 
clearer definition of the group’s mission. Initially, BGA was established as a seed capital 
group, but it has recently assisted later stage startups with greater financial needs. This 
has consumed more capital than expected. In addition, several members noted that the 
Angels should become more involved in the due diligence process, as well as serve in 
advisory positions in the startups. Members also indicated that they expected to profit 
from investments and to see more exits (BGA Minutes, 2012).  
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Thus far, the Angels have had two exits (where companies returned initial 
investments and profit to the investors) since 2004. A couple of companies have gone out 
of business, and a few more are inactive (Interview A, Interview E; 2012). Moreover, the 
exits were not from UK technology spinoffs. The exits came from Bluegrass Venture 
Fund I. The first company, VRBO, is an online service that provides information about 
vacation homes for rent by the owners. A small company; it was acquired by a larger 
corporation within 18 months of its launch. The second company, Global Shelter, 
manufactures small, blast proof shelters. When a British company acquired Global 
Shelter, “They didn’t make a lot of money but because they [BGA] got out early, the way 
you calculate the return works out pretty good” (Interview A, 2012). The second fund, 
established in 2009, has not had any exits (Interview A, Interview E; 2012). Angel 
investors suggest that the economic recession of 2008 has inhibited both their ability to 
invest and the progression of spinoffs (Interview A, Interview E, Interview F; 2012). 
Aside from the recent economic climate, the investors suggest that there are a few 
challenges to their operation.  
Challenges to investment goals. 
The Angels recognize economic difficulties as a significant challenge to their goals. 
Moreover, the lack of a clear mission and procedures provides additional challenges. The 
Angels suggest that without definitive structures in place, they have found themselves 
with an abundance of opportunities that have not been addressed with appropriate 
expertise. This has contributed to an aversion to risks, a lack of attention and assistance to 
startups, and struggles with entrepreneurs. These issues can contribute to a lack of exits, 
as well.  
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For Booker, it is still too early to tell how some spinoffs will fare. He argues that 
startups, in general, are struggling “because of the economic conditions, because of the 
lack of capital in the region, and in their space, and in the country.” Conceding that there 
have been some failures, he notes that there were not many “big failures” because the 
Angels did not invest much in them from the start. “So maybe I would sit here now and 
say, ‘Well, they were never any good.’” His point is that he regularly tracks the 
progression (or digression) of investment companies. He has come to believe that “our 
upper middle and middle upper groups are the sweet spot.”  Although, he would like to 
see greater political support for small businesses development, “It’s really hard for 
bureaucrats and public servants to work very hard to support the private sector, because 
there are so many naysayers on the other side.” He argues that an important consideration 
during difficult economic times is whether the creation of an entrepreneurial environment 
within the community, itself, improves the economic climate. Nonetheless, Chiles 
suggests that economic uncertainty has led individuals who would normally be inclined 
to invest in startups “decide to keep their money in their pockets.” Chiles tempers that 
statement by indicating,  
I don’t want to overplay that because I think-at least at the Angel investing level-  
I mean-we were able to raise this $4 million fund in that environment…I don’t 
think most investors are waiting to invest as we decide who’s going to win the 
next presidential election. That’s not been my experience, ever.  
 
He does think that during the “crisis of ’07 and ’08” individuals who would have 
otherwise invested probably “sat on their hands for a while just waiting to see how things 
are going.” In an economic recession, Chiles feels that investors have become less patient 
for payoffs. He notes that an investment that previously had a horizon of four to seven 
85 
 
years before payoff has been stretched indefinitely, so certain types of investments are 
likely not seeing the money that they used to see.  
The lack of clear goals and procedures has also been a challenge for BGA. “I think 
we have a problem with communication, and with expectations. I absolutely do” 
(Interview A, 2012). This lack of structure was the impetus for the Angels’ November 
planning meeting. It was an opportunity, 
To evaluate what we do, both from the fund standpoint and  also,  just the 
general membership and how-what the process is. How we recruit new members, 
how we market ourselves…The questions are being asked internally… [We’ve 
got to] get the  members together and say, ‘Ok, how do we do this better?’ 
(Interview F, 2012) 
 
Strategies are being revised to consider how to ensure that the Angels see the companies 
that they want to see and make decisions quickly. They are considering, from an 
operational perspective, how members could contribute experience, as well as money, to 
spinoffs. “It’s historically been footloose. You just show up to meetings. If you like an 
idea…you raise your hand and get on an e-mail [list]. You either invest or you 
don’t…We’re trying to look at the process.” (Interview F, 2012).  BGA is examining 
establishing a group of volunteers with CEO or CFO experience who can assist young 
companies with setting up their business plans. They recently found a COO for a startup 
to assist with areas like payroll and insurance, as well as a project management strategy. 
It has made the entrepreneur’s schedule much more manageable and eased some business 
related concerns of investors (Interview A, Interview E, Interview F; 2012). 
Entrepreneurs intuitively know many things, but business operations are not usually one 
of them. The Angels believe that facilitating operations could enhance intellectual 
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property that is strong and could be executed, “but…calls for some adult supervision 
sometimes” (Interview F). 
For the investors, weeding through the business ideas can be a daunting task, as well. 
They see a wide variety of opportunities, that any single member is not qualified to pass 
judgment. There may be one individual knowledgeable enough, but BGA does not track 
expertise. A proposal is to compile a spreadsheet of different member talents, so an 
entrepreneur must complete a pre-screening with an expert before presenting. This could 
also assist members, in that they occasionally see presentations that are not of any 
investment interest. A diversified portfolio remains an important goal, however, so 
matching investors to specific fields is an imperative of the group. It would also provide 
opportunities, similar to the recent COO assignment to a startup, for members to coach 
entrepreneurs with strong ideas before their presentations (Interview F).  
In conjunction with the economic climate of the past few years, some structural issues 
have led investors to make decisions they lament. This has contributed to some risk 
aversion among members of the group. Ellison argues, “They’ve got their ten minutes to 
wow us.” Ten minutes does not provide much time to consider the investment. He 
suggests that investors might be more comfortable if there were “pre-meetings” or some 
process in place to allow the Angels more time to understand the technology and business 
plan. Members have also become apprehensive toward investing because of a “herd 
mentality” among the group. “This has happened to me. I specifically think about it in 
Fund I because I have specific memories about it (Interview A, 2012).” When one 
member is relentless in support of an investment, decisions become less disciplined. 
Generally, the group informally ensures that companies meet minimum criteria, but a 
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strong member with either positive or negative opinions, “can really steamroll the thing 
through.”  Because of difficulties when this occurred with early investments, though, 
“We’re a little bit better at that now, but it can be a problem (Interview A, 2012).” 
Another challenge is attendance and involvement. Ellison hopes that at least 60% of the 
group will attend meetings, and at least 10%-15% of them will personally invest in 
companies. However, “the economy has stung people…people are a little more careful 
about it. But its venture investing…It’s risky investments by definition.” As Booker 
indicates, the theory behind the funds was that the sidecar fund would augment individual 
investments. Risk aversion has led to the opposite process. Ellison agrees, “I don’t see 
too often where individual members. I can say this maybe. Never have I seen where 
individual members invest where the fund hasn’t already led. I’d like to see that change a 
little bit.” 
 The group also feels that investors could do a better job of advising and 
monitoring startups. Ellison argues that, currently, only four or five members personally 
invest in startups. He believes that if people with expertise would involve themselves 
with the companies, it would lead to more private investments. “Once somebody’s 
involved sort of operationally or strategically, then they usually, if they like it, will get 
involved financially.” He feels that a hands-on approach could potentially lead to more 
exits. Ellison travelled to an investment group meeting in Louisville and saw a different 
approach.  
I went to Louisville. A guy was pitching up there. They have this little venture 
club. I  forget what it’s called. They don’t have a sidecar fund, but they are much 
more involved, it seemed, in getting groups of them together to write-each of 
them-a $25,000 check-collectively $150,000. Whereas I look at Bluegrass Angels 
and usually the way the dominos fall is the fund says yes. We set the terms. Then 
wait and see who comes on board as individuals. 
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The group does have some individuals who become involved with companies, but the 
majority, have day jobs and do not have the time. Working with a startup is essentially 
volunteering to see the company grow. Volunteers are generally retired or semi-retired 
investors who participated in due diligence and developed an emotional investment in 
addition to the financial one (Interview E, 2012). Ellison considers, perhaps, assistance or 
monitoring should be part of the due diligence process. The Angels could provide terms 
that indicate, “We will only invest if you do X, Y, and Z.” He believes oversight is 
important, particularly, because the Angels have had some antagonistic relationships with 
CEOs in the past. In some cases, entrepreneurs “look at investors as providing capital… 
[and] chaff at investors trying to get involved” (Interview A, 2012). Atkinson agrees,  
There are faculty that think they have to be everything.  And I hate to be the one 
telling you this, but I’ll say it. There are faculty, sadly enough, they are very, very 
intelligent and great in their discipline. They’re great teachers, but to tell them 
that they might not be the right one? They don’t have the knowledge or expertise. 
They bristle at that.  And why I don’t know.  You can’t be an expert in 
everything. ‘Oh, I know what I’m talking about.’  What do you mean?  ‘I’m a 
faculty, I publish’ ‘Yes, you do.  Have you run a business?  Have you gone and 
done the dog and pony show to raise money?’ That’s not a lot of fun...  Most 
faculty can’t do that-don’t want to do that. 
 
Ellison had a negative experience with a faculty CEO in the past, and he regrets not 
speaking up early. When he first joined BGA, he invested $25,000 in the company in a 
$2 million round. “It was royally mismanaged.” He contends that the Angels should have 
monitored the company more closely from the beginning. The first investment 
communication the Angels received was asking for more funding, immediately. He 
indicates, “It was not that they just screwed around. A lot of mistakes were made within 
that company. But the biggest mistake was not keeping investors abreast of what was 
going on.” He believes that the CEO knew, or should have known, months earlier that the 
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company was about to run out of funds. The most disconcerting part was that the CEO, 
who was a business professor at a university in another state, did not follow standard 
business procedures.  
I’m still dubious as to whether his claims-his business claims-were valid or 
not…because  structurally the company wasn’t set up correctly… [There were] 
some things I always  questioned. I just didn’t sort of stand up and say ‘Why 
didn’t you set this up?’…But he came from a business school, [a] professor from 
the University of XXX.  I figured he  kinda knew… and especially small business 
development.  I thought maybe he knew something I didn’t know at the 
beginning...So there were warning signs that I probably should have – and I’m not 
sure the due diligence was done.  On that particular  company, there was a bit of 
nepotism involved.  There were some familial relations with employees and 
things. I think it still has complications. The problem is that they’ve, at least 
locally, they’ve kind of screwed up the – no investor wants to touch it now after 
what’s happened in the past. 
 
Booker, Chiles and Ellison all agree that as a group they should better assist their 
startups. They are also looking into assisting staff at the Von Allmen Center and the ICC. 
UKCED staff work with entrepreneurs before they present to the Angels. Because they 
are not investors, entrepreneurs sometimes do not accept their feedback. When the person 
offering advice is prepared to write a check, entrepreneurs seem more attentive. The hope 
is that additional assistance will enhance startup performance and potentially lead to more 
exits.  
 Angel accomplishments. 
Unlike the technology transfer personnel, BGA members considered their 
achievements from a personal level, as well as from the perspective of economic 
development. Their positions may differ because they are not professional colleagues. 
Although Angel investing can provide revenue, and some of the volunteers spend as 
much time working on projects as they would at a full-time job, it is still at-will 
membership. They do not need the group in order to make a living. In addition, the 
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Angels admit that their organization lacks a clear mission or objective (other than to earn 
money from investments). Dave Richardson believes, “In order to play that game, you’ve 
got to have the money.  And I think a lot of them play because it’s a hobby. They need 
something to do.” Whatever the case, their responses include thoughts about economic 
development, but lack concrete methods to achieve it.  
From a personal perspective, the Angels offer accomplishments or achievements that 
reflect individual satisfaction. Ellison considers his personal involvement with spinoffs 
an achievement. He enjoyed developing the pitch and “getting kind of the deal going. 
That, to me, was fun. I enjoy doing that. I think there was a good idea. That’s the reason I 
was involved.” He is proud of his efforts to set up one USO’s business plan because it 
resulted in solid funding.  
Every door that they knocked on, basically, made an investment… The idea that 
he [the entrepreneur] had is partly the way we structured the presentation of the 
deal.  So that  was satisfying. I’d like to do more of those types of things. I like to 
get involved with the companies rather than just writing the checks and saying, 
‘Good luck.’ 
 
Ellison indicates that being hands-on with entrepreneurs is a passion because he has been 
an entrepreneur. He feels he learned from his mistakes and enjoys sharing his experiences 
with entrepreneurs, so that they do not make some of the “common mistakes…when 
people take financing.”  
Although Chiles does not specifically refer to achievements on a personal level, he 
does discuss his involvement in BGA in terms of its appeal. “I just am fascinated by 
scary smart people who come out of their labs or out of their offices at the 
university…and want to start a company and solve a new problem.” He also notes that 
the presentations are “interesting and intellectually stimulating.” Booker, as well, feels, 
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“It’s interesting, and it’s so rewarding.” In some ways, the members appear to approach 
their involvement like a pastime, rather than a pursuit.   
While the results of their activities may not be immediately evident to the public, the 
Angels take pride in their efforts to enhance economic development, but openly admit 
that they would like to make a profit.  
Generally, if the company is successful, then their [individual Angel’s] personal 
investment is successful.  If they’re becoming successful, then they hire people.  
It’s economically beneficial for the community. But I don’t think individual 
members, by and large, are looking at deals and saying, ‘Yeah, we need to do this 
for the community.’ We’re probably just in it just for ourselves.  The secondary 
benefit is for the community. Now, from the fund standpoint, I think, again, we’re 
managing money for the investors. So I don’t think we can look at it as a 
community development effort – sort of legally or ethically. I think it just really 
has to be just, ‘Is this the one thing that’s gonna make our  investors the rate [of 
return] they expect?’ Right? (Interview F, 2012) 
 
The BGA members are satisfied with their ability to raise $4 million for the sidecar 
fund in a struggling economy. They are also content with their decision making related to 
economic development. “We make decisions based, not just on the profit motive, but also 
based on what we think is going to be good for the local community and state” (Interview 
E, 2012). Booker agrees, noting, “It is about making money at the end of the day”, but it 
is also about the community. “I mean it is Capitalism. And I’m not ashamed to say that. 
But again, we need some of these things to pay off. And they’ve demonstrated that they 
have, you know, in other communities, especially out West and in Boston.” He tempers 
the statement by clarifying that investors’ ambitions of economic change should be 
balanced. He is well aware that the impact of “Google or something” can distort 
economic data.  
Without implementing direct economic change, the Angels believe that they have 
helped to foster an environment that encourages a new economy, with state-of-the-art 
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jobs in the Central Kentucky area. Booker contends that, although there have not been an 
abundance of successfully funded spinoffs, “Absent our interest in trying to encourage 
and finance these…I think there would be even fewer…I think that the community has 
come together to demonstrate that it’s interested in this activity.” 
In terms of organizational achievements, economic development is approached as a 
work-in-progress. Before facilitating change, the environment must be in place.   
So I would say, you know, the biggest achievement we have is working to create 
the environment. Have we developed businesses that as of today are writing big 
checks to UK for royalties and stuff like that?  No, but if like [one of the medical 
technology investments] ... hits the way it could, it’ll be writing large checks to 
the University  of Kentucky. I mean that’s the whole – it’s just we need that. You 
know, it’s either gonna happen or it isn’t. If it doesn't happen, you know, it’s 
gonna be – I will have spent five or six years of my life working on something 
that didn't work, but that’s not the first or last time. I really believe that it should, 
it just it takes a long time. As I said earlier, we’re operating under a very difficult 
economic environment, and everything’s slower. Have people made a lot of 
money? No, okay, that’s number one. I’ll be honest about that. Number two, have 
we created an environment? We have the funds and we have the venue. We have 
the meetings every month. We get a certain number of people. We’re trying to get 
more. I think we’ve done that. That’s an achievement. We’re helping create this 
entrepreneurial – we’re part of a number of people in town…creating this 
entrepreneurial [environment]. I think that’s the biggest achievement we have.   
 And I think creating the environment-you have to do that first before you expect  
all that stuff. (Interview A, 2012) 
 
The other Angels agree that enhancing the local economy is an important aspect of their 
activities. Chiles suggests that there are probably individuals outside of the business 
community who assume that what they are doing is “all about money or greed”. He notes, 
“Capitalism only works if…people are motivated to make money.” However, he 
describes the Angels’ work as having a “double bottom line”. Chiles believes he speaks 
for almost every member, when he says that investors look for opportunities for a return, 
but they are also interested in companies “that are going to grow and develop here in the 
region and have a positive impact on the community and on the economic growth of the 
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state.” He is also proud that the Angels have had opportunities to invest in companies 
outside the region and- other than a couple of “minor exceptions”- they have declined.  
Chiles admits that tax incentives for investors often discourage them from investing in 
non-regional companies, but prior to those incentives, the community benefit always 
factored into investment decisions. 
 The impact of administrative change. 
Unlike UKCED officers’ experiences, the administrative changes at the university 
have not influenced the funding or operations of the Bluegrass Angels. The Angels, 
however, do suggest an affinity for Dr. Todd and an admiration of his stated objectives 
for economic development. They mention the departure of Vice President Len Heller, but 
largely refer to economic development and technology transfer in relation to Lee Todd. 
The greatest impact of the administrative changes appears to be related to concerns about 
the future.   
Rob Ellison joined the Bluegrass Angels approximately two years ago. He states that 
he does not know much of the administrative history of UKCED, other than stories from 
other investors and reading news accounts. Ellison estimates that when Lee Todd was 
president, “He had a very strong push toward entrepreneurship and got resources flowing 
to help that process along.” He assumes that the level of assistance will likely decline and 
considers, “I know the resources available are gonna go down. So how do we, as the local 
group, respond to that? And perhaps, shoulder more of that burden?” As for any 
noticeable changes, Ellison asserts that he joined the Angels, “either right after or right 
before he [Heller] retired”, so he is unable to speak to any day to day changes. “I could 
say we’re not sitting around talking about, ‘What would Len do?’ You know what I 
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mean?” On one hand, he notes it is generally “business as usual”. On the other, the 
investors are waiting to see what happens. He suggests that financial cuts to UKCED will 
likely happen, but for now, the Angels are simply making their usual investments. 
 Presently, not much has changed, but the probable effect on the Von Allmen Center 
and ICC’s operations is troublesome. Chiles and Booker each refer to the financial 
situation of the Von Allmen Center as signaling upcoming upheaval. Their perspectives 
are interesting, in that UKCED staff confirm some grant funding, but speak to it as 
financing that UKCED has consistently utilized over the past decade. The TT personnel’s 
categorizations of upcoming changes do not convey the same sense of urgency as the 
Angels’. In addition to their frustration over probable changes at UKCED, the investors, 
specifically the two that have been involved for several years, address Dr. Todd as a 
champion of their cause, and relay concern over the priorities of VP Jim Tracy and 
President Capilouto. The following excerpts from interviews conducted in 2012 
demonstrate the Angels’ perspectives on administrative changes.  
On the financial outlook for UKCED: 
 Well, I think the potential for an impact is pretty strong. (Interview E) 
 
 These tech transfer offices … during the economic crisis, they laid off a 
 bunch of people, like I think a lot of the universities did.  (Interview A) 
 
 Roger [Kemp] was able to obtain a grant for funding that operation for 
 another year at a reduced sort of footprint. So there’s fewer people doing 
 the same amount of work than there was before but that’s true really 
 probably across the university.  So I’m not complaining about that.  
 However, if he’s unable to secure a grant next year, then it’s going to have 
 a real damper, or put a real damper, on what has traditionally been I think 
 a good partnership between the university and the entrepreneur 
 community here in central Kentucky.  Both in terms of the entrepreneurs, 
 but also in terms of the would-be investors in those startup companies. It 
 could put a real damper on things, if there isn't a continued emphasis on 
 this aspect of what has traditionally been a university role. (Interview E) 
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On Todd as an innovator and proponent of commercialization and economic 
development: 
 Well, it [change] has affected the mood I would say, because, in Dr. Todd, 
 I think the business community, as it relates to starting up new businesses 
 here in central Kentucky, had a huge ally. (Interview E) 
 
 Dr.  Todd… he had a lot of ideas about trying to link the University of 
 Kentucky with the community – the business community in terms of 
 linking the research and commercializing the technology. So then he 
 created …an economic development activity, which was, you know, 
 I thought very forward-thinking, especially given the region that we’re in 
 and the need we have. (Interview A) 
 
 [He] was a faculty member who attempted, while being a member of the 
 faculty, to start a business…and roadblocks were placed in his way, to the 
 point where he was told, ‘You can either develop your business or you can 
 teach here. You’re not going to be able to do both.’ And he can point to 
 numerous examples today of universities where, not only are there no 
 obstacles for faculty members who want to try to commercialize 
 something that they’ve come up with in their own research, but there are 
 universities who encourage and almost insist that faculty members do that. 
 (Interview E) 
 
 I think it’s a big, intellectually interesting thing for him and also part of his 
 passion. (Interview E) 
 
 I mean Dr.  Todd never stopped talking about it, right?  I think he really 
 did decide that this was really something that he wanted to do. And I think 
 he…thought there might be some nuggets in there [in the technology 
 transfer office].  And… I think that there was a feeling that the university 
 could do more to help Kentucky prepare for an economy that had been 
 different than one that it had really experienced in the past.  So this all 
 kind of came together.  (Interview A)  
 
 The point that I think, for example, Dr. Capilouto makes about focusing 
 on undergraduate education-I would much rather be taught by 
 somebody who is pumped up and motivated and engaged in his or her 
 work in all aspects, including possibly commercialization, than I would 
 somebody who is merely a good teacher. (Interview E) 
 
96 
 
On the need for time to complete President Todd’s mission: 
 Dr.  Todd… [his goal] was to try to create you know, a place where it 
 would be cross-university, and cross-silo, and create a place where these 
 ideas could be explored more collegially.  And I think that because of the 
 fact that it was a relatively-it was certainly a new idea …Dr. Todd …who 
 is a great idea guy. And I love the guy, but he tends to take on, as I do 
 myself, more things than he can get done, so sometimes, you know, you 
 lose a little bit of focus, but basically the thing that killed him was time. 
 He didn't have enough time…because I mean I think an initiative like 
 what he was trying to do takes a generation, and he didn't have a 
 generation, he had half a generation, or not even half a generation. 
 (Interview A)  
 
 Until Dr. Todd left I think UK was doing as good a job. Maybe not the 
 best job in the country, but as good a job as most universities And I can’t 
 really speak to what’s going to happen now or what is happening now. But 
 to the extent that the emphasis goes away from that, I think it’s going to 
 have a deleterious effect on the willingness of would-be entrepreneurs on 
 the faculty to send their stuff outside the lab to see what how they might 
 fare in the greater world outside the university. (Interview E)  
 
 And so, as I said earlier, what really  frustrates me is they’re sort of 
 throwing the baby out with the bath water, and wasting a  lot of time, 
 and just throwing a lot of stuff that was probably good ideas, and – just to 
 build dormitories.  I mean. I’m sorry, and that’s probably not fair. I mean 
 if Dr. Capilouto was here, he’d probably belt me in the mouth.  I don’t 
 want to do that because again, I don’t think I – I don’t fully understand the 
 issues that he’s facing so that’s not fair.  But it is very frustrating. 
 (Interview A)  
 
 On President Capilouto’s focus: 
 I know he’s dealing with very limited resources, and I know – it’s very 
 obvious to me, based on what’s happened since Dr.  Todd left, and the fact 
 that there hasn’t been much of a groundswell …you know, there hasn’t 
 been a groundswell from the university saying bring this all back, we want 
 it.  No, instead, you know, you see – when you read about what the faculty 
 is thinking you’re doing, you know, they’re grumbling about a lot of other 
 things, and I think Dr.  Capilouto said, ‘I cannot do everything, and I need 
 resources, and this was costing me whatever it was costing, and I’m gonna 
 use that money to do something else.’ I mean it’s just a business decision, 
 but it’s unfortunate.  It’s unfortunate to somebody like me, that kind of 
 cares about it.  (Interview A)  
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 I don’t  uestion his – he’s got his own priorities, and he’s new.  He has the 
 benefit of understanding what the Board of Trustees is telling him to do.  
 But it clearly – it’s very, very clear that it’s been – that there’s a huge de-
 emphasis of this activity here, from when Dr. Todd was here. And it’s 
 almost as if everything Dr.  Todd did, they’re turning on its head, which is 
 really – I’m sorry, I’ll use the world childish, but you know, universities 
 are filled with people who don’t think very big.  (Interview A)  
 
 I don’t think he is particularly inclined toward diving into 
 commercialization. I don’t think he is opposed to commercialization, but 
 it’s just not-he [President Todd] had somebody at the level of Len Heller 
 to sort of worry about that, and he had one person that he could go to-and 
 Len could kind of keep his boss informed. And now with the restructuring 
 going on at the university, he’s pretty swamped, I would think. The fact 
 that there isn’t a relatively high level individual working on 
 commercialization and economic development at the university is a 
 concern. (Interview E) 
 
 And ...there’s a new sheriff in town, and I don’t think Dr.  Capilouto-if 
 you look at his CV that was published in the Herald Leader when he was 
 first coming, you know, that kind of development was like on page four, 
 and it was like it was almost added .And you know, he’s out there building 
 dormitories and trying to figure out where to get money to keep the 
 university going. (Interview A) 
 
On Vice President Tracy’s responsibilities and priorities: 
 Dr.  Tracy…I personally wish that I could spend – I only met him once.  
 I’d like to understand more.  My person feeling about Dr. Tracy is, from 
 observation, not from knowledge, is that he had a huge job that is bigger 
 than he really wishes that it were. That he has actually academic interests 
 that are more narrow. That he wishes that – it gets back to this whole idea 
 if he’s a professor, and he’d much rather do whatever it is that he’s really 
 good at.  I don’t even know what it is.  And instead, he’s been sort of 
 saddled with all these administrative things, so that you run into a thing – 
 he’s trying to – you know, he’s taking one for the team, in terms of 
 helping Dr. Capilouto, but it comes at a price. (Interview A)  
 
 Right now, we’re sort of operating under the Department of Research, and 
 it’s not clear that the fellow that’s running this is very enthusiastic about it 
 [commercialization and economic development].  I’m not exact – I think 
 his reasons for not being enthusiastic – I’d like to think, because I think 
 he’s a pretty smart guy – I think he has so many things. (Interview A) 
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The investors in this study have considerable reservations about changes to the stated 
priorities (or omitted priorities) of upper level administrators. They contend that it will 
affect future efforts at technology transfer. They also admit, however, that their 
participation in UK’s TBED efforts has not led to many personal financial returns or a 
tangible influence on the local economy. To gain a better understanding of the type of 
companies funded by BGA, the next section looks at three UK spinoffs, at various levels 
of early stage development.  
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CHAPTER 5: AN EXPLORATION OF THREE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY USOS 
 
The presentation of the following university spinoff (USO) cases is comparable to 
that utilized by Mowery, et al. in Chapter 8 of their book, entitled, “What Happens in 
University-Industry Technology Transfer” to explore five university sponsored 
technologies. As they indicate, “The heterogeneity within… [a] small sample of cases 
underscores the need for caution in generalizations about the nature of the technology 
transfer process” (p. 154). Noting the dissimilarities between cases at the historically 
dominant institutions, Columbia University and the University of California, they argue 
that policies and procedures that are appropriate in one field may not be as effective in 
another. Their presentations include a summary of the technology, the roles of various 
personnel, and commercialization and development of the product as of the publication 
date.  A similar approach to presentational organization is used here, although, the 
samples are all of early stage university spinoffs. Therefore, any conclusions as to future 
revenues would be premature. The purpose of this presentation is a rich description of 
personnel experiences. The information is derived from interviews and company 
websites. Note that due to concerns from some participants over the release of proprietary 
information, the following companies will be described, but not named. For presentation 
purposes, individuals will be cited using pseudonyms. Moreover, only references will be 
made to information from related websites, so that the companies are not directly 
identifiable. 
University Spinoff X: Engineering Technology Company 
Company X (also referred to simply as X) falls into the Researcher/Codified category 
as a product-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea developed by a researcher (Pirnay, et al., 
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2003). The technology was discovered by a faculty member in UK’s department of 
Electrical and Computer Engineering and the initial patent was issued in 2008. Although 
the faculty member remains involved in X as the Chief Technology Officer, an 
entrepreneur began working with the technology from UK in 2009. A license was 
executed in 2011. The entrepreneur serves as President and CEO of Company X. The 
company’s name is derived from a commonly used Japanese word, meaning success. 
Company X is in the early stage of development. It currently has two locations. The lab 
and corporate head uarters are located in UK’s campus incubator space, ASTeCC. A 
second office, a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation, is located in Kawasaki, 
Japan. The Japanese office is charged with managing global commercialization 
operations. It is led by an individual with previous experience in the areas of 
semiconductor components, computing products, projectors, and printers at a large 
technology company (Interview D; Company X website; 2012). 
Technology X 
In laymen’s terms, the technology consists of four patents that comprise a system and 
complementary method to produce three dimensional (3D) images using structured light. 
This system and method offers 3D images that can capture human motion in real-time, 
which is faster and lower cost than traditional 3D technologies.  
Commercialization and Development 
The approach to commercialization of this technology stems from the interests of the 
current president/CEO, Mark Brown (pseudonym, Interview D, 2012). Brown’s 
background includes previous work at major technology corporations as an intrepreneur, 
a corporate employee who serves an entrepreneurial role within the confines of the 
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corporation. In those roles, Brown initiated movements from ideas to products for his 
employers by organizing support and testing of new ideas or innovations. He has also 
held executive positions in a number of startup companies in Silicon Valley.  
Education and Professional Background 
Brown’s educational background is in physics and engineering. He holds a Master’s 
degree in Electrical Engineering from an academically prestigious public institution on 
the West Coast (Mark Brown: Bloomberg Businessweek.com Executive Profile, 2012). 
Brown claims to have no “formal” business training, noting that he felt areas like physics 
and engineering should be studied at an academic institution. While business could be 
“learn[ed] better through experience.”  Brown intentionally pursued business training 
from a former employer: 
If your role is going to be to build product lines, they give you training. I thought, 
‘Training and product line management and how to build business will be better 
at [corporation] than at a business school because the company is all about 
producing profitable products.’ Not that business schools aren’t a good thing to 
have…I went through a lot of internal training about how to build product lines, 
how to give a product introduction. Most of my product development and product 
launch training and experience come from [company]. Then I spent time at 
[company] in sales because I wanted to understand how that was done…because I 
knew I wanted to do that sort of thing. Pretty early on, from the time I was an 
undergraduate I knew I wanted to get involved in startups. 
 
Before working with that company, Brown “did the startup tour for a couple of 
years.” His strategy toward training was “sort of consciously done.” In addition to 
pursuing engineering, Brown studied Japanese language because “at the time the 
Japanese were sort of the premier competitors for American businesses.” Due to his 
engineering focus, he felt Japanese language skills would be important. He targeted 
employment with companies that could allow him to integrate his academic skills with 
business and apply them appropriately. 
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Brown’s startup involvement immediately prior to Company X began in 2003 and 
involved raising $60 million, which he describes as typical for Silicon Valley, as the Vice 
President of Marketing for a company that produced micro-electro-mechanical system 
(MEMS) products for projection display. It led him to Tokyo, Japan. While serving as 
Marketing Vice President, he continued to research emerging startup opportunities. 
Brown notes, “I didn’t expect to spend a decade in Tokyo. It was a little bit longer there 
than I had planned. But doing startups in Tokyo is a lot harder than doing startups in 
America. The culture is not really well set up for startups.” Brown believes that the same 
level of infrastructure is not present in Asia. The startup company he worked for as Vice 
President of Marketing was acquired in 2009 by a large, Asia-based corporation. Brown 
did not disclose the ac uisition price, but indicates that in those situations “You have to 
have a business plan that says, ‘Here’s how I’m going to generate $300 million in 
revenue’ and have, you know, a billion dollar exit so you can put in $60 million and get a 
10 times or 15 times return.”  
The Road to Technology Company X 
As the company where Brown was Marketing VP was undergoing the acquisition 
process (2007), he began considering his next move.  
It was first recognizing the 3D whatever. 3D imaging. 3D content creating. 3D 
applications was going to be a big emerging market. That was a market where you 
had billions and billions of dollars of opportunity and then you segment it out 
because there was pieces of it. First is, ‘Here’s a big market that is going to 
emerge over the next  decade. This is a good sandbox to play in.’ 
 
He worked with several venture capitalists (VCs), to pursue his interest in 3D imaging. 
At the time, Brown believed that 3D displays and content creation could be an emerging 
trend in media. “You could sort of see it coming.” One event that supported Brown’s 
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suspicion was the 2007 release of the movie Beowulf.  The movie was released in both 
2D and 3D formats in theaters. “Beowulf did in its first couple of weeks several hundred 
million. And it was a lousy movie.” Brown felt that the box office results of Beowulf’s 
release, suggested a public interest in 3D technology.  He reviewed the box office 
statistics and found that significantly more revenue came from screenings of Beowulf on 
3D screens as opposed to 2D; indicating that moviegoers may have been less interested in 
the content of the film than in its novel 3D presentation. He then turned his attention to 
3D content. “You can’t do anything with 3D displays if you don’t have 3D content. The 
content information was going to be important.”  
Six months prior to the release of Beowulf, Brown approached the Board of Directors 
at his startup to discuss the emergence of 3D technology. “Nobody believed me.” In 
2007, he met with approximately 400 people working in consumer electronics or media.  
In that case, [being in Tokyo] helped because it was easy for me to meet 
everybody at Sony, Panasonic, Toshiba, Sharp. [I] noticed that every one of these 
groups had somebody doing something in 3D. Went to film festivals, talked to 
film producers, [and] noticed that…all of these studios have on their roadmap 3D 
films. Looking at gaming companies… [which] had already made the jump…after 
enough conversation it was pretty clear that billions and billions of dollars are 
already being spent moving towards this next level of entertainment.   
 
At the time, Brown recognized part of the driving force was Hollywood; noting that 
once most of the public had high definition televisions, the industry needed something to 
draw people into theatres. “They have to have something in the theatre in an experience 
that could not be replicated at home.” Incidentally, around 2005, a group of technologies 
was emerging to generate better quality 3D images onscreen. Historically, 3D projections 
were accomplished through two projectors. Theatres utilized the projectors in order to 
switch film reels from one to the next, in order to project the film continuously. In the 
104 
 
1930s, the industry realized that if the two projectors were aligned properly, they could 
create a 3D image. Yet, the physics of the projections created disparity between objects 
and varied experiences from theatre to theatre within the same film. Twenty-first century 
technologies provided a 3D image using one screen and only one projector that allowed 
for complete electronic control. Thus providing equivalent experiences across theatres. 
One well-known American company had been developing a microchip that contained that 
type of technology since 1998. Since 2002, Brown “had been heavily involved…working 
with [the well-known company] to create the technology.” Rather than focusing strictly 
on 3D displays, though, Brown watched “that ecosystem, watching not only for the 
technology to do this, but for an ecosystem to create products that would be inexpensive.”  
Finding the appropriate technology, environment, and ecosystem. 
Determining the proper “technology, environment, and ecosystem” to pursue his 
interests in 3D technology began with examining academic research and funding 
opportunities. From about 2005-2009, Brown saw his understanding of 3D technologies 
and the market converging. Discussions with the Board of Directors at his startup did not 
lead to any movement in that direction. Continuing to formulate ideas and gather 
information, he began pursuing the available academic research into 3D technology. As 
part of this endeavor, he surveyed the venture capital landscape, particularly in Silicon 
Valley.     
“One of the things we saw in 2009, VCs, that venture part kind of went away.” By 
Brown’s account, venture capitalists began operating more like banking institutions. If 
banks were willing to lend startups money, the VCs were more likely to invest. “They 
really wanted to invest in companies that were cash flow positive. Generally if you’re 
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cash flow positive, you have a bit less need.” The types of companies that Silicon Valley 
investors remained interested in were those that “were these big businesses where lots 
and lots of money was needed to really get things started.” Brown’s interpretation is that 
Silicon Valley, including technology transfer operations at Stanford University, prefers a 
model largely targeted at home run, billion dollar technologies. The reason is that the 
amount of time spent vetting an investment is essentially the same, whether a business is 
a billion dollar business or a $100 million business, so investors gravitate toward bigger 
payoffs. As Brown states, “What Silicon Valley does is make the bet on the big 
win…invest in ten companies, nine of them will produce nothing and one company will 
have that big one.” He adds that from a support perspective, working in Silicon Valley 
provides a better infrastructure for developing companies headed in a large-scale revenue 
trajectory. Although, “that’s not the only way to generate a good return”, you can still 
“win a game with a lot of singles.” Brown’s assessment is that “Most ideas coming out of 
universities are just around $100 million ideas. But they’re probably good, solid 
[ideas]…I think that there are actually fewer billion dollar business [out there].” 
His preference this time around was to begin by exploring the available academic 
research, a process that included searching for individuals doing 3D imaging and could 
acquire and process data at a high speed. He assumed that researchers were likely doing 
work in the field without marketing, business development, or product generation 
experience, but were developing the core technologies. He followed several research 
groups across the globe-some in the US and others in Tokyo, looking for a level of 
execution that could address market needs in human motion and captured human motion. 
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 The level of research involved in finding the right technology requires looking at 
“real details and patentable activity” at a high level and the mechanics of the technology, 
itself. He approached the process by examining “those 10 or 15 institutions that are 
leaders in this field.” The next step, “The easy way is to say ‘Who is really on the track 
for patent level stuff?’ is to read the publications.”After studying the publications, Brown 
was able to narrow his research down to three groups he felt were worth meeting. He first 
met with the UK faculty researcher in late summer/early fall 2009. “It was clear after-his 
stuff was-you had to talk to him. I don’t know if it was the best [technology], but it 
emerged as the best.” The research group demonstrated enough focus and interest in the 
area that, 
There’s a good chance they’re going to produce something that’s really 
valuable…I read the papers that they published …not only did they have 
algorithms that had the speed, but those algorithms looked like they mapped into a 
very inexpensive way of building products.  
 
In 2010, after following the research at UK for about a year, Brown requested a license of 
the technology from UK’s Office of Commercialization and Economic Development, 
specifically through the Von Allmen Center for Entrepreneurship. He and the faculty 
member continued to work together as co-founders of Company X, incorporated in 
Lexington, KY. 
In terms of the proper “ecosystem” for Company X’s technology, as Brown noted, he 
first considered entertainment media. In addition to its use in film projection, Brown 
contemplated gaming. Video game systems have recently utilized motion capture 
technology to bring human activity into gaming. “I met with Nintendo and Sony and 
talked to them about what was needed for gaming, because we knew the idea of motion 
capture was going to be important.  
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They all said, ‘You really need to be at 125%’. That speed will allow computer 
processing…fast enough that the game player won’t perceive the latency. [After 
executing the licensing agreement and starting the company], I went back and 
talked to Nintendo.  
 
The initial prototype that Company X built cost roughly $50,000 to manufacture. “They 
[Nintendo] said ‘We will buy everything you can make for $8.00/unit’. Okay, we’ll get 
back to you on that one.” In response to that setback, Brown took the same prototype to a 
trade show. 
Within three days, after meeting with colleagues in similar fields, Company X had 30 
unique applications for the prototype. Brown felt it was good validation that they had a 
strong technology platform, a technology with multiple applications for long-term 
development. With the new applications in hand, Company X needed to determine which 
applications were the most viable. One of the “throw away” applications was “actually a 
real interesting one-and I would still love to do it.” The application was using the systems 
for human motion capture in editing. One consideration was to apply the system to 
Animé.  Animation is less time consuming when animators can modify a model, rather 
than start from scratch. Company X’s technology can further streamline current green 
screen technology, because in that technology, the mechanism captures the motion of 
individual points (or dots) placed on, for example, an actor. X’s technology uses light to 
capture motion without the use of points. Moreover, the system could be used for special 
effects in motion pictures. Yet, market considerations have to prevail.  
Only studios in Tokyo are doing Animé and it’s 25 [studios]. So we can maybe 
sell 25 of those systems, right? Nobody is going to invest in a company whose 
target market is 25. $100,000-that’s what Hollywood pays [for point capture 
systems]. That is an opportunity, but we found that actually the best use of the 
speed is not in capturing motion. It’s in making measurements on people fast 
enough that movement doesn’t blur the image. 
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Company X pursued the question, “How much motion is there in a half second?”  
They found that there is “ uite a lot.” They adjusted the capture speed down to a 72-
millisecond space, where there is a minute amount human movement. At that speed, 
human movement does not affect a measurement result. This application appears to 
Brown to be much more valuable.  
 “Most of our core casting for ‘How big is the market?’ is really bottoms up.”A large 
amount of time was spent talking to professionals in target fields attempting to gauge: the 
economic value of the need the technology meets and the upper bound businesses are 
willing to pay. Two disparate fields emerged with similar needs that could be met by the 
technology: medical practitioners and pipeline operators.  
The first application, for medical practitioners, was arrived at through the 
deliberations over who needs to take measurements that can be impeded by movement. 
The first answer was podiatrists. Podiatrists must take precise foot measurements; while 
their patients may have difficulty holding their feet still for extended periods. “So you 
need to measure fast. Worldwide, there’s 125,000 [podiatrists], and that’s our market. 
Podiatrists aren’t the only people. Dentists, 500,000 dentists worldwide, that’s our 
market.”  Consideration of the market leads Brown to estimate 1 million units of a 
product. “And since each of these units is roughly $5,000-$10,000 that’s a $5 billion 
opportunity.” Company X has focused part of its attention specifically on dental imaging.  
Brown includes among X’s most significant accomplishments, the ability to measure 
natural teeth. Contemporary imaging systems use powders or sprays to help measure 
teeth because “Most teeth are not opa ue, they’re translucent.” Using optical technology 
to determine tooth surface creates an issue because light hits the surface of the tooth and 
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comes back, while also penetrating the tooth and coming back. The problem arises in 
differentiating between the light on the tooth’s surface and the light from below the 
surface. Company X was able to develop information technology around the problem and 
demonstrate that it produces accurate measurements. Because of this technology, one of 
the five products in its line is a handheld, high speed, 3D microscope that can measure 
semi-transparent objects.  The product can measure live teeth without the need for dental 
impressions or molds. Part of the reason for X’s subsidiary in Kawasaki, Japan is access 
to innovative optics. Another is that Company X found that dental offices in Japan were 
not using traditional dental imaging systems. In Japan, the systems are considered too 
large. Company X developed their handheld device in an attempt to meet the needs of the 
market there. Aside from its streamlined process, X produced a much smaller unit than 
others available on the market.   
Brown notes that dentists tend to be relatively frugal, but that such considerations are 
important to determine market elasticity. In addition to dental applications, the imaging 
technology is marketed for several other applications. X is collaborating with an 
automobile manufacturer in Japan to tailor the technology for tire inspection. Another 
partnership is with a company to use 3D measurement for medical testing for lung 
function in infants, unconscious patients and others who are incapable of breathing into a 
tube. 
A less frugal group that Company X’s technology is focused toward is pipeline 
operators. That is because of the economic significance of the technology. Pipeline 
corrosion can lead to costly damages. Oil pipeline failures can lead to spills that cause 
widespread damage at environmental and economic levels. Economic consequences can 
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spread from oil companies to pipeline operators and to the communities where the oil 
pipelines are located. Natural gas pipeline corrosion can cause, in extreme cases, pipeline 
explosion. Current inspection techniques for thinning from corrosion are costly and time 
consuming. Moreover, buried pipelines are difficult to access. With its platform, 
Company X is able to offer products that acquire 3D images of pipelines and analyze 
them, to determine whether there is any damage. The process is less expensive and time 
consuming than traditional methods; allowing for inspections that are more frequent. 
Company X’s effort to write the software for acquisition and analysis of 3D images is the 
same for the animation industry, medical technology industry, and oil and gas industry. 
The difference is the market size and projected value. 
The University of Kentucky and its Technology Transfer Process 
After corresponding with the faculty inventor, Brown contacted UK’s Von Allmen 
Center for Entrepreneurship, in order to license the product through the Office for 
Commercialization and Economic Development. He describes it as a relatively 
streamlined process. “They said, ‘Sure’…and based on the technology we went off and 
looked at raising money.”  He describes it as “pretty easy here”, noting that he had been 
corresponding with the faculty researcher for several months, so the first trip to 
Lexington was to meet with members of the technology transfer team. Brown describes 
UKECD as well structured to facilitate licensing. “They want to actually create or take 
UK property and create vehicles for commercialization.” The meetings included 
representatives from UK’s Intellectual Property Office, and he indicates that IP had 
standard agreements in place that only took a couple of weeks to negotiate. “It was fairly 
straightforward.” The IP agreement, he suggests, was not much different from those at 
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other universities, as over past decades, licensing agreements have become highly 
standardized. Terms are essentially the same across institutions, streamlining the 
negotiation process (Geiger & Sá, 2008; Interview B, Interview D; 2012). Moreover, 
Brown feels that UK actively pursues licensing agreements, which he feels is “an 
important factor.” In contrast, he argues that attempts to license technology from a 
Japanese institution are “incredibly difficult” and indicates that American institutions 
have developed a much better model for licensing of university technologies. He 
describes licensing agreements overseas as generally “front end loaded.” That is, “Give 
us a million dollars now and you can have the IP now”  before it has demonstrated its 
value. U.S. institutions, on the other hand, are “back end loaded.” UK’s position, 
consistent with others, is that intellectual property “is the main generator of value for 
return for the university.” The process is still speculative, of course, but American 
institutions take a “We’ll never know unless we try” approach. If the barrier to licensing 
is too strong, potential licensees abandon the effort. University TT enterprises in the U.S. 
opt to hedge their bets; assuming that some revenue is better than no revenue. A greater 
reward may be available if, and when, a spinoff begins to see returns, or, when the USO 
is ultimately acquired by a larger organization. This is where the significance of equity 
stakes emerges. 
Company X and Funding 
Brown spends a large amount of time securing seed capital for X. “[He] spends a lot 
of time [seeking out funding]. He’s trying to bring in private e uity money, running from 
these different places in order to do that (Interview C, 2012).” Brown’s company is “on 
the fast track. He has raised a lot of money from the Bluegrass Angels and other private 
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investors. He’s currently going after more (Interview I, 2012).” Brown agrees that 
response from investors has been supportive, but is surprised that UK did not ask for 
equity shares in his company, as part of his licensing agreement. 
The one thing that UK doesn’t do that Stanford does, and I know that UK can’t do 
it because it’s a public university, but it would be great if they could figure out 
how. Stanford actually participates…shares some ownership in the company…if 
there were a way for public institutions to do that, that would be very helpful to 
them. I’m glad they couldn’t because it preserved a little e uity in the company. 
But putting my UK background to use, not that I actually have one, but if there 
were a vehicle that would allow you to have ownership in companies as part of 
the IP agreement, that would be another way they could benefit on the back end. 
 
UKCED technically does participate in equity shares through Kentucky Technology Inc. 
(KTI). As noted previously, however, KTI is currently inactive. Brown’s response 
appears to be an assumption about equity stakes, because he is not familiar with KTI’s or 
UK’s TBED enterprise histories. 
In Brown’s case, Richardson says that the university covered some of the early patent 
fees, while Brown covered others once his license was in place. A signing fee 
incorporates some of the patent costs in licensing agreements. UKCED attempts to 
recover some of the fees, if the licensee begins to generate revenue (Interview B, 2012).  
Brown notes that funding is the greatest challenge for Company X. In 2011, X was 
granted $100,000, as part of its Series B funding, in seed capital from Commonwealth 
Seed Capital (CSC). CSC generally provides debt or equity investments in specific 
technological areas, such as information technology, environmental and energy 
technology, and health and human development. It limits investments to early-stage 
Kentucky businesses. Funding for CSC comes from the Kentucky Economic 
Development Finance Authority (KEDFA) and the Economic Development Partnership 
Board (Fuqua, 2011). Additional sources of Series B funding include capital from a lead 
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investor (a large multi-national automotive and electronics company), individual 
Bluegrass Angels, BGA Fund II, and some “venture capitalists” in Texas and California. 
As part of the Bluegrass Angels’ terms, Gary Chiles currently serves as on the company’s 
board of directors (Interview E, 2012). Although Brown notes that, “The state of 
Kentucky has been absolutely great about helping us raise money here in Kentucky”, he 
also concedes, “The pool of venture capital in Kentucky is not that large.” Brown has 
found that “There is still a need to get on an airplane.” The reason, he argues, is not 
limited to location or Kentucky’s economy. It is also that venture capitalists do not tend 
to invest in platform technology. His investors in California are interested in Company 
X’s medical applications, while investors in Houston are attracted by the technology’s 
implications for the oil and gas industry.  Creating a structure that allows investors to 
earmark capital for specific uses of technology has been complex, but from a financial 
perspective, it is important to allow investors to “do what they’re comfortable doing.” 
Brown indicates, “Probably the biggest barrier [to success] is being effective at raising 
money.”  
Company X’s location, nonetheless, is something Brown considers an asset, in a 
number of ways.  
The environment here seems to me to be very good for companies whose 
financial needs are not tens of millions, but might be millions-whose target 
markets might be billions, in  terms of the total market, but the company is 
looking more to be like a $100 million type  company in terms of revenue. And if 
it’s a company that is going to make something, this is a good place to be because 
there’s reasonably priced manufacturing infrastructure here. You can go off and 
get things made. The Silicon Valley model, you don’t typically make stuff 
because you just can’t really make stuff inexpensively or at reasonable prices. It 
used to be Silicon Valley, and they moved a lot of that production to Taiwan, and 
then it stopped being interested in Silicon production at all, at least from the 
startup standpoint. It’s mostly software. 
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He contends that the emerging economic engine of Silicon Valley is different from what 
the public has traditionally perceived. He recently toured a manufacturing facility in 
Lexington and considered it “ideal” for Company X’s purposes  finding it had “just 
phenomenal” capabilities, reasonable cost structure, and organization.  
In terms of Company X’s location on campus, Brown is also satisfied. He believes 
that ASTeCC’s infrastructure “alleviates” some of the responsibilities that fall on startup 
executives that can divert attention from company development. “The ASTeCC incubator 
is really for the true startup.  [Who] just started [and] they need office space.  They need a 
telephone. They need a little conference room to have meetings in when people come and 
visit (Interview E, 2012).” While ASTeCC staff do not assist with technological or 
growth objectives, the “Infrastructure… [takes on] the things that most startups have to 
do, but don’t want to do…I don’t have to spend the time on things that don’t advance the 
products of the company.” Some of the benefits of the campus incubator are that Brown 
does not regularly deal with tasks like ordering supplies. Many office essentials are 
“borrowed from people on a more permanent basis”. Moreover, the space in ASTeCC is 
competitively priced. ASTeCC rent is subsidized (Interview I, 2012). Brown feels that 
outside of the leasing costs, there are additional financial benefits; noting that in 
Kentucky, “I couldn’t rent an office with exactly this size for exactly what I’m paying. I 
like to tell people that my office is the same size as the UK campus.” He argues that the 
office provides Company X with access to the internet, the campus library, shipping and 
receiving, and other integrated benefits. “There are so many extra things that we get that 
we don’t have to pay for”  which include certain aspects of accounts payable. Tenants do 
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not split their time between company development tasks and office management tasks, 
like paying utilities. An additional inherent benefit is academic climate.  
“Having an incubator on campus is great for us.” He suggests that it provides access 
to the faculty inventor, which is significant, in that, “It’s his mind that is behind a lot of 
what we’re doing.” If the company were off campus, Brown believes that the level of 
interaction and conversation, which induces progress, would be limited. The fact that 
collaborators can discuss ideas, leave to work on them, and then return with results, has 
provided a distinct advantage for the company.  
Growth and Economic Development 
Economic development is considered a compelling argument, by upper level 
administrators and policymakers, for university technology transfer, and specifically 
university spinoffs (Geiger, 2006). Moreover, university science or research parks are 
established as a mechanism for high tech cluster promotion, leading to area economic 
development (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2007).  “The vision of Coldstream was to create a 
space within central Kentucky area where high tech companies could in fact locate and 
start their businesses; being able to draw on the employment base of the area (Interview 
E, 2012).”  Considering these factors, I asked Brown about his thoughts concerning 
Company X’s expansion. First, if he would be interested in relocating to UK’s 
Coldstream Research Campus? Second, what role, if any, economic development plays in 
his business related decisions?  
For Company X, Coldstream is an option once it has outgrown its current location in 
ASTeCC. After visiting the facility a number of times, Brown considers it “a nice place.” 
Although his first choice, once the company expands, is to “move some place very, very 
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close to campus because we don’t want to lose the connection to any… [advanced] 
research.” Alternatively, Company X could move somewhere local that can completely 
meet its needs. The decision hinges on determining whether X will manufacture its own 
products. Currently, the company outsources its manufacturing projects. Production 
needs are relatively low at this point. However, if production needs increase and X opts 
to manufacture its products, Brown will need to investigate a different level of funding, 
as well alternative space needs. The advantage to in-house manufacturing, from his 
perspective, is that the link between engineering and production is “tighter” and provides 
some level of cost control. “It’s more effective and, of course, we’re not paying someone 
else to do a skill that you can develop. Probably we will do something in 
between…outsource the manufacturing to a local Lexington company…and be near 
them.” The examination of facilities also lends itself to considerations for economic 
development. 
Brown notes that as X grows, it will be creating jobs for some professionals with 
extensive experience, but also “bringing in a different level” by helping to sustain jobs 
for companies. Manufacturing jobs, particularly, have recently been moved overseas. He 
also states,  
This is sort of my own personal agenda. I am a firm believer in globalization, but 
I think  we have swung globalization a little bit too far. I don’t think it is, for 
example, more economically favorable to outsource what we’re making. There is 
no reason to go over to China or Taiwan to make that. I don’t think it would be an 
economically beneficial trade off to do that…How do you measure significantly 
cheaper? One of the things we don’t do well is-we will reward a business for 
sending a job overseas. The business pays less dollars to have that made. But it’s 
not an apples to apples comparison. My favorite example is ‘What are we doing 
with  Beijing?’ We send jobs to Beijing in an unregulated environment. They 
come over here and drop back down in California. Are we penalizing them for 
that? No. Is there an economic cost for that? Yeah.  
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He argues that the structure of the U.S. economy allows companies to improve their 
bottom lines through outsourcing, but “the burden” is born by U.S. taxpayers. “I just 
don’t think we have really looked at the economic cost of moving stuff out of here.” 
Brown notes that much of his opinion has been influenced by his tenure in Japan. There, 
he observed what he feels is part of an unintended consequence of outsourcing: the 
growth of the Chinese military. Brown feels that the trade deficit between America and 
China has enhanced funding for the development of the Chinese Navy; which worked to 
push the definition of Chinese borders while he was living in Japan. He argues that 
outsourcing should be considered “holistically”, because it takes jobs from American 
workers and stimulates shifts in political power.  
University Spinoff Y: Entertainment Media Company 
Company Y(Y) can be categorized as a Student/Codified USO, what Pirnay, et al 
refer to as a product-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea developed by a student (2003). The 
inventor/entrepreneur began developing his company while attending the University of 
Kentucky. The specific intellectual property is a result of cumulative work, begun as an 
undergraduate. UKCED worked with the entrepreneur to obtain funding, and members of 
the Bluegrass Angels have invested and consulted on the IP. This specific USO was not 
originally under consideration as part of the sample. However, several participants 
referenced it (Interview A, Interview C, Interview E, Interview F, Interview I; 2012), as 
an interest. In particular, the participants indicate that it is a unique investment, compared 
to most, because it stems from the emerging and evolving gaming industry. Moreover, 
the investment horizon on this technology is estimated to be much shorter than most.  
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The gaming industry is now bigger than movies. Andrew Stone (pseudonym, 
Interview H, 2012) convinced the Angels to put in a considerable amount of 
money. You can develop a game in six to nine months. It will soon be on the 
market and there will be a quick turnaround, whether it goes anywhere or not. 
[This is] in contrast to [alternative] university investments that are equally high 
risk, but usually take three, four, eight years  to know if it’ll go anywhere 
(Interview I, 2012). 
Technology Y 
Essentially, Technology Y is an online video game. The principal 
entrepreneur/inventor works with a team that has written a script, chosen the platform 
(which is Xbox Live) and is currently developing the game.  The company has submitted 
an application to trademark the name of its game. The CEO, Andrew Stone, has a 
significant amount of experience in the gaming industry. This property, however, is the 
first game his team is developing. 
Commercialization and Development 
 
Although investors and UKCED personnel note that the turnaround time for this 
investment will likely be around 18 months, Company X is still in the very early seed 
phase. It is currently developing the game using a team of seven or eight people, across 
the country, with extensive experience in gaming journalism and development. Stone 
calls them “The Justice League” because of their “pretty close to icon status.”  While 
Stone and his team “run the business side”, they outsource programming and other 
technical work to specialists across the United States. The company is located in the 
community incubator, Base 163. Stone feels it is a good opportunity to work among other 
entrepreneurs in a shared space, who can assist him with company development.   
There's people up here that have been an entrepreneur for – some only, you know, 
like me, a few years, you know, five, ten years.  There's others that have been here 
for 20- some years that are entrepreneurs that started, you know, 15 companies, 
and sold them, have been acquired. [It is beneficial because I can ask] ‘How do 
you get on NASDAQ?’  You know, there's somebody up here that can, at least, 
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tell you the person to talk to.  So, we have that experience at our fingertips.  It 
makes being able to kinda hop and skip over some hurdles that would have totally 
made us trip, you know, five, six years ago. We would have fell on our face big 
time. 
   
Education and Professional Background 
Unlike Brown, who set out to study areas of professional interest, Stone found that 
the  interaction of a number of variables led to his entrepreneurial activities. While a 
student at the University of Kentucky, he studied Sociology. Stone worked at a local 
movie theatre his freshman and sophomore years and became involved with some 
promotional work. “And that's what kinda spurred my, ‘Hey, I'm kinda good at this. I 
kinda can understand how to make people be interested in a product or a service.’"  
That experience led him to think about pursuing marketing in UK’s College of 
Business and Economics.   
And that's what spawned the conversation at UK, which didn't – it wasn't fruitful 
for me  from a collegiate standpoint where they were gonna help me in my 
education on that…At that time, I was still in college, and I kinda had an affinity 
toward marketing and advertising, but also, I loved video games.  It's funny.  I 
went to UK and I wanted to do-I wanted to major in marketing, so I went to the 
Gatton School.  I said, ‘Hey, I wanna major in marketing.’  They said, ‘Oh, you're 
not smart enough. Your GPA isn't strong enough.’ I was like, ‘Oh, okay.’ So, I 
just went back to my boss [at the movie theatre] and said, ‘What can I do?’  And 
they're like, ‘Well, you're close to pretty much anything in arts and sciences.’ So, 
I just literally went, and pointed my finger, and said, ‘Oh, sociology.  I guess 
that's what I'll major in.’  
 
When asked whether his Sociology background might have influenced his marketing 
capabilities, in areas like understanding cultures, Stone notes, “I never thought about that. 
I think it has.  I mean, definitely it has.  I just didn't think of it that way.” He believes, 
though, that preparation in business school would have assisted him in his current 
position.  
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That seems to – it would have made sense, but I've met a lot of people that did go 
to business schools, including Gatton, that didn't know their head from their ass.  I 
mean, it doesn't mean that just because you come out of the school that you are 
ready to not only run a business, but have the foresight to run a cutting-edge 
business.  
 
After leaving the movie theatre, around 2004, Stone and his friend Nick Jones 
(pseudonym) took jobs at a website that featured news and information on video games. 
They reviewed new games. He describes it as, “Basically, Consumer Reports for games is 
a good way to kinda put it.” The website was not particularly profitable and the two saw a 
“very limited future” there. “And so, I thought, ‘Well, I'll just put the two things together 
that I really enjoy and see if I can make a business out of that.’"  They left the company 
and rented some inexpensive office space in Lexington.  
And, from our little office over on Third Street, we would play games…and try to 
get that news out the same way that we were doing previously. But we wanted to 
do it with video content, not just written word, because we saw the Internet was 
kinda going in that direction about that time and it seemed to make sense to do 
that.  
 
Many of Stone’s ventures seem based on what he intuitively knows makes sense. 
While working out of their Third Street office, Stone read an article on the virtual world, 
Second Life (SL). He downloaded Second Life and played it. At the time, Second Life had 
approximately 100,000 global users. As he played the game and met some people in the 
virtual space, Stone realized that all of the content was generic. “There was no brands.  
There was no McDonald's. There was no Coca-Cola.  None of that stuff existed.” Users 
in SL could socialize and make purchases for their avatars. All of the products, though, 
were community based. For example, users could buy homes to live virtually in, but if 
they were interested in digital furniture for their homes, or clothing, they purchased it 
from a local retailer. That led him to consider two things. 
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First, no “outside entity” existed in Second Life. Second, the world was dominated by 
a sex and drug trade.  
And, of course, sex is a huge trading network, as well. So, people buying and 
selling  virtual body parts.  When you're born in that world you don't have proper 
– you're more  like a Barbie doll when you're born in that world… So, anyway…I 
thought, ‘Wow, there's sex.  There's drugs.  There's all this stuff happening in this 
world, and yet, there's no brands.  That's really interesting. I think someone should 
make that leap.’   
 
At the time, Stone was a fan of the clothing brand American Apparel (AA). He refers to it 
as “having a crush” on the brand. American Apparel is the country’s largest manufacturer 
of clothing, accessories, and undergarments. “But their underlying factor is sex.  
Everything about them is a very sexual brand.  So, I thought that may be a perfect 
match.” 
By happenstance, Stone attended high school with a woman whose father was the 
Operations Manager for American Apparel. Stone contacted her and she told her father 
about his idea. She gave Stone her father’s business number and they spoke about his 
plan. The Operations Manager set up a conference call with AA’s Marketing Director. 
“So, I talked to him just briefly to give him the whole idea and just say, ‘Hey, I wanna 
come out and pitch this thing to you.’” There was also an upcoming video game 
convention in Los Angeles that Stone and Jones planned to attend for work. He realized 
that American Apparel headquarters were only 20 minutes away. Stone and Jones, 
travelled to L.A., and during a break at the convention Stone, 
Shot over to American Apparel headquarters and pitched them all this idea about 
putting them in Second Life.  They bit on the idea. They loved it and we built 
them a virtual store in this world.  Full on store to scale, It was like a real store 
would be in real life.  It has like 32 pieces of clothing you could purchase and the 
part that was revolutionary was you could not only buy it for your digital self, but 
you could buy it for your real self.  So, their campaign was, ‘Be your own twin’ 
was kinda the campaign that was dreamed up there.  So, you can dress your guy in 
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Second Life just like you dress yourself in real life. So, that launched. It was the 
first brand to be in a virtual world. 
 
When asked if Second Life is regulated in any way, Stone replies, “No. You could do 
whatever you want.” He clarifies that if someone attempted to simply go into the world 
and build a store, it would be immediately closed. In order to work in SL users must 
purchase land, from a real person, which is actually server space. He indicates that the 
virtual world functions much like the real world, except that police are the server 
managers. If a user infringes on space s/he does not own, the managers will shut down 
his/her account. “It’s literally a light switch on/off situation.” 
Within a few weeks of American Apparel’s launch in Second Life, over 350,000 
avatars walked through its doors.  
We were covered in about 22 major press outlets, including being on the front 
page of Ad Age, the front page of the Wall Street Journal, Forbes Magazine Inc., 
Time. 60 Minutes even did an American Apparel interview for this whole thing.  
So, in the world of video games and advertising, it was a big deal.  A lot of people 
talked about it and it skyrocketed our business. And that's when the Second Life 
thing hit, and I was literally, like, in midterms getting phone calls from people at 
Wall Street Journal [and] people at The New York Times trying to interview me.   
 
Immediately after the American Apparel launch, Stone was contacted by several 
companies asking for his assistance. The work he began in Second Life led to the 
intellectual property he is currently developing. He attributes some of his early success to 
his lack of complacency.  
I don't settle for just good.  People are like, ‘I guess that's just the way it is or 
whatever,’ and that's just not how I function because I know it's not the way it is.  
And things don't change by themselves; things change because a person makes it 
change, you know?  I  never was a person that just punched my time clock, and I'd 
get my paycheck, and  then, you know, on the weekends, I'd get to spend some of 
that money, and I'm happy. That was never me.  I've never felt that that was a life 
I wanted to live; it was more I always wanted to see, ‘How could this thing in 
front of me – be it a product, a service, or whatever it is, how could this thing be 
better?’   
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The Road to Company Y 
Samsung quickly requested Stone to build a store in Second Life. Additional clients 
included Clear Channel Communications, parent company of Spectacolor, which owns 
the majority of the advertising space in New York’s Times Square.  Stone worked with 
Samsung and Clear Channel to build a scaled Times Square in Second Life. 
So, we took on that project and started working those two brands.  It was a lot of 
fun. And we kinda had Clear Channel's ear, and so, Nick and I pitched them this 
crazy idea to make a little video game TV show, sorta, and air it on one of their 
screens in [real] Times Square.  No one had ever put together a show, so to speak, 
and aired it there. They loved the idea.  And so, about every 20 minutes on this 
screen on the corner of 43rd and Broadway, the W Hotel would air our little show 
that we were producing out of a tiny  little office over here on 3rd Street.  It was a 
lot of fun to work on that together, especially to have some of the video game 
industry elite going to watch.  They would be in New York on business, and they 
would call us, and say, ‘Hey, we're trying to find this screen.’ I'm like, ‘You keep 
walking. You can't miss it.’ Because it was 30 by 40 feet, I mean, it was gigantic.  
And then, we got to watch their games that they were creating, in pattern, on the 
screen.  So, it was really fun. 
 
The work in Second Life led to thoughts about brand content. Stone considered, “The 
Second Life thing is old now, but what's the next thing?  What should we be doing next?” 
He began engaging Clear Channel and other companies in discussions about video games 
and the gamer demographic. He argued that conceptions of the gaming community were 
completely inaccurate.  
Most people didn't understand.  The average gamer is 34. They make $80,000 a 
year. And we say that to the Chief Creative Officer for Axe body spray, they 
about jump out of their seat, you know?  There's a whole market they didn't even 
realize. 
 
He contends that the misconception is that gamers are young, without much income. 
Gamers ask their parents to buy them products. While certain game audiences skew 
toward the younger demographic, he indicates that, there are over 550 million gamers 
worldwide and that half of American households have a game console. 
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Those ideas brought about a new marketing and advertising consulting opportunity. 
Stone travelled to companies from Klondike Ice Cream to Ford Motor Company. Ford 
contacted Stone to find out “What’s next? What should we be doing next?” and Stone 
responded that video games were a large part of his business, but he had also heard about 
a cell phone coming on the market called an Apple iPhone, where customers could utilize 
a touch screen and other advanced functions. The clients at Ford relayed that the iPhone 
was on was on their radar, but they were not sure how to exploit it, asking, “What’s an 
app?” Stone had been granted early access to Apple’s technology, along with a software 
development kit. Stone and his team constructed the second automobile application for 
the iPhone. “Audi beat us by a week, so they get to claim it. But, yeah, we built the Ford 
Flex [app], which was the first crossover vehicle.” Within two weeks of its release, the 
application had been downloaded 52,000 times. Stone argues that, launched today, it may 
not have been so popular, given that approximately 1,000 applications are added to 
Apple’s App Store daily. “At the time [though] it was literally like the Wild, Wild, West. 
There was nothing there. It was like, ‘Claim whatever you want!’ You know?” 
 Stone suggests a good comparison for his early involvement with mobile 
applications, would be the emergence of online commerce. 
It created an entire new channel to touch a user because, if you think about it, 
from the moment you wake up, to the minute you go to bed, there’s nothing you 
touch more, besides your significant other, than your phone.  You touch this more 
[gesturing toward his iPhone] than anything else in the world.  And so, when you 
have this thing on you, it's a very powerful thing to say, ‘We're gonna claim some 
of the real estate on this. We have a brand.’ That you allow that brand to have 
some real estate on this is very, very  powerful.  It's more important than your 
purse or anything. I mean, that's usually how people treat this kinda stuff. 
 
When you work on the cutting edge of technology, Stone argues, the only option is to 
think, “What’s the next one? O.K. We’ve already done that. What’s the next one?” 
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Stone began contemplating the Xbox technology. He notes a strong amount of “great 
content that’s happening [in gaming consoles], especially with television.” He argues that 
at some point, cable television will be extinct. Instead, individuals will pay an “Xbox 
bill”. Currently, networks like HBO and NBC are represented on Xbox, as well as the 
movie rental company Netflix. He claims that most content will be advertisement driven. 
It is essentially the same programming on cable, but available on any device. He suggests 
that cable companies are grappling with ways to keep up with changing technology, but 
are “kinda too late.” Nevertheless, a cable corporation contacted Stone to consult on how 
to keep current customers satisfied and address the future of the industry. Much of the 
focus of those discussions revolved around the gamer demographic. Yet, the 
conversations were not about video games. Instead, they focused on branding in various 
types of media, like Skype or Pandora. Stone believed that branding would be his next 
focus. He assembled a team to advise corporations concerning issues like,  
How can Nike be [viewed] more in Madden football [video] games? That's what 
we thought our core business was gonna be, but anyone who's ever been an 
entrepreneur or ran a business realizes, "You don't know [expletive]."  You think 
you know what you're doing when you start, and then, it's not. What we didn't 
realize was we put together this Dream Team and companies like Electronic Arts, 
and Microsoft, and Activision, you know, games like Halo, Call of Duty, 
Battlefield, those huge mega titles, they actually could use our team more 
effectively than someone, like Coca-Cola, could. 
 
The team began reaching out to electronic media companies offering to review their 
games and advise on ways to make them more profitable. About the outreach, Stone 
adds, “And that doesn’t mean we’re gonna tell you that you should put Coke in your 
game.” The pitch was to improve user interface and multiplayer functions. User interface 
refers to the player’s experience. It is connected with the menu on a screen, known as a 
“heads-up-display” (HUD). The HUD is similar to a meter that indicates how much life a 
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player has remaining, or how many weapons s/he has. It is essentially, “how you interact 
with the game.” 
Stone’s team devised a method for predicting a game’s metascore, which is a 
profitability index. The metascore scale ranges from 0-100. For example, a game that 
scores an 85 will earn on average $12 million. Stone’s method is generally accurate plus 
or minus two points. The team can review the game’s user interface, predict the 
metascore, and provide feedback for improvement. As Stone says,  
We say, ‘Change these ten things and you go up six points.’ And those six points 
could roughly be $20 million for that company. So, they pay us to do that.  So, we 
just took that, leveraged all that experience, leveraged that brain trust that we put 
together, and said, ‘Let's just put our money where our mouth is and make our 
own game.’ 
 
This game is the current intellectual property supported by UKCED, and Stone is 
developing it as a separate company. 
Finding the Appropriate Technology, Environment, and Ecosystem 
 Stone’s path to the appropriate technology was the result of an evolution of 
previous projects. He indicates that the current focus on developing the game will not 
keep him from interacting with previous clients, although projects in those areas are “on 
the back burner”. 
If EA [Electronic Arts] calls me tomorrow and says, ‘We need some help with our 
game,’ we'll take the contract and we'll help them with it. But it doesn't take any 
of my time, personally. I push that off to someone else on the team to manage. 
‘Hey, EA called.  They need help. Here. Go do it.’ And they know the rates that 
we charge and it's kinda on autopilot. So, it just-it doesn't require a lot of my 
assistance. 
 
For now, Stone is focused on development. Earlier in the project’s life, he spent most of 
his time fundraising, with assistance from the Bluegrass Angels. 
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He believes that Base 163 provides an exceptional environment. He suggests that 
working at Base 163 is like “living in an entrepreneur dictionary” because of the access 
to experience. He can walk across the room and find someone who has been in a similar 
situation for advice. Before coming to the incubator, he “felt like we were stuck in this 
little office-island-out by ourselves and we were sure surrounded by sharks.”  He has 
learned from experience.  
Like we were terrified to push on the client to say, ‘No, we demand 15 percent up 
front because we need to meet payroll,’ You know?  But we didn't know-we didn't 
know how to be that way, so it was like you-you coddle your client.  You say, 
‘Whatever you want, we'll do. Because I need you bad’ and they know that. And 
so, they mistreat you, and they ask for free work, and they-I think there's just a lot 
of lessons that you learn early on that I wish I had known.  
 
Stone enjoys passionately working with fellow entrepreneurs on his project, noting that 
his childhood dream to make video games always felt intangible. However, now that he is 
pursuing his dream, he says that, 
Surrounding myself with people that are not only smarter than me, but more 
talented, and creative. And seeing like…That's what to me has been one of the 
most rewarding pieces of this, is to sit down and say, ‘I have this idea that looks 
like this.’ And I hand it to someone, and they go, ‘Well, what if you took this idea 
and you did this with it?’  You know?  And then, you're like, ‘Whoa! I didn't think 
of that.’…And it spawns off this whole other- it's like just turning on this creative 
spigot. It's just like more stuff keeps  coming out. You're like, ‘Oh, this is so 
great.’   
 
Although in many ways, this is a fantasy position for Stone, he does indicate some 
challenging aspects of it. One challenge is the location of the business. For fundraising 
and other business travel, Stone says,  
I could never get a direct flight anywhere, unless I'm going to Charlotte or 
Atlanta. I can't – I have to fly to Cincinnati or something. If I was trying to get 
direct somewhere, it still could be difficult, yeah. Even Louisville – I can't go 
Louisville to New York.  I have to go to Cincinnati to go to New York to get a 
direct flight.  I can fly, like, from Louisville to Detroit and then over to New 
York.  It's weird, you know?   
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As a native Kentuckian, he also suggests that it is sometimes difficult to be taken 
seriously in metropolitan areas. “When you're talking to an ad executive for Unilever, 
you know, and they're either very much New Yorker or British…When they hear you 
speak, they think, ‘This guy is an idiot’ or, ‘He's uneducated.’” Moreover, working with 
the right team can be a challenge because of the location. He suggests that the specialists 
he works with most often are found in across the country: San Francisco, Austin,  and 
Washington State (with a large concentration in Seattle). However, the population in the 
Research Triangle in North Carolina, is also growing rapidly. “Yeah, for my business, 
The Triangle, it's fantastic. I mean, I borrowed half a million dollars and half of that is 
going to a company in Research Triangle.”  
Apparently, that area in North Carolina has a number of large game studios, 
institutions that teach game development, where college students can internship at “mega 
publishers” and work with major games. That support structure provides students 
opportunities beyond what Stone experienced in Kentucky. In fact, he is attempting to 
help establish a game development program at the University of Kentucky, but says, 
“Who knows?” in terms of whether that will happen.  
 For his previous work with branding, location was less important. Now, though, 
he suggests that he would like to hire local developers to work on the project. He has 
been forced go outside of the state to hire outside help, because that population is not in 
Lexington. Location is not the only challenge to working on his dream. He argues that a 
large challenge is “how to monetize cool.” In one respect, he argues that social capital 
cannot pay the rent. In another, he suggests that “cool” is much more difficult to price 
than a tangible good. 
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Because that's what we were selling through almost everything we’re doing-and 
the proper way to price that.  I didn't know how to do that and so we suffered, you 
know, in the early stages. A lot of times, if–not necessarily–getting pretty close to 
not paying yourself so you can pay the rest of the team, and yeah, there was a lot 
of sacrifice to get–but that's how everything is, you know?  Because we were–
there were so many times that we were right at the edge of shutting it all down 
because you just don't have enough money to do it, you know? We skyrocketed in 
terms of social equity amongst our peers and amongst big brands, but that didn't 
necessarily trickle down for our wallets. I can't walk into Meijer, and fill my 
grocery cart, and pay with cool.  I can't walk up and say, ‘Hey, I was on the cover 
of Ad Age.’ You know?  Like–so, that can't get you squat.   
 
Stone’s challenges are resource related. His achievements, however, are mostly on a 
personal or less concrete professional level.  
 From a personal and business perspective, he considers seeing himself on Times 
Square a major accomplishment.  
I had a friend of mine with me…I'd go down, and shoot a video for us on the 
corner, and just like–to see the cabs, and the people going by. And ads for 
Maybelline, and all this kinda crazy stuff, and then, there's our logo. And there's 
our product or our–you know, stuff that we were sitting here slaving over in our 
little office in 3rd Street down here. That was a pretty big accomplishment for us 
to just see that happen. 
 
He also considers his experience with his team an asset. Six months before he began 
fundraising, the validation of the group, felt like a major milestone.  
And so, to have that ‘a-ha’ moment with them, and then, see it again six months 
later with the investors go, ‘Oh, yeah, this is something different. Yeah, there we 
go.  Now you get it.’  And then, it was very easy for them to open their wallets 
and get involved with it because they moved from understanding to believing. 
 
He suggests that without his team, the company would not be where it is today. Being 
surrounded by individuals who are “way smarter” than himself is rewarding in that, “You 
can…make awesome things and build fantastic things and it absolutely re uires a 
village.” He also takes pride in the fact that he was instrumental in building a group that 
works well together. 
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UK and the Technology Transfer Process 
 For Stone, the technology transfer process with UK was much more involved than 
Brown’s licensing experience. Stone created his product. Moreover, his involvement 
began in the ICC, rather than a campus lab. Stone has a family member who previously 
worked in the Small Business Development Center, a department of UKCED, located in 
downtown Lexington. He became acquainted with personnel in the Commerce Lexington 
building when he would stop by to visit over the years. He also spent time in the building 
as a “ uasi-consultant to help out with stuff.” Because of that connection, the ICC 
became aware of his project.  
 Stone feels the ICC representative, “genuinely wants to help…companies get 
started”. The TT officer inquired as to what Stone was doing and suggested he work with 
UKCED and BGA to fund a spinoff. Stone relayed his concerns about the investment 
group, noting, “I don’t think they’d understand it. They’re old. Their great grandkids play 
video games. I wish there were some younger people.” He was encouraged that there are 
“a couple of young guys” and the representative offered to schedule a private meeting 
with the younger members. Stone was able to pitch his idea to the young Angels and they 
were supportive. Enough so, that they brought him to a full meeting and explained they 
had privately invested and suggested the other members follow suit. Ellison was in that 
early meeting.  He agrees that he found the idea very interesting.  
Then that sort of transitioned to helping them get the pitch set up because, again, 
Andrew is the founder.  He never sort of raised capital, right?  He’s got experience 
in his domain  of games.  He understood his market.  But he doesn’t understand 
companies.  Didn’t understand financing aspects of it, valuation. What investors 
need to hear versus what he wants to tell them. What’s his experience? You’ve 
got to balance the two, right, because you’ve gotta let him sort of shine in his area 
of expertise.  But you also have to satisfy the investors in what they want to hear.   
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With assistance from Ellison and another younger Angel, Stone was able to refine his 
pitch and business plan. One aspect of the company that appealed to the investors was the 
horizon. Investors must acknowledge the “risk with reward.” At the end of the year, there 
may be nothing, but there could be something. Stone’s IP came across as an opportunity 
to “scale pretty  uickly”, because “the market has some change going on…so there’s an 
opportunity for new companies to come in and do something…games…that’s a huge 
market (Interview F, 2012).”  “It will be on the market in six to nine months and will be a 
quick turnaround (Interview I, 2012).” 
Company Y and Funding 
 Stone was able to secure a solid amount of funding that he and the Angels believe 
the company requires at this stage.  
 I'm a damn good salesman. I'm really good at talking people into stuff.  But no, 
seriously, it's kinda a perfect storm. The story that we told, and the types of 
leadership and team that we have associated with this project, it was the perfect fit 
for it. (Interview H, 2012) 
 
Ellison’s help substantially influenced Stone’s fundraising efforts. Ellison performed the 
due diligence. The Angels and entrepreneurs working in Base 163 assured Stone, “Rob 
did due diligence and gives you a thumbs up. I trust his judgment.” Stone continues, 
“They were like, ‘I understand Rob makes money off what he invests in.  I'm gonna put 
my money where Rob does." Stone adds,  
It's the same thing.  It's just, I'll get to the analogy, but, you know, the lemming 
that jumps off the mountain and the rest jump with it; it's that same kinda thing.  
Once someone does it, they're like, ‘Yeah, sure.’ It doesn't matter. I thought it was 
Lexington, but it's everywhere, everywhere.  And it's funny because you have the 
big companies that are helping me try to raise $600 million. I may go to some 
venture capital firm, and that  venture capital firm says, ‘We'll give you 150.’  All 
the other big wigs hear that and they  go, ‘Oh, what do they know that we don't?  
We need to get in on it.  Here's 200.’   
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Funding Stone’s technology has gone well.  
They raised $500,000 from the Bluegrass Angels, money from Commonwealth 
Seed  Capital, Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation, and a number of 
individual investors. We’re doing a follow-up round right now. KSTC is putting 
more money. Bluegrass Angels might put more money in.  I’m putting in a little.  
So helping them with  that has been interesting.  That, again, all started from [a 
phone call] saying, ‘Would you meet with these guys?’ (Interview F, 2012)  
 
Stone is still surprised at the local investments made in his project. 
I actually didn't expect any money in Lexington. I thought that, since I wasn't 
opening something that was pharmaceutical, or something that was equine-
related, or I wasn't opening a car dealership with Jamal Mashburn [a former 
University of Kentucky and professional basketball player], that I wouldn't get–I 
wouldn't raise any money; it just wouldn't happen.  But I was delightfully 
surprised. We went to one meeting outside of Lexington. It was in Louisville–to 
pitch to the local Angels.  There's like one–we got one deal out of that, one guy. 
His own money or whatever. 
 
He has found a drawback to having a large number of investors, which is oversight. He 
suggests wealthier investors are less concerned with monitoring the company. 
I think, people that invest all these large sums of money usually have large sums 
of money, and they understand that they can't be Superman for everyone.  They 
realize that, and so, they do put some of their responsibility out to others…But 
those people that are only putting a small amount of money in usually only have a 
small amount of money to begin with. So, it's a huge risk–a much larger risk–and 
so, they always wanna know what's going on because they're so, you know, 
worried about that dollar amount. It's, ‘What are you doing with my money?’ You 
know?  And so those people usually get–they'll start reading and seeing more 
things about the industry that it's invested in, like with us it's video games, and so, 
some older investors that maybe necessarily never even thought of video games, 
they invested me, and are now reading the Wall Street Journal have some story 
about video games in it.  And they'll be like, ‘Hey, it says here that Xbox games 
are down 18 percent.  Do we need to worry about that?’ And I'm like, ‘Ugh,’ you 
know?  ‘No, there's no big Xbox game’   
 
He notes that not all investors are like that, but it can be a “beast” to deal with some 
personalities. 
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Growth and Economic Development 
In terms of growth, Stone suggests that he currently does not have plans for 
expansion of his staff. “Right now, we’re like a think tank.” He suggests that his team’s 
role is similar to a movie production team’s. “We do all the stuff behind the scenes, and 
then we say, ‘Here is this game. Build it for us.’” Although there are times it would be 
nice to work closely with everyone,  
I don't have to be, you know, literally on them every single day.  It would be good 
if I could get in the car, and drive down the street, and go in, and say, ‘Hey, what's 
going on?’ and like, ‘Show me stuff.’  Luckily, with technology, we can get all 
that done. That's-when you walked in, just seen me doing in there, was a video 
conference with our team, going over the game, going over things we wanna 
change, and that kinda stuff. So, luckily, that gives us that ability to do that–being 
a teleconference.   
 
At the same time, he says it would be easier if he were able to call a meeting where 
everyone could physically be in the same room “because it’s a much more efficient way 
of communicating. But they're only eight hours away; it's not a crazy drive.”   
 He does not seriously consider relocating closer to his outsourced team because 
he is from the area, his family is close, and he and his wife own a home. If the 
opportunity presents itself, Stone is likely to continue to grow his local team from seven, 
to thirty, to sixty people, and so on. He considers it a long-term goal for the project, but 
believes,  
It'll never happen here until you tell UK that they can do a [game developer] 
program. It just would never happen because no one would. Why would you leave 
an area that has 100 jobs pitching for you, to come to a company, to a city, that 
has one–which is my company? And if I didn't like you or we didn't work out well 
and I had to let you go, what are you gonna do? Pack up and fly back home?  And 
that's a pretty crappy position to be in. 
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Although Stone does not plan to leave the Lexington area, and seems to consider the 
impact relocating to Lexington might have on employees, he argues that economic 
development is not a consideration for his business. 
No, don't think about economic development. It never really crosses my mind, but 
I know that, in the long term, if our company does well, I know it will drive the 
economy in Lexington because the games that–you know, here, the industry 
makes pretty good money. I mean, there's games that are doing $15 million a 
month in revenue. To bring that kinda money to a city like the size of Lexington, 
that's a real changer. I mean, you've become one of the top ten companies period 
in the city when you're doing that kinda revenue. If you're at the $400 to $600 
million a year, yeah, you've got–you've got some weight to kinda throw around. 
 
He continues that “weight” in Lexington is not a consideration, either. 
It doesn't mean anything to me because we're launching our game in 15 languages 
in almost every country in the world. I don't–the local economics and politics of 
Lexington do very little for me, but that doesn't mean I don't wanna give back to it 
in some way. And it's kinda–I guess, for me, is it's self-fulfilling–is that I want to 
see UK start a game program, and I wanna give as much of my time to help them 
do that because it'll help my business later.  If students are coming out of that 
school, they have experience, and know what they're doing; I can bring those kids 
in and get some work  done that way. So, I would love to see that kinda thing 
happen, but we're just in the  talking stage right now. We'll see. 
 
University Spinoff Z: Biotechnology Company 
Company Z (Z) can be categorized as a Researcher/Codified USO, what Pirnay, et al 
refer to as a researcher-oriented spinoff utilizing an idea developed by a researcher or 
researchers (2003). The faculty began developing the product in the 1990s while 
researching enzymes at two institutions, including the College of Agriculture at 
University of Kentucky. Of the three USOs, Company Z is the most mature early stage 
company. The technology is the result of approximately twelve years of collaborative 
research between a UK faculty member and a researcher from another institution. The 
company is one of the first UKCED spinoffs, was launched roughly eight years ago 
(Interview I, 2012). Company Z’s operational unit is located on UK’s Coldstream 
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Research Campus. Coldstream is targeted at companies “a little bit further down the 
development curve” from those in incubators (Interview E, 2012).   
Because of its comparatively advanced status, Z was the most difficult to research. 
That is, although operations are based in Kentucky, the CEO (not an academic) is 
stationed in California. Because of scheduling difficulties, the CEO was not available to 
participate. An operations executive located in Lexington did agree to participate in the 
study, but voiced concern over sharing proprietary information. Inasmuch, the descriptive 
information in this section is limited as an effort to keep the USO’s identity confidential.     
Technology Z 
 
  In laymen’s terms, technology Z manipulates enzymes to create certain 
compounds. The class of enzymes that the technology reproduces can produce a variety 
of products. This process yields more products and is less expensive than traditional 
methods. Although it is a platform technology, with a number of applications, the current 
focus of Z is inexpensively producing flavors and fragrances.  
Commercialization and Development 
 
Doug Wilson (pseudonym, Interview G, 2012) is an operations executive at Company 
Z. He suggests that the researchers are “among the first to clone the genes or put out a 
class of enzymes and…the first to determine the three-dimensional structure of that class 
of enzymes.” Initially, the research was “purely academic”. This led to a number of 
patents. The patent families are part of Company Z’s technology portfolio. In total, the 
company’s technology is protected by 62 patents (Company Z website, 2012).  
In an effort to further their original study, the researchers realized that they would 
need to produce large amounts of enzymes. They “developed systems to over-produce 
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those enzymes and over-produce the product of those enzymes. And it has since led to the 
commercial interest in those enzymes and the products of those enzymes.” The 
production mechanism is the partial basis for the company, because of its ability to 
produce compounds.  
The technology also allows the researchers,  
To manipulate how enzymes work so they could produce different products 
because of the diversity of types of products that can be made by this class of 
enzymes. You can actually convert-change the products that were made by a 
specific enzyme by changing the amino acids sequence of the enzymes, and they 
developed technology surrounding changing the specificity of these enzymes.   
 
Wilson continues, 
Yeah. I don’t think they went into this thinking we’re gonna take this technology 
and commercialize it. I think their interest was purely academic, but then they saw 
that there was commercial potential and they took advantage of that opportunity. 
And so when they filed those patents they filed patents around the structure 
function relationships of these enzymes and that led to a pretty strong family of 
patents that work based on this. And  it’s one of the cornerstones of [Company 
Z’s] intellectual property portfolio. 
 
Education and Professional Background 
Wilson’s educational background is scientific. He earned a Ph.D. in Biochemistry and 
pursued some graduate work in chemical engineering. His postdoctoral work was in 
molecular genetics. He adds,  
This was back in the early ‘80s when biotechnology was first, it was in its 
infancy.  The talk at the time was ‘This is technology that’s gonna revolutionize 
chemicals, fuels, medicine’-and it was really very exciting. And I thought, okay a 
background in biochemistry, chemical engineering, and genetics would all be very 
appropriate to practice that technology. So it was all pretty much by design that I 
came into this. At the time, I was thinking that it would be interesting technology 
to be applied to make new classes of chemicals that can’t be made in traditional 
synthetic organic chemistry, because maybe they’re too complicated to synthesize 
from scratch. And that’s kind of where this technology comes into being. 
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After completing his postdoctoral research, Wilson worked for a company making 
amino acids “which are generally made by fermentation involving several things by 
fermentation or extracted from normal sources or something like proteins or…stuff like 
that.  But we were applying new techniques to doing that using genetic engineering.” He 
moved on from that position to work for a contract research company that used several 
different technologies and various aspects of biotechnology, including fermentation, 
genetics, and enzymology. Because the organization handled contract research, Wilson 
spent fixed periods working on several projects. “A lot of projects are three months; six 
months…A year is considered a long term project when you’re in a company like that.  
So I got exposed to a lot of different aspects of industrial biotechnologies as a result.” 
After his time in contract research, Wilson left for a position as Director of Research 
and Development for an enzyme company. While there, he was contacted by a recruiter 
for Company Z and says, 
I heard about this opportunity and it all sounded vaguely, more than vaguely 
familiar. It sounded very familiar. And I realized when I saw the technology that 
was being developed, I really said ‘It originated out of the company I used to 
work for.’ At the time we first came in contact with each other I don’t think either 
of us realized that connection, but we did [eventually]. 
 
He also notes that the position at Z is intellectually challenging. He believes that working 
to produce chemicals, rather than enzymes, is professionally rewarding. Working with a 
fermentation process that requires balancing of several different enzyme activities is 
more stimulating than his previous research and development work. “So this is more, like 
I said, more intellectually interesting problems to solve. And I was familiar with it. And I 
saw the technology portfolio and it was very interesting.” 
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The Road to Company Z 
 
After initial contact from the recruiter, Wilson had a number of telephone and 
teleconference interviews. Once they established a mutual interest, Wilson travelled to 
Lexington to meet the CEO. He requested to meet in Lexington, rather than California, 
because he wanted to see the facility and meet the team. He admits that he was living in 
Florida at the time and “Florida is a great place to vacation. I’m not sure it’s a great place 
to live.” Lexington, on the other hand reminded Wilson of the Midwest, where he was 
raised, and he liked the community. 
Another factor that influenced Wilson’s decision to join Company Z was the strength 
of the technology and the organization. He indicates that he came to Z because he was 
impressed initially with the technology and had the appropriate background.  
You know I came here with a lot of experience. I mean [that is] one of the reasons 
they hired me, because I had experience in a broad range of commercial industrial 
biotechnology.  I had worked for companies that had produced in and had large 
scales and their commercial scale. We had a complete supply chain for producing 
products by fermentation. So I knew what it took to get the job done. Although 
our team was small, we made some key hires, hires in all of the key areas.  
  
He indicates that the CEO is skilled at finding consultants that could “fill in the gaps.” He 
notes that when funding only allows for a small team, “We can’t hire everybody…you 
need to work with people on the outside.” In addition to consultants identified by the 
CEO, Wilson has relationships with many consultants, as well. “We have a good team of 
hardworking, motivated, smart people here that know how to get the job done.” 
Finding the Appropriate Technology, Environment, and Ecosystem 
 Wilson believes his position is “the best job I’ve ever had”. He admits that it comes 
with challenges, “but the challenges are what make the work interesting.” He argues that 
in the industrial biotechnology field, it is important to understand the limits of 
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technology. “There are a lot of companies out there that have said they were gonna 
change the world and they’re not  uite meeting expectations right now. And that’s kind 
of put a black eye on the industry to some extent.” He asserts that what Company Z does 
right, is that it remains modest in terms of technology expectations. He adds that it is 
important to “underplay” rather than “overplay” capabilities. “We’re not out there 
promising things that we don’t think can be done.” 
He argues that in the biotechnology industry, “The ones [firms] that make the 
headlines are the ones that have not delivered, and I would say there a few highly visible 
cases where the expectations have not been met.” However, overall, companies approach 
technological value from the perspective of “Let’s do something that we believe in that 
can be met.” He notes there are a few examples of biofuel or renewable energy 
technologies where, “I think they actually thought that they could do what they wanted to 
do, but then reality set in.” 
Wilson believes the key to success in science and technology fields is to assess 
situations, make balanced decisions concerning challenges, and follow through with an 
action plan.  
Do we go ahead and revise our plan and push out our timelines and increase the 
cost of  development or do we–? Well, basically, we have to go over those 
decision points. We either go ahead with the increased time and effort that 
develops going ahead, or do we have the no-go decision and say, ‘Okay, this is 
more difficult than we thought it was gonna be? Is it worth pursuing?’ 
 
Wilson indicates that go or no-go decisions are imperative to success. At the USO, he and 
the team make those kinds of decisions frequently.  
It all depends on a lot of different factors: What is the newly assessed probability 
of success; and what is the commercial value of the technology? If you were 
working on something that is a small niche market and you thought it was gonna 
be easy and it turned out not to be easy, you probably would say, ‘Nah, there’s not 
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enough market incentive to continue with this.’ But if it’s a huge market and 
there’s a big reward at the end if you  are successful; if it’s not deemed to be 
impossible you might go ahead and do it.  
 
Company Z has been at several of these decision points and Wilson feels that the no-
go decisions are generally easier to make. At the same time, there have been instances 
where it would have been easier to say, “No-go”, but the team has pushed ahead. 
 Let’s say we have not given up on something that was a really-something that 
was when it’s successful, it will be–really be a lucrative product. When we have 
made no-go decisions, it was because, ‘This is more difficult that we thought it 
was and it’s in the niche market.’ We’ve run across some technically challenging 
things that are more than the niche market opportunities, so we made the go 
decision. Now if we had made the no-go decision then, now [presently] we would 
say, ‘Gee Whiz, we did do the right thing!’ 
 
It all comes down to risk analysis. If the reward could be greater, there is a tendency to 
take more time considering a go/no-go decision point. Determining potential reward is 
also a complicated process. Wilson indicates that, in that case, the strength of the team is 
essential. 
[Company Z’s CEO] is really good at identifying good consultants. And we have 
a number of consultants from the industry that have been in the industry for a long 
period  of time, know the industry. Not only what the industry wants today, but 
what the industry may want in the future, and how our technologies can provide 
those things. 
 
For example, Wilson suggests that when the current market opportunity for the product is 
low, but Company Z has the ability to bring down the price significantly, the market 
opportunity can increase. Technology Z’s success is based upon solid market analysis. 
“So when I say something has a huge market opportunity it may not be the current market 
opportunity but it’s a perceived future market opportunity. So it could be a blockbuster.” 
In terms of location, Wilson feels that if there is any drawback, it is “immediacy.” 
There are times when a question arises and, because of the time difference in locations, 
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contacting the CEO is not feasible. Most communication is electronic. “Ninety-five 
percent to ninety-nine percent of the time, that’s sufficient. But the one thing I do miss is, 
like when I worked in places where everybody was in one location, you could, you know, 
go to lunch with people [or] talk in the hallways.” Currently discussions must take place 
over the phone or in meetings. “It doesn’t get done by osmosis, but it does if you’re all in 
one place.”  Wilson suggests, though, that being “forced” to make a call or send an e-mail 
“requires more focus.” Therefore, communications tend to be more specific and clear 
than a chat in the hallway. 
Wilson includes, among Company Z’s greatest accomplishments, its development 
progress.   
We’ve taken technology that was developed in the laboratory, brought it to 
commercial, not only to commercial viability, but all the way up to commercial 
manufacturing and sales. When it comes to producing [Company Z’s product] 
we’re the only company that has any products that are being manufactured at that 
scale and being sold. So I think that’s a pretty significant accomplishment. We, 
you know, we accomplish it with a pretty small team and then fairly short period 
of time.  So I think that’s something we can all be pretty proud of. 
 
Product manufacturing is outsourced. Because of a non-disclosure agreement, Wilson 
could not reveal where it takes place, other than to say, “We work with contract 
manufacturing companies and organizations. Well, we have worked with people in the 
country and worked with people outside the country. I can’t tell you who they are.” He 
indicates that when producing products at a 50,000 a year scale, a large facility is 
required. “A fermentation plant, a fully capable fermentation plant, would cost tens of 
millions of dollars to build.  We intend to have our own manufacturing facility at some 
point, but when you’re first starting out that’s an awful lot of expansion.” 
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Producing Company Z’s products can be challenging. Although Wilson had 
experience, it was “mostly technical.” He insists that the logistics and regulatory details 
were new to him and he was surprised by the level of details.  
I have much greater respect for the VP of manufacturing that I used to work with.  
Not that I didn’t respect him in the past, but when I realize now all the things that 
he did, I even have more respect for him! Because there’s a lot of details that go 
into that to make it all work. [It] requires a significant attention to detail and 
obviously [to] make the effort in a lot of different areas. So one of the biggest 
challenges is, I would say, is getting that all together and in a cohesive fashion 
that all the pieces fit together well. 
 
UK and the Technology Transfer Process 
Wilson admits that he has never really had direct contact with the university. He 
states that collaboration with UKCED is most important when a company is “first starting 
out and that was before I came.” He says the CEO “did a lot of that initial leg work, I 
guess. And [the CEO] used to be the primary point of contact with the patent process. I 
mean we still communicate with them, but it’s not like it’s vital to the conduct of the 
business.”   
Company Z and Funding 
 In addition to its general development progress, Company Z has amassed the 
greatest amount of funding of the three USOs identified. Since 2005, Z has secured 
approximately $33.5 million in funding. In its initial seed round, Z received almost $3 
million. The Series A round was led by the Bluegrass Angels. In 2007, Company Z went 
through a Series B round, in the form of a convertible note, worth $3.35 million. That 
round was backed by a global food and beverage conglomerate, based out of London, 
England, and Tech Coast Angels. Series C funding added an additional $9 million in 
early 2010. It was backed by two venture capital firms, as well as the London-based 
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Corporation. In March 2012, a venture capital firm’s subsidiary invested $13.5 million. 
The subsidiary led an $18.5 million Series D financing round, joined by the investors 
involved in the Series C round. (Interview G, 2012; Company Z website, 2012). In 
addition to the Series D financing, Company Z acquired state incentive funds to create 14 
new positions. It cannot be classified as “a success”, however, because no investors have 
seen a return (Interview I, 2012). 
Growth and Economic Development 
 Company Z is “probably the farthest down the road in terms of developing into a 
good sized business. That’s where the [hypothetical] 300 jobs become 3,000 jobs.  You 
get all of the companies that started seven or eight years ago to get to the stage where 
[Company Z] is now, and you begin to have multiplier effects in terms of employment 
(Interview I, 2012).” Although Z manufactures and sells its products, Wilson indicates, 
“We still consider ourselves an early-stage company…developing our initial pipeline of 
products.” Before investigating the development of a manufacturing facility, Z must find 
out how widely its products are embraced by the industry, and how economically the 
products can be manufactured.  
Company Z recently distributed a press release announcing that it would be hiring for 
several positions at its Lexington location (with the assistance of the state’s incentive 
funds). Each technology transfer officer and investor that participated in this study 
mentioned the press release as a promising sign for UK’s TBED enterprise. When asked 
to discuss the positions in terms of qualifications, Wilson states, 
There are whole different levels. Some of the positions are a Ph.D. and experience 
on top of that. And there’s our entry level positions that are a bachelor’s-with just 
a bachelor’s degree. Some are even non-degree positions. So they cover the whole 
range. Well, I  mean, like I said, our new hires encompass that entire range.  But 
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the majority of those jobs do require a degree-and most of the positions that we 
are currently looking at now [require advanced education] because they have 
some pretty specific needs. As I said, some of the positions are pretty high-level 
jobs, and you know a Ph.D. with 10 years of experience, for example. That’s a 
good job I’d say….highly technical position, and we have several of those.   
 
In regard to the number of “high level” positions compared to entry-level positions,  
So we’ve, if you look at our current hiring plan, out of those 14 people I would 
say seven or eight of them are Ph.D.s plus experience. And most of the rest 
re uire a bachelor’s or master’s degree, and a couple of them are technical 
positions.  
 
Concerning employment needs beyond the current hiring plan, 
And we need media makers, dishwashers, glassware washers, media preparers, 
and people that help out. And so those positions, like I say, don’t even really 
re uire a degree. Sometimes we’ve got people that work part-time who are going 
to school, going to college, for example.  
 
Company Z anticipates continued growth. Wilson states that Coldstream has been a 
satisfactory location for operations. When asked if there are plans to remain in Lexington, 
for example if Z moves forward to construct a manufacturing facility, he does not want to 
speculate. He feels the company is still too young and there are too many unknown 
variables. Company Z’s market success and profitability are the primary variables 
considered in terms of growth. Any economic development in the region is ancillary. The 
cross-country split of the executive team implies that, at least from the CEO’s 
perspective, a Lexington location is not fundamental for success.  
 
 
© Tara Kristen Baas, 2013 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The objectives of this study are to address five interrelated questions concerning the 
University of Kentucky’s approach toward a program for technology based economic 
development. UK was chosen for the study based on its characteristics as a mid-level 
performer, based on contemporary standards of measurement, in terms of technology 
transfer. Moreover, as a public institution, the University of Kentucky is faced with a 
number of variables that many of the top performing institutions are not. Those include a 
land grant and flagship heritage, access to funding, and collaborative connections to state 
and local government. The majority of previous studies concerning university technology 
transfer address private, highly ranked, strong performers. In addition, UK has undergone 
administrative changes in recent years, which based upon the results of this research, 
have influenced its TBED enterprise in various ways. The level of influence appears 
dependent upon the nature of the relationship with UKCED. The following section 
addresses the study’s research  uestions individually, in the hope that a broad 
understanding of the case will be reached. As noted throughout, the study is intrinsic, and 
not meant for generalization. Because intrinsic studies allow the reader to draw his/her 
own conclusions, this section is intentionally brief. The discussion is not meant to 
encompass the large number of possible interpretations.  The findings may have 
implications for future areas of study. 
Question 1: How can the organizational structure of the TBED enterprise at the 
University of Kentucky be described? 
The nature of the TBED enterprise is farther reaching than the technology transfer 
operation, itself. As Geiger and Sá suggest, technology transfer activities are linked to the 
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private sector, directly or indirectly. Examples of technology transfer operations often 
include discussions of patenting and licensing. University spinoffs have emerged as a 
“distinct sector of technology transfer, one that largely complements and amplifies 
university patenting and licensing (p. 134).” Although directly connected to patenting and 
licensing, spinoffs require a greater amount of work than license execution (2008). 
UKCED’s description of the intellectual property process suggests a much more 
straightforward process than what actually occurs. UKCED’s Intellectual Property 
Overview indicates that researchers submit their disclosure(s), work with the Intellectual 
Property Development Office and present the disclosure to the IP committee. A brief 
paragraph at the top of the UKCED IP development website, states that UKCED will,  
Protect IP through patenting, and develop the IP into useful technologies and 
products to benefit the public through licensing. In addition, UK inventors, their 
departments and their colleges benefit from royalty sharing. Inventors can further 
develop their IP by licensing their own startup company (UKCED, 2012 b).  
 
However, participants’ discussions of the number of organizations and partnerships 
involved, indicate a much more intricate and difficult road from disclosure to spinoff. In 
addition, personnel continue to change strategies as they learn. Establishing structures 
takes time, but the inherent nature of government and institutional structures and 
partnerships is that they continue to evolve. For UKCED, that involves its own 
evolutionary nature, a number of local and state organizations, as well as private 
individuals and corporations.  
Question 2: From an organizational perspective, what are the goals of UK’s TBED 
enterprise, as perceived by affiliated professionals? 
 The primary goal when President Todd created UKCED was job creation. Several 
considerations within this study take into account economic development as the 
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principal goal. As President Todd demonstrated in his strategic and business plans 
concerning the Top 20 Compact, several strategies and measures must be in place, in 
order for a diverse organization to meet a goal. In this case, individuals and groups 
relayed their own stakes in the effort. For the Office for Commercialization and 
Development, the primary goal was establishing a foundation for economic 
development by creating the necessary infrastructure. For the Bluegrass Angels, the 
goal was to see returns on investments, which could lead to economic development. 
Finally, for USO personnel, the goal was to operate successful companies. Although 
one USO officer had personal feelings about economic development, it was in 
opposition to outsourcing overseas, as opposed to local job creation. 
 The majority of participants saw job growth as a long-term, auxiliary outcome of 
other accomplishments. This was contradictory to the way that TBED was marketed 
by the university. It also begets a chicken or egg type scenario. The premise of much 
of the actions of parties involved was that, given the proper environment, job growth 
would occur. However, as seen in many of the technology clusters, the environment 
may also be a consequence of economic development.  
 In some ways, considering a climate for economic development is analogous to 
considering the viability of an intellectual property disclosure. One must consider, ‘Is 
it novel-solving a problem and is the solution unique?’ ’ For UK, as a relative 
latecomer to the technology based economic development enterprise, it seems that the 
approach is not unique. It could address a problem, but it is not directly addressing 
the state’s economic problems today. ‘Does the team work together well and 
represent expertise in the field?’ UKCED’s professional staff, as well as the USO 
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officers, appears to work well together and, overall, to represent certain levels of 
expertise. The Angels, however, readily admit that they are not venture capitalists. 
They do not have the same level of financial expertise or access to capital. As an 
initial link between UKCED technologies and USO viability, their limitations appear 
significant. ‘Are the timeframes realistic?’ No timeline was set. As UKCED 
personnel suggested, the public is impatient, but economic development initiatives 
take time. The amount of time is unclear. ‘Is the market overcrowded?’ The answer, 
concerning the number of alternative communities with similar programs, is yes. As 
of 1994, eight years prior to the establishment of UKCED, 1,056 such organizations 
existed in the United States (Cohen, Florida, & Goe, as cited in Yusuf & Nabeshima, 
2007). These answers indicate that, even with an entrepreneurial climate, the 
University of Kentucky and the city of Lexington may not meet be able to meet the 
specific needs of technology firms. Even if they can, there is little impetus to choose 
UK or Lexington over the large number of options available.  
Question 3: What are the challenges to the TBED enterprise’s goals, as perceived by 
affiliated professionals? 
A number of participants referenced a lack of resources as a challenge to goals. 
Resources, in this case, generally included funding, buy-in, and talent or expertise. 
However, while the groups were working directly or indirectly to affect economic 
development, it was rarely mentioned as an immediate goal. This could relate to St. 
John and Parson’s argument about the “pervasive role of…self-interest and political 
ideology in policy development (p. 19).” Although their argument concerns federal 
policy, it appears appropriate in reference to some institutional policies, as well. They 
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suggest that uniform theories concerning policy development may be impossible 
achieve. Policy decisions are often influenced by areas like educational research and 
economic theories, but informed by political ideology (2004). 
Several participants in this study, who understood that the primary goal of 
UKCED was specified as job creation; continued to reference economic development 
from a trickle down perspective. Three participants mentioned the influence a small 
number of high tech positions could have on the economy, indicating that those 
individuals will have expanded purchasing power (Interview C, Interview E, 
Interview F; 2012).  Only one participant believed that the economic development 
argument was largely influenced by political ideology (Interview B, 2012).  When 
asked about job creation, as one Angel responded, “I mean I think a lot of these ideas 
– they – it’s hard to argue with them because they seem to make sense (Interview A, 
2012).”  
This comes back to the argument that, overall, the groups did not subscribe to a 
specific rationale for their involvement. Technology transfer personnel discussed the 
importance of economic development as an institutional goal. Angels discussed 
economic growth as an important offshoot of their activities, but did not implement a 
system to achieve it, likely, because their primary goal was to see returns. Finally, 
USO personnel seemed to have little concern for local economic development 
initiatives. The basis for state matching programs was to encourage companies to 
remain in, or relocate to, Kentucky. Yet the primary ambition of the USO personnel 
was to manage a successful firm. However, all of these individuals and groups 
comprise UK’s technology based economic development network. 
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Question 4: What goals have been achieved by the TBED enterprise, as perceived by 
affiliated professionals? 
 Achievements of individuals and groups were also not specific to job creation. 
Based upon affiliation, individuals indicated a range of accomplishments. Technology 
transfer personnel suggested accomplishments related to establishing a foundation for 
TBED in the state, organizing groups, and streamlining processes. Angels’ 
accomplishments were generally personal or financial. Although one Angel indicated that 
he was “proud” that the group rarely invested in companies outside of the region, he was 
clear that state tax incentives were a persuasive factor (Interview E, 2012). Finally, the 
majority of USO personnel achievements fell within the realm of business development, 
including technology and process improvements. Accomplishments outside of business 
enhancement were related to areas such as team building and personal achievements. 
None of the participants indicated that they had achieved significant job growth.  
Question 5: What factors, as perceived by affiliated professionals, have influenced 
challenges and achievements to the TBED enterprises’ goals? 
 Concerning challenges to attainment of goals, technology transfer personnel cited a 
change in administrative goals, insecurity about the future of the organization, and a lack 
of infrastructure. Angel investors referenced different administrative priorities within 
UK, the economic recession, and lack of input with USOs as factors that led to 
challenges. Of the three groups, the Angels appeared most effected, in terms of morale, 
by President Todd’s retirement. That could be because in their discussions of Todd, they 
seemed to view him as a model for faculty entrepreneurs. From their perspectives, he was 
the ultimate academic turned entrepreneur, and represented their understanding of the 
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investment opportunities that should emerge from the university. Finally, USOs, overall, 
referenced funding opportunities and lack of experience with specific procedures as 
contributing to challenges.  
As far as influences on accomplishments, each group, sighted influences based upon 
its own interpretation of essential goals. TT personnel indicated the existence of strong 
networks and teams in helping to build infrastructure. Angels suggested their personal 
financial influences on the economic environment in Kentucky. Finally, USOs, like 
technology transfer personnel, considered factors like solid teams and collaboration as 
contributing to their successes. This could be partly because, as part of a large institution, 
UKCED officers were provided with objectives from upper level administrators. USO 
officers had guidelines to follow, such as traditional business plans or procedures. The 
Angels, on the other hand, were persuaded largely by personal financial objectives, which 
can make group goal setting and achievement complicated. 
Conclusion  
Overall, this study indicates that UK’s TBED enterprise consists of complex network 
of loosely and tightly affiliated individuals and groups. Members of the network have 
some common and disparate goals. Aside from varying group priorities, individuals 
suggest different goals, as well. This is particularly the case for private investors and 
entrepreneurs. The study also provides some areas of interest for future research. Spinoff 
funding appears to be a major challenge. A more detailed look at the investment 
community could provide insight into spinoff funding, in terms of the rationales and 
decision-making processes of investors. Moreover, it would be exciting to pursue the 
concept of ideology and its impact on technology transfer. Many of the participants in 
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this study expressed conservative viewpoints. Only one, a technology transfer officer, 
expressed a different perspective. It could be beneficial to gain a greater understanding of 
the influence that ideological outlooks have on the priorities and interactions of groups 
involved in technology based economic development.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Tara Kristen Baas, 2013 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Legend for Oral History Interviews 
 
Interview A: Personal Communication with Investor: Randall Booker* November 6, 
2012  
 
Interview B: Personal Communication with Technology Transfer Officer Dave  
Richardson*: October 22, 2012 
 
Interview C: Personal Communication with Technology Transfer Officer: Terry 
Atkinson* November 3, 2012 
 
Interview D: Personal Communication with University Spinoff Officer Mark Brown*: 
October 18, 2012 
 
Interview E: Personal Communication with Investor: Gary Chiles* October 9, 2012 
 
Interview F: Personal Communication with Investor: Rob Ellison October 28, 2012 
 
Interview G: Personal Communication with University Spinoff Officer Doug Wilson*: 
October 30, 2012 
 
Interview H: Personal Communication with University Spinoff Officer Andrew Stone*: 
November 2, 2012 
 
Interview I:  Personal Communication with Technology Transfer Officer: Roger Kemp* 
October 4, 2012 
 
Interview J: Personal Communication with Technology Transfer Officer: November 14, 
2012: Roger Kemp*  
 
*For narrative purposes, the participant has been referenced throughout the study by this 
pseudonym. 
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Appendix B: Text of Introductory E-mails to Sampling Frame/ Invitations to Participate 
in the Study: Entrepreneurs/Investors 
 
Dear [Prospective Participant], 
[Gatekeeper/and or Intermediary], with [Organization], referred me to you. I am a 
PhD candidate in Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation at the University of 
Kentucky, and [Gatekeeper and/or Intermediary] suggested you as a possible resource for 
my dissertation study. My dissertation attempts to gain a deeper understanding of factors 
that influence university spin-off development. As a part of my study, I am asking 
individuals connected to that process to answer some broad questions regarding their 
experiences.  
Would you be interested in speaking with me and answering some of my questions? 
The timeframe is generally an hour. If so, could you let me know of some times that you 
may be available in the near future? Also, please do not hesitate to contact me if you have 
any questions/concerns regarding my study. Thank you for your time, and have a great 
day. 
Best,  
Tara K. Baas, M.S.Ed 
PhD Candidate 
Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation 
University of Kentucky 
Tara.Baas@uky.edu 
Phone: [xxx-xxx-xxxx]  
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Appendix C: Text of Introductory E-mails to Sampling Frame/ Invitations to Participate 
in the Study: Technology Transfer Personnel 
 
Dear [Prospective Participant], 
[Gatekeeper/and or Intermediary], with [Organization], referred me to you. I am a 
PhD candidate in Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation at the University of 
Kentucky, and [Gatekeeper/and or Intermediary] suggested you as a possible resource for 
my dissertation study. My dissertation attempts to gain a deeper understanding of factors 
that influence university spin-off development. As a part of my study, I am asking 
individuals connected to that process to answer some broad questions regarding their 
experiences.  
Would you be interested in speaking with me and answering some of my questions? 
The timeframe is generally an hour. If so, could you let me know of some times that you 
may be available in the near future? Also, please do not hesitate to contact me if you have 
any questions/concerns regarding my study. Thank you for your time, and have a great 
day. 
Best,  
Tara K. Baas, M.S.Ed 
PhD Candidate 
Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation 
University of Kentucky 
Tara.Baas@uky.edu 
Phone: [xxx-xxx-xxxx]  
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Appendix D: Text of Introductory E-mails to Sampling Frame/ Invitations to Participate 
in the Study: USO Officers 
 
Dear [Prospective Participant], 
[Gatekeeper/and or Intermediary], with [Organization], referred me to you. I am a 
PhD candidate in Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation at the University of 
Kentucky, and [Gatekeeper/and or Intermediary] suggested you as a possible resource for 
my dissertation study. My dissertation attempts to gain a deeper understanding of factors 
that influence university spin-off development. As a part of my study, I am asking 
individuals connected to that process to answer some broad questions regarding their 
experiences. As part of that effort, I hope to look specifically at a few technology 
companies, in order to gather more in-depth data concerning their unique circumstances.  
Would you be interested in speaking with me and answering some of my questions? 
The timeframe is generally an hour. If so, could you let me know of some times that you 
may be available in the near future? Also, please do not hesitate to contact me if you have 
any questions/concerns regarding my study. Thank you for your time, and have a great 
day. 
Best,  
Tara K. Baas, M.S.Ed 
PhD Candidate 
Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation 
University of Kentucky 
Tara.Baas@uky.edu 
Phone: [xxx-xxx-xxxx]  
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Appendix E: IRB Exemption Certification 
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Appendix F: Copy of Informed Consent Form 
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
 
The Public Research University in the 21st
 
Century: A Case Study of 
Technology Based Economic Development Initiatives (Working Title) 
 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the efforts of public 
research universities to enhance economic development. If you volunteer to take part in 
this study, you will be one of about 10 people to do so.  
 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? 
The person in charge of this study is Tara Baas, a PhD student at the University of 
Kentucky, in the Department of Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation. She is being 
guided in this research by Drs. Alan J. DeYoung and John R. Thelin.  
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
By doing this study, we hope to gain greater insight into the efforts of public flagship 
universities to enhance state or regional economic development. 
 
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS 
STUDY? 
You should not take part in this study if you feel that answering questions regarding 
your experiences would cause excessive emotional or physical stress. 
 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG 
WILL IT LAST?  
The research procedures will be conducted at your office at the University of 
Kentucky.  The interviewer will need to come to your office approximately one (1) time 
during the study.  Each visit will take about one hour.  The total amount of time you will 
be asked to volunteer for this study is up to your discretion over the next six (6) months. 
 
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO? 
You will be asked to provide an oral history of your experiences related the 
University of Kentucky’s Office of Commercialization and Economic Development.  
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm 
than you would experience in everyday life. 
You may find some questions we ask you to be upsetting or stressful.  If so, we can 
tell you about some people who may be able to help you with these feelings. 
In addition to the risks listed above, you may experience a previously unknown risk 
or side effect. 
 
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
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You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study. 
 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to 
volunteer.  You will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have if you 
choose not to volunteer.  You can stop at any time during the study and still keep the 
benefits and rights you had before volunteering.   
 
IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE 
OTHER CHOICES? 
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part 
in the study. 
 
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study. 
 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS 
STUDY? 
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study. 
 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE? 
We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify you to the 
extent allowed by law. 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in 
the study. When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write 
about the combined information we have gathered. You will not be identified by name. 
You will be assigned a random number connected to your oral history. The number will 
be linked to a general description of your position in an appendix. As an oral history/case 
study, you may be indirectly identifiable in these written materials, based on the 
description of your position. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will 
keep your name private.  We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the 
research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. A 
digital recording of your oral history will be saved by the primary investigator on a 
password-protected computer for six years after the completion of the study. At the 
conclusion of six years, the recording will be erased/destroyed. 
We will keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by 
law.  However, there are some circumstances, in which we may have to show your 
information to other people.  We may be required to show information, which identifies 
you, to people who need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these would be 
people from such organizations as the University of Kentucky. 
 
CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time 
that you no longer want to continue.  You will not be treated differently if you decide to 
stop taking part in the study.   
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WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR 
COMPLAINTS? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please 
ask any questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, 
suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study, you can contact the investigator, 
Tara Baas at Tara.Baas@uky.edu.  If you have any questions about your rights as a 
volunteer in this research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the 
University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428.  We will give 
you a signed copy of this consent form to take with you.  
 
WHAT ELSE DO YOU NEED TO KNOW? 
This study is being conducted as part of the requirements of the primary investigator, 
Tara Baas, to complete the PhD. Degree. No other individuals (besides the dissertation 
advisory committee), institutions, or companies are involved in the study through 
funding, cooperative research, or by providing supplies or equipment 
_________________________________________   ____________ 
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study    Date 
  
__________________________________________ 
Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study 
  
________Tara Baas__________________________   ____________ 
Name of [authorized] person obtaining informed consent   Date 
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Appendix G: Basic Interview Script for Entrepreneurs/Investors 
 
Oral History Interview Script for Investors * 
Provide Informed Consent for Signature & ask again for permission to record 
1. Describe purpose of study. 
2. I’d like to start by learning more about how you came to be in this position. I’ve 
reviewed your biosketch (if applicable), but can you tell me briefly about your 
background and interest in the Angels and how you were recruited? 
3. How would you describe the investment process-presentation, discussion, 
decision? 
4. I understand that the Top 20 plan was part of the impetus for creating CED.  Can 
you tell me if/how it has influenced any investments? 
5. From an administrative perspective, I understand that the explicit expectations 
for UKCED were job creation. Is that a consideration for the investment group, 
as well? 
6. Are you familiar with any of the results of investments, in terms of job creation? 
a. Tech jobs 
b. Mid-level 
c. Entry-level 
7. Have expectations/processes changed now that UK has a new president/has made 
administrative changes? 
8. The successes of technopoles like Route 128, Silicon Valley & Research 
Triangle are relatively well known. As the investment process has developed, did 
other institutions serve as models/influences for your decisions? 
9. What would you consider some of the major accomplishments/outcomes 
associated with the Bluegrass Angels and UKCED-what factors influenced those 
outcomes?  
10. I assume that there have also been challenges to the achievement of these goals. 
Could you talk to me about some of the hurdles investors have faced? What 
factors would you attribute to these challenges? 
11. What are the qualities/characteristics that you find attractive in a start up-in terms 
of investment? 
12. What are the qualities/characteristics that are less appealing for a start up-in 
terms of investment? 
13. Re Spinoff Sample: What can you tell me about Case(s) x, y, & z? 
14. Are you aware of any additional individuals I could speak with or documents I 
could review to shed further light on our discussion? 
 
*During the interview, follow up questions to clarify responses or further explore 
respondents’ statements may be utilized. The oral history script for this study is 
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purposely broad and flexible for two reasons. First, it seeks to obtain the unique 
experiences of individuals’ involvement in these processes through broad, 
extensive, and interpretive answers. Second, as an exploratory and descriptive 
study, it seeks to elicit information that may not be available in the current 
research literature. Using examples for reference, as opposed to offering 
choices/options for responses, allows new information to surface, when 
applicable. 
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Appendix H: Basic Interview Script for Technology Transfer Personnel 
 
Oral History Interview Script for Departmental Personnel-UK Office of 
Commercialization & Economic Development/Technology Transfer* 
 
Provide Informed Consent for Signature & ask again for permission to record 
 
1. Describe purpose of study. 
2. I understand that the Top 20 plan was part of the impetus for creating this office.  
Can you tell me if/how the Top 20 plan influenced the development of your 
office? 
3. From an administrative perspective, what are the explicit expectations for 
UKCED? Have you noticed/had any experiences with informal/implicit 
expectations? 
4. Have expectations or operations changed now that UK has a new president/has 
made administrative changes? 
5. What do you consider some of the major accomplishments/outcomes associated 
IP development? 
6. I assume that there have also been challenges to the achievement of these goals. 
Could you talk to me about some of the hurdles your office has faced? What 
factors could be attributed to them? 
7. The successes of technopoles like Route 128, Silicon Valley & Research 
Triangle are relatively well known. As the TT office has developed, did other 
institutions serve as models for the organization? 
8. We’ve reviewed major accomplishments and challenges. Reflecting upon those, 
have you found the need to revise some of your original strategies or 
expectations for UKCED, or your position in particular?  
9. Re Spinoff Sample: What can you tell me about Case(s) x, y, & z? 
10. Are you aware of any documents I could review or individuals I could speak 
with that could shed further light on our discussion?  
 
*During the interview, follow up questions to clarify responses or further explore 
respondents’ statements may be utilized. The oral history script for this study is purposely 
broad and flexible for two reasons. First, it seeks to obtain the unique experiences of 
individuals’ involvement in these processes through broad, extensive, and interpretive 
answers. Second, as an exploratory and descriptive study, it seeks to elicit information 
that may not be available in the current research literature. Using examples for 
reference, as opposed to offering choices/options for responses, allows new information 
to surface, when applicable. 
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Appendix I: Basic Interview Script for USO Personnel 
Oral History Interview Script for USO Personnel* 
 
Provide Informed Consent for Signature & ask again for permission to record 
 
1. Describe purpose of study. 
2. I’d like to start by learning more about how you came to be in this position. I’ve 
reviewed your biosketch (if applicable), but can you tell me briefly about your 
background and how you came to be in this position? 
3. The backgrounds of innovations are often unique. Can you tell me about the 
research that led to this discovery? 
4. What was the IP disclosure process like? What interactions did you have with 
UKCED staff? 
5. What processes have occurred during the development stage, thus far? For 
example, with whom have you interacted, what have been your impressions of 
interactions with the technology transfer office? 
6. What interactions, if any, have you had with the Angels and other investors? 
7. What do you consider some of the major accomplishments/outcomes associated 
with the spinoff process, thus far? What factors would you attribute to them? 
8. I assume that there have also been challenges related to the spinoff process. 
Could you talk to me about some of the hurdles you have faced? As with 
accomplishments, what factors would you attribute to them? 
9. Are you aware of any documents I could review or individuals I could speak 
with that could shed further light on our discussion?  
 
*During the interview, follow up questions to clarify responses or further explore 
respondents’ statements may be utilized. The oral history script for this study is 
purposely broad and flexible for two reasons. First, it seeks to obtain the unique 
experiences of individuals’ involvement in these processes through broad, 
extensive, and interpretive answers. Second, as an exploratory and descriptive 
study, it seeks to elicit information that may not be available in the current 
research literature. Using examples for reference, as opposed to offering 
choices/options for responses, allows new information to surface, when 
applicable. 
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